Studying membrane trafficking in the worm C. elegans by RNA interference

A powerful approach to gain understanding of molecular machinery responsible for membrane trafficking is through inactivation of gene function by RNA interference (RNAi). RNAi-mediated gene silencing occurs when a double-stranded RNA is introduced into cells and targets a complementary mRNA for degradation. The subsequent lack of mRNA prevents the synthesis of the corresponding protein and ultimately causes depletion of a particular gene product from the cell. The effects of such depletion can then by analyzed by functional, morphological, and biochemical assays. RNAi-mediated knockdowns of numerous gene products in cultured cells of mammalian and other species origins have provided significant new insight into traffic regulation and represent standard approaches in current cell biology. However, RNAi in the multicellular nematode Caenorhabditis elegans model allows RNAi studies within the context of a whole organism, and thus provides an unprecedented opportunity to explore effects of specific trafficking regulators within the context of distinct developmental stages and diverse cell types. In addition, various transgenic C. elegans strains have been developed that express marker proteins tagged with fluorescent proteins to facilitate the analysis of trafficking within the secretory and endocytic pathways. This chapter provides a detailed description of a basic RNAi approach that can be used to analyze the function of any gene of interest in secretory and endosomal trafficking in C. elegans. © 2013 Elsevier Inc.

Molecular identification of 26 syntaxin genes and their assignment to the different trafficking pathways in Paramecium

SNARE proteins have been classified as vesicular (v)- and target (t)-SNAREs and play a central role in the various membrane interactions in eukaryotic cells. Based on the Paramecium genome project, we have identified a multigene family of at least 26 members encoding the t-SNARE syntaxin (PtSyx) that can be grouped into 15 subfamilies. Paramecium syntaxins match the classical build-up of syntaxins, being 'tail-anchored' membrane proteins with an N-terminal cytoplasmic domain and a membrane-bound single C-terminal hydrophobic domain. The membrane anchor is preceded by a conserved SNARE domain of approximately 60 amino acids that is supposed to participate in SNARE complex assembly. In a phylogenetic analysis, most of the Paramecium syntaxin genes were found to cluster in groups together with those from other organisms in a pathway-specific manner, allowing an assignment to different compartments in a homology-dependent way. However, some of them seem to have no counterparts in metazoans. In another approach, we fused one representative member of each of the syntaxin isoforms to green fluorescent protein and assessed the in vivo localization, which was further supported by immunolocalization of some syntaxins. This allowed us to assign syntaxins to all important trafficking pathways in Paramecium.

The MK2/3 cascade regulates AMPAR trafficking and cognitive flexibility

The interplay between long-term potentiation and long-term depression (LTD) is thought to be involved in learning and memory formation. One form of LTD expressed in the hippocampus is initiated by the activation of the group 1 metabotropic glutamate receptors (mGluRs). Importantly, mGluRs have been shown to be critical for acquisition of new memories and for reversal learning, processes that are thought to be crucial for cognitive flexibility. Here we provide evidence that MAPK-activated protein kinases 2 and 3 (MK2/3) regulate neuronal spine morphology, synaptic transmission and plasticity. Furthermore, mGluR-LTD is impaired in the hippocampus of MK2/3 double knockout (DKO) mice, an observation that is mirrored by deficits in endocytosis of GluA1 subunits. Consistent with compromised mGluR-LTD, MK2/3 DKO mice have distinctive deficits in hippocampal-dependent spatial reversal learning. These novel findings demonstrate that the MK2/3 cascade plays a strategic role in controlling synaptic plasticity and cognition. © 2014 Macmillan Publishers Limited. All rights reserved.

Crustacean plankton abundance in the Danube River and in its side arms in Hungary

The spatial distribution and seasonal dynamics of the crustacean zooplankton were studied in the Danube River and in its side arms near Budapest, Hungary. Microcrustaceans were sampled biweekly from October 2006 to November 2007 at eleven sites. Thermocyclops crassus, Moina micrura and Bosmina longirostris added up to 57.6% of the total density. Comparisons of the different water bodies stressed the separation of the eupotamal and parapotamal side arms. Densities in the side arms were one respectively two orders of magnitude higher as compared to the main channel, which was relatively poor in plankton. There were remarkable longitudinal and transversal variations in the abundance of the major zooplankton groups (cladocerans, adult copepods, copepodites, nauplii) and dominant species (t-test, P < 0.05). However, no general pattern was observed, the spatial distribution depended on the examined objects. There were statistically significant seasonal differences in zooplankton abundance (Tukey-test, P < 0.05). Water residence time and water discharge were not found to be related to zooplankton abundance, but water temperature was positively correlated with microcrustacean density.

