How to avoid a double-dip recession in the eurozone. CEPS Commentary, 15 November 2012

This CEPS Commentary argues that the way in which the burden of adjustment to the imbalances in the eurozone is borne almost exclusively by the deficit countries in the periphery produces a deflationary bias in the region as a whole. Against the threat of double-dip recession, Paul De Grauwe asserts that the adjustment could be done differently and calls for implementation of a more symmetric macroeconomic policy that reduces the deflationary bias.

Smart choices for growth. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/21, November 2012

Recovery in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain is held back in part by structural barriers. Overcoming these requires structural reform and public investment. Given the limited availability of political and financial capital, prioritising reform efforts and spending is important, but difficult. The different success factors for individual sectors are complementary. Using the example of the high-tech industry, we make the case that only investing in one success factor (eg broadband infrastructure) without having a sufficient endowment of others (eg education) is unlikely to make the sector successful. One consequence of the complementarity of the different success factors is that public investment and reform efforts should be fine-tuned in order to match the endowment of other factors. This might imply an increase in efforts to tackle several structural barriers at the same time, but it might also imply reducing investment in less promising fields. This in turn requires strategic thinking about whether it is worthwhile pursuing development strategies that require investment in many success factors but that do not promise much success. Such a strategic approach to public investment and reform efforts might make the allocation of scarce public financial and political capital more efficient.

A budget for Europe's Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22, December 2012

In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget (1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe recessions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability. The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral, avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output from potential appears to be the best option. A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank resolution authority. Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for stabilisation policy and financial stability.

The false promise of a eurozone budget. CEPS Commentary, 7 December 2012

n this new CEPS commentary, CEPS Director Daniel Gros takes a closer look at the US experience to point out that the federal budget provides much less insurance against state specific shocks than widely assumed, while the US Banking Union act as a very powerful shock absorber. Accordingly, he argues that the euro’s long-term stability depends far more on completing plans for a European banking union than on the introduction of a fiscal capacity for the eurozone.

Private long-term investment in uncertain times. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/23, December 2012

The economic and financial crisis in Europe is affecting the financing of long-term infrastructure investment. There are multiple clearly identifiable channels: reduced demand for long-term investment, a tightening prudential framework for lending, upward adjustment of risk perception, complex transition of the financial system, and increasing macroeconomic, sovereign and regulatory risk. Some of the identified channels are potentially dangerous spillovers from the crisis that entail the risk of a downward spiral (eg increasing regulatory risk), while others are efficient market responses (eg reduced investment demand, correction of pricing of risk). Consequently, public policy instruments should not address the accessibility of long-term finance per se, but should explicitly target the critical channels.

Monetary policy and banking supervision: coordination instead of separation. CEPS Policy Brief No. 286, 12 December 2012

Introduction. Following the June 2012 European Council decision to place the ‘Single Supervisory Mechanism’ (SSM) within the European Central Bank, the general presumption in the policy discussions has been that there should be ‘Chinese walls’ between the supervisory and monetary policy arms of the ECB. The current legislative proposal, in fact, is explicit on this account. On the contrary, however, this paper finds that there is no need to impose a strict separation between these two functions. The authors argue, in fact, that a strict separation of supervision and monetary policy is not even desirable during a financial crisis when the systemic stability of the financial system represents the biggest threat to a monetary policy that aims at price stability. In their view, the key problem hampering the ECB today is that it lacks detailed information on the state of health of the banking system, which is often highly confidential. Chinese walls would not solve this problem. Moreover, in light of the fact that the new, proposed Supervisory Board will be composed to a large extent of representatives of the same institutions that also dominate the Governing Council, the paper finds that it does not make sense to have Chinese walls between two boards with largely overlapping memberships. In addition, it recommends that some members of the Supervisory Boards should be “independents” in order to reduce the tendency of supervisors to unduly delay the recognition of losses.

Why is the Greek economy collapsing? A simple tale of high multipliers and low exports. CEPS Commentary, 21 December 2012

In an attempt to understand why the Greek economy is collapsing, this Commentary points out two key aspects that are often overlooked – the country’s large multiplier and a bad export performance. When combined with the need for a large fiscal adjustment, these factors help explain how fiscal consolidation in Greece has been associated with such a large drop in GDP.