Political economy of Caribbean drug trafficking: The case of the Dominican Republic

The purpose of this dissertation was to examine the relationship between narcotics trafficking and the processes of economic liberalization and democratization in the Caribbean. The salient social, political and economic processes were explored at each juncture of the drug trafficking chain to determine why certain groups and locales became integrated in the global narcotics economy. It also considered the national security implications of the global narcotics economy. ^ The Global Commodity Chain framework allowed the study to examine the social, political and economic processes that determine how a commodity is produced, transported, distributed and consumed in the global economy. A case study method was used to specify the commodity (cocaine) and locations (U.S. and Dominican Republic) where these processes were examined. ^ The important contributing factors in the study included: a liberalizing global economy, the social processes of migration, the formation of enclaves in the U.S., the opening of the political process and institutional weakness in the country of origin. All of these factors contributed to the Dominican Republic and Dominican migrants becoming key players in the cocaine commodity chain. It concluded that narcotics trafficking as a national security issue remains a fluid concept, contingent on specific cultural and historic antecedents. ^

Against small arms: An analysis of an international network

Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW) proliferation was undertaken by the Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) as the next important issue in international relations after the success of the International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL). This dissertation focuses on the reasons why the issue of SALW resulted in an Action Program rather than an international convention. Thus, this result was considered as unsuccessful by the advocates of regulating the illicit trade in SALW. The study provides a social movement theoretical approach, using framing, political opportunity and network analysis to explain why the advocates of regulating the illicit trade in SALW did no succeed in their goals. The UN is taken as the arena in which NGOs, States and International Governmental Organizations (IGOs) discussed the illicit trade in SALW. ^ The findings of the study indicate that the political opportunity for the issue of SALW was not ideal. The network of NGOs, States and IGOs was not strong. The NGOs advocating regulation of SALW were divided over the approach of the issue and were part of different coalitions with differing objectives. Despite initial widespread interest among States, only a couple of States were fully committed to the issue till the end. The regional IGOs approached the issue based on their regional priorities and were less interested in an international covenant. The advocates of regulating illicit trade in SALW attempted to frame SALW as a humanitarian issue rather than as a security issue. Thus they were not able to use frame alignment to convince states to treat SALW as a humanitarian issue. In conclusion it can be said that all three items, framing, political opportunity and the network, play a role in the lack of success of advocates for regulating the illicit trade in SALW. ^

Gender, identity, and the security state: The politics of international drug trafficking

This dissertation examined how United States illicit drug control policy, often commonly referred to as the "war on drugs," contributes to the reproduction of gendered and racialized social relations. Specifically, it analyzed the identity producing practices of United States illicit drug control policy as it relates to the construction of U.S. identities. ^ Drawing on the theoretical contributions of feminist postpositivists, three cases of illicit drug policy practice were discussed. In the first case, discourse analysis was employed to examine recent debates (1986-2005) in U.S. Congressional Hearings about the proper understanding of the illicit drug "threat." The analysis showed how competing policy positions are tied to differing understandings of proper masculinity and the role of policymakers as protectors of the national interest. Utilizing critical visual methodologies, the second case examined a public service media campaign circulated by the Office of National Drug Control Policy that tied the "war on drugs" with another security concern in the U.S., the "war on terror." This case demonstrated how the media campaign uses messages about race, masculinity, and femininity to produce privileged notions of state identity and proper citizenship. The third case examined the gendered politics of drug interdiction at the U.S. border. Using qualitative research methodologies including semi-structured interviews and participant observation, it examined how gender is produced through drug interdiction at border sites like Miami International Airport. By paying attention to the discourse that circulates about women drug couriers, it showed how gender is normalized in a national security setting. ^ What this dissertation found is that illicit drug control policy takes the form it does because of the politics of gender and racial identity and that, as a result, illicit drug policy is implicated in the reproduction of gender and racial inequities. It concluded that a more socially conscious and successful illicit drug policy requires an awareness of the gendered and racialized assumptions that inform and shape policy practices.^

Illicit interest groups: The political impact of the Medellin drug trafficking organizations in Colombia

Although drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) exist and have an effect on health, crime, economies, and politics, little research has explored these entities as political organizations. Legal interest groups and movements have been found to influence domestic and international politics because they operate within legal parameters. Illicit groups, such as DTOs, have rarely been accounted for—especially in the literature on interest groups—though they play a measurable role in affecting domestic and international politics in similar ways. Using an interest group model, this dissertation analyzed DTOs as illicit interest groups (IIGs) to explain their political influence. The analysis included a study of group formation, development, and demise that examined IIG motivation, organization, and policy impact. The data for the study drew from primary and secondary sources, which include interviews with former DTO members and government officials, government documents, journalistic accounts, memoirs, and academic research. To illustrate the interest group model, the study examined Medellin-based DTO leaders, popularly known as the "Medellin Cartel." In particular, the study focused on the external factors that gave rise to DTOs in Colombia and how Medellin DTOs reacted to the implementation of counternarcotics efforts. The discussion was framed by the implementation of the 1979 Extradition Treaty negotiated between Colombia and the United States. The treaty was significant because as drug trafficking became the principal bilateral issue in the 1980s; extradition became a major method of combating the illicit drug business. The study's findings suggested that Medellin DTO leaders had a one-issue agenda and used a variety of political strategies to influence public opinion and all three branches of government—the judicial, the legislative, and the executive—in an effort to invalidate the 1979 Extradition Treaty. The changes in the life cycle of the 1979 Extradition Treaty correlated with changes in the political power of Medellin-based DTOs vis-à-vis the Colombian government, and international forces such as the U.S. government's push for tougher counternarcotics efforts.

Latin America and the Caribbean in 2011 and Beyond: A conversation among Latin America and Caribbean Specialists.