Flexible rules cum constrained discretion: a new consensus in monetary policy

This paper demonstrates that recent influential contributions to monetary policy imply an emerging consensus whereby neither rigid rules nor complete discretion are found optimal. Instead, middle-ground monetary regimes based on rules (operative under 'normal' circumstances) to anchor inflation expectations over the long run, but designed with enough flexibility to mitigate the short-run effect of shocks (with communicated discretion in 'exceptional' circumstances temporarily overriding these rules), are gaining support in theoretical models and policy formulation and implementation. The opposition of 'rules versus discretion' has, thus, reappeared as the synthesis of 'rules cum discretion', in essence as inflation-forecast targeting. But such synthesis is not without major theoretical problems, as we argue in this contribution. Furthermore, the very recent real-world events have made it obvious that the inflation targeting strategy of monetary policy, which rests upon the new consensus paradigm in modern macroeconomics is at best a 'fair weather' model. In the turbulent economic climate of highly unstable inflation, deep financial crisis and world-wide, abrupt economic slowdown nowadays this approach needs serious rethinking to say the least, if not abandoning it altogether

Flight to quality? An investigation of the attributes of sold properties in hot and cold markets

This paper uses sales transaction data in order to examine whether flight from risk phenomena took place in the US office property investment market during the financial crisis of 2007-2009. The effect of the crisis on the pricing of property quality attributes, mainly summarized by the class category of each building, is investigated. In addition, the paper examines how turnover levels were affected by the market downturn and whether there were significant variations between different real estate quality types. The results of the hedonic regression models suggest that the price spread between Class, A, B and C grew significantly during the downturn. We also find that property attributes such as size, height and age are priced significantly different in ‘hot’ and ‘cold’ markets.

The basis of valuations for secured commercial property lending in the UK

In the context of the financial crash and the commercial property market downturn, this paper examines the basis of valuation used in the UK commercial property lending process. Post-crisis there is discussion of countercyclical measures including the monitoring of asset prices; however there is no consideration of a different approach to property valuation. This paper questions this omission, given the role that valuations play in the bank regulatory process. The different bases of valuation available to lenders within International Valuation Standards are identified as Market Value (MV), Mortgage Lending Value (MLV) and Investment Value (IV), with MV being the most used in the UK. Using the different bases in the period before the financial crisis, the UK property market is modelled at a national office, retail and industrial/warehouse sector level to determine the performance of each alternative valuation basis within the context of counter-cyclical pressures on lending. Both MLV and IV would have produced lower valuations and could have provided lenders with tools for more informed and prudent lending. The paper concludes by recognising some of the practical issues involved in adopting the different bases for the bank lending role but recommends a change to IV.

Developing “Best Practices” for bankers’ pay in line with Basel III

This paper proposes hybrid capital securities as a significant part of senior bank executive incentive compensation in light of Basel III, a new global regulatory standard on bank capital adequacy and liquidity agreed by the members of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision. The committee developed Basel III in a response to the deficiencies in financial regulation brought about by the global financial crisis. Basel III strengthens bank capital requirements and introduces new regulatory requirements on bank liquidity and bank leverage. The hybrid bank capital securities we propose for bank executives’ compensation are preferred shares and subordinated debt that the June 2004 Basel II regulatory framework recognised as other admissible forms of capital. The past two decades have witnessed dramatic increase in performance-related pay in the banking industry. Stakeholders such as shareholders, debtholders and regulators criticise traditional cash and equity-based compensation for encouraging bank executives’ excessive risk taking and short-termism, which has resulted in the failure of risk management in high profile banks during the global financial crisis. Paying compensation in the form of hybrid bank capital securities may align the interests of executives with those of stakeholders and help banks regain their reputation for prudence after years of aggressive risk-taking. Additionally, banks are desperately seeking to raise capital in order to bolster balance sheets damaged by the ongoing credit crisis. Tapping their own senior employees with large incentive compensation packages may be a viable additional source of capital that is politically acceptable in times of large-scale bailouts of the financial sector and economically wise as it aligns the interests of the executives with the need for a stable financial system.