For the first time in more than fifty years, the domestic and external conflicts in Latin America and the Caribbean (LAC) are not primarily ideological in nature. Democracy continues to thrive and its promise still inspires hope. In contrast, the illegal production, consumption, and trading of drugs – and its links to criminal gangs and organizations – represent major challenges to the region, undermining several States’ already weak capacity to govern. While LAC macroeconomic stability has remained resilient, illegal economies fill the region, often offering what some States have not historically been able to provide – elements of human security, opportunities for social mobility, and basic survival. Areas controlled by drug trafficking organizations (DTOs) are now found in Central America, Mexico, and the favelas of Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo, reflecting their competition for land routes and production areas. Cartels such as La Familia, Los Zetas, and Primeiro Comando da Capital (PCC-Brazil), among others, operate like trade and financial enterprises that manage millions of dollars and resources, demonstrating significant business skills in adapting to changing circumstances. They are also merciless in their application of violence to preserve their lucrative enterprises. The El Salvador-Guatemala-Honduras triangle in Central America is now the most violent region in the world, surpassing regions in Africa that have been torn by civil strife for years. In Brazil’s favelas and Guatemala’s Petén region, the military is leaving the barracks again; not to rule, however, but to supplement and even replace the law enforcement capacity of weak and discredited police forces. This will challenge the military to apply lessons learned during the course of their experience in government, or from the civil wars that plagued the region for nearly 50 years during the Cold War. Will they be able to conduct themselves according to the professional ethics that have been inculcated over the past 20 years without incurring violations of human rights? Belief in their potential to do good is high according to many polls as the Armed Forces still enjoy a favorable perception in most societies, despite frequent involvement in corruption. Calling them to fight DTOs, however, may bring them too close to the illegal activities they are being asked to resist, or even rekindle the view that only a “strong hand” can resolve national troubles. The challenge of governance is occurring as contrasts within the region are becoming sharper. There is an increasing gap between nations positioned to surpass their “developing nation” status and those that are practically imploding as the judicial, political and enforcement institutions fall further into the quagmire of illicit activities. Several South American nations are advancing their political and economic development. Brazil in particular has realized macro-economic stability, made impressive gains in poverty reduction, and is on track to potentially become a significant oil producer. It is also an increasingly influential power, much closer to the heralded “emerging power” category that it aspired to for most of the 20th century. In contrast, several Central American States have become so structurally deficient, and have garnered such limited legitimacy, that their countries have devolved into patches of State controlled and non-State-controlled territory, becoming increasingly vulnerable to DTO entrenchment. In the Caribbean, the drug and human trafficking business also thrives. Small and larger countries are experiencing the growing impact of illicit economies and accompanying crime and violence. Among these, Guyana and Suriname face greater uncertainty, as they juggle both their internal affairs and their relations with Brazil and Venezuela. Cuba also faces new challenges as it continues focusing on internal rather than external affairs and attempts to ensure a stable leadership succession while simultaneously trying to reform its economy. Loosening the regime’s tight grip on the economy while continuing to curtail citizen’s civil rights will test the leadership’s ability to manage change and prevent a potential socio-economic crisis from turning into an existential threat. Cuba’s past ideological zest is now in the hands of Venezuela’s President Hugo Chavez, who continues his attempts to bring the region together under Venezuelan leadership ideologically based on a “Bolivarian” anti-U.S. banner, without much success. The environment and natural disasters will merit more attention in the coming years. Natural events will produce increasing scales of destruction as the States in the region fail to maintain and expand existing infrastructure to withstand such calamities and respond to their effects. Prospects for earthquakes, tsunamis, and hurricanes are high, particularly in the Caribbean. In addition, there are growing rates of deforestation in nearly every country, along with a potential increase in cross-sector competition for resources. The losers might be small farmers, due to their inability to produce quantities commensurate to larger conglomerates. Regulations that could mitigate these types of situations are lacking or openly violated with near impunity. Indigenous and other vulnerable populations, including African descendants, in several Andean countries, are particularly affected by the increasing extraction of natural resources taking place amongst their terrain. This has led to protests against extraction activities that negatively affect their livelihoods, and in the process, these historically underprivileged groups have transitioned from agenda-based organization to one that is bringing its claims and grievances to the national political agenda, becoming more politically engaged. Symptomatic of these social issues is the region’s chronically poor quality of education that has consistently failed to reduce inequality and prepare new generations for jobs in the competitive global economy, particularly the more vulnerable populations. Simultaneously, the educational deficit is also exacerbated by the erosion of access to information and freedom of the press. The international panorama is also in flux. New security entities are challenging the old establishment. The Union of South American Nations, The South American Defense Council, the socialist Bolivarian Alliance, and other entities seem to be defying the Organization of American States and its own defense mechanisms, and excluding the U.S. And the U.S.’s attention to areas in conflict, namely Iraq, Afghanistan, and Pakistan – rather than to the more stable Latin America and Caribbean – has left ample room for other actors to elbow in. China is now the top trading partner for Brazil. Russian and Iran are also finding new partnerships in the region, yet their links appear more politically inclined than those of China. Finally, the aforementioned increasing commercial ties by LAC States with China have accelerated a return to the preponderance of commodities as sources of income for their economies. The increased extraction of raw material for export will produce greater concern over the environmental impact that is created by the exploitation of natural resources. These expanded trade opportunities may prove counterproductive economically for countries in the region, particularly for Brazil and Chile, two countries whose economic policies have long sought diversification from dependence on commodities to the development of service and technology based industries.

Beyond the Pay: Current Illicit Activities of the Armed Forces in Central America

The growth of criminal gangs and organized crime groups has created unprecedented challenges in Central America. Homicide rates are among the highest in the world, countries spend on average close to 10 percent of GDP to respond to the challenges of public insecurity, and the security forces are frequently overwhelmed and at times coopted by the criminal groups they are increasingly tasked to counter. With some 90 percent of the 700 metric tons of cocaine trafficked from South America to the United States passing through Central America, the lure of aiding illegal traffickers through provision of arms, intelligence, or simply withholding or delaying the use of force is enormous. These conditions raise the question: to what extent are militaries in Central America compromised by illicit ties to criminal groups? The study focuses on three cases: Nicaragua, El Salvador, and Honduras. It finds that: Although illicit ties between the military and criminal groups have grown in the last decade, militaries in these countries are not yet “lost’ to criminal groups. Supplying criminal groups with light arms from military stocks is typical and on the rise, but still not common. In general the less exposed services, the navies and air forces, are the most reliable and effective ones in their roles in interdiction. Of the three countries in the study, the Honduran military is the most worrying because it is embedded in a context where civilian corruption is extremely common, state institutions are notoriously weak, and the political system remains polarized and lacks the popular legitimacy and political will needed to make necessary reforms. Overall, the armed forces in the three countries remain less compromised than civilian peers, particularly the police. However, in the worsening crime and insecurity context, there is a limited window of opportunity in which to introduce measures targeted toward the military, and such efforts can only succeed if opportunities for corruption in other sectors of the state, in particular in law enforcement and the justice system, are also addressed. Measures targeted toward the military should include: Enhanced material benefits and professional education opportunities that open doors for soldiers in promising legitimate careers once they leave military service. A clear system of rewards and punishments specifically designed to deter collusion with criminal groups. More effective securing of military arsenals. Skills and external oversight leveraged through combined operations, to build cooperation among those sectors of the military that have successful and clean records in countering criminal groups, and to expose weaker forces to effective best practices.