Performance drivers of UK unlisted property funds

An unlisted property fund is a private investment vehicle which aims to provide direct property total returns and may also employ financial leverage which will accentuate performance. They have become a far more prevalent institutional property investment conduit since the early 2000’s. Investors have been primarily attracted to them due to the ease of executing a property exposure, both domestically and internationally, and for their diversification benefits given the capital intensive nature of constructing a well diversified commercial property investment portfolio. However, despite their greater prominence there has been little academic research conducted on the performance and risks of unlisted property fund investments. This can be attributed to a paucity of available data and limited time series where it exists. In this study we have made use of a unique dataset of institutional UK unlisted non-listed property funds over the period 2003Q4 to 2011Q4, using a panel modelling framework in order to determine the key factors which impact on fund performance. The sample provided a rich set of unlisted property fund factors including market exposures, direct property characteristics and the level of financial leverage employed. The findings from the panel regression analysis show that a small number of variables are able to account for the performance of unlisted property funds. These variables should be considered by investors when assessing the risk and return of these vehicles. The impact of financial leverage upon the performance of these vehicles through the recent global financial crisis and subsequent UK commercial property market downturn was also studied. The findings indicate a significant asymmetric effect of employing debt finance within unlisted property funds.

Sharing power? Prospects for a U.S. concert-balance strategy

The Pax Americana and the grand strategy of hegemony (or “Primacy”) that underpins it may be becoming unsustainable. Particularly in the wake of exhausting wars, the Global Financial Crisis, and the shift of wealth from West to East, it may no longer be possible or prudent for the United States to act as the unipolar sheriff or guardian of a world order. But how viable are the alternatives, and what difficulties will these alternatives entail in their design and execution? This analysis offers a sympathetic but critical analysis of alternative U.S. National Security Strategies of “retrenchment” that critics of American diplomacy offer. In these strategies, the United States would anticipate the coming of a more multipolar world and organize its behavior around the dual principles of “concert” and “balance,” seeking a collaborative relationship with other great powers, while being prepared to counterbalance any hostile aggressor that threatens world order. The proponents of such strategies argue that by scaling back its global military presence and its commitments, the United States can trade prestige for security, shift burdens, and attain a more free hand. To support this theory, they often look to the 19th-century concert of Europe as a model of a successful security regime and to general theories about the natural balancing behavior of states. This monograph examines this precedent and measures its usefulness for contemporary statecraft to identify how great power concerts are sustained and how they break down. The project also applies competing theories to how states might behave if world politics are in transition: Will they balance, bandwagon, or hedge? This demonstrates the multiple possible futures that could shape and be shaped by a new strategy. viii A new strategy based on an acceptance of multipolarity and the limits of power is prudent. There is scope for such a shift. The convergence of several trends—including transnational problems needing collaborative efforts, the military advantages of defenders, the reluctance of states to engage in unbridled competition, and hegemony fatigue among the American people—means that an opportunity exists internationally and at home for a shift to a new strategy. But a Concert-Balance strategy will still need to deal with several potential dilemmas. These include the difficulty of reconciling competitive balancing with cooperative concerts, the limits of balancing without a forward-reaching onshore military capability, possible unanticipated consequences such as a rise in regional power competition or the emergence of blocs (such as a Chinese East Asia or an Iranian Gulf), and the challenge of sustaining domestic political support for a strategy that voluntarily abdicates world leadership. These difficulties can be mitigated, but they must be met with pragmatic and gradual implementation as well as elegant theorizing and the need to avoid swapping one ironclad, doctrinaire grand strategy for another.

Forecasting by factors, by variables, by both or neither?

We consider forecasting with factors, variables and both, modeling in-sample using Autometrics so all principal components and variables can be included jointly, while tackling multiple breaks by impulse-indicator saturation. A forecast-error taxonomy for factor models highlights the impacts of location shifts on forecast-error biases. Forecasting US GDP over 1-, 4- and 8-step horizons using the dataset from Stock and Watson (2009) updated to 2011:2 shows factor models are more useful for nowcasting or short-term forecasting, but their relative performance declines as the forecast horizon increases. Forecasts for GDP levels highlight the need for robust strategies, such as intercept corrections or differencing, when location shifts occur as in the recent financial crisis.