Innovating from the War Economy: Formal, Informal, and Illicit Economic Activities of the Military in Colombia

Over the last decade, the Colombian military has successfully rolled back insurgent groups, cleared and secured conflict zones, and enabled the extraction of oil and other key commodity exports. As a result, official policies of both the Uribe and Santos governments have promoted the armed forces to participate to an unprecedented extent in economic activities intended to consolidate the gains of the 2000s. These include formal involvement in the economy, streamlined in a consortium of military enterprises and social foundations that are intended to put the Colombian defense sector “on the map” nationally and internationally, and informal involvement expanded mainly through new civic action development projects intended to consolidate the security gains of the 2000s. However, failure to roll back paramilitary groups other than through the voluntary amnesty program of 2005 has facilitated the persistence of illicit collusion by military forces with reconstituted “neoparamilitary” drug trafficking groups. It is therefore crucially important to enhance oversight mechanisms and create substantial penalties for collusion with illegal armed groups. This is particularly important if Colombia intends to continue its new practice of exporting its security model to other countries in the region. The Santos government has initiated several promising reforms to enhance state capacity, institutional transparence, and accountability of public officials to the rule of law, which are crucial to locking in security gains and revitalizing democratic politics. Efforts to diminish opportunities for illicit association between the armed forces and criminal groups should complement that agenda, including the following: Champion breaking existing ties between the military and paramilitary successor groups through creative policies involving a mixture of punishments and rewards directed at the military; Investigation and extradition proceedings of drug traffickers, probe all possible ties, including as a matter of course the possibility of Colombian military collaboration. Doing so rigorously may have an important effect deterring military collusion with criminal groups. Establish and enforce zero-tolerance policies at all military ranks regarding collusion with criminal groups; Reward military units that are effective and also avoid corruption and criminal ties by providing them with enhanced resources and recognition; Rely on the military for civic action and development assistance as minimally as possible in order to build long-term civilian public sector capacity and to reduce opportunities for routine exposure of military forces to criminal groups circulating in local populations.

Consolidating Security and Development in Colombia: Lessons for Peru and Panama

Colombia's increasingly effective efforts to mitigate the power of the FARC and other illegitimately armed groups in the country can offer important lessons for the Peruvian government as it strives to prevent a resurgence of Sendero Luminoso and other illegal non-state actors. Both countries share certain particular challenges: deep economic, social, and in the case of Peru ethnic divisions, the presence of and/or the effects of violent insurgencies, a large-scale narcotics production and trafficking, and a history of weak state presence in large tracts of isolated and scarcely-populated areas. Important differences exist, however in the nature of the insurgencies in the two countries, the government response to them and the nature of government and society that affects the applicability of Colombia's experience to Peru. The security threat to Panama from drug trafficking and Colombian insurgents --often a linked phenomenon-- are in many ways different from the drug/insurgent factor in Colombia itself and in Peru, although there are similar variables. Unlike the Colombian and Peruvian cases, the security threat in Panama is not directed against the state, there are no domestic elements seeking to overthrow the government -- as the case of the FARC and Sendero Luminoso, security problems have not spilled over from rural to urban areas in Panama, and there is no ideological component at play in driving the threat. Nor is drug cultivation a major factor in Panama as it is in Colombia and Peru. The key variable that is shared among all three cases is the threat of extra-state actors controlling remote rural areas or small towns where state presence is minimal. The central lesson learned from Colombia is the need to define and then address the key problem of a "sovereignity gap," lack of legitimate state presence in many part of the country. Colombia's success in broadening the presence of the national government between 2002 and the presence is owed to many factors, including an effective national strategy, improvements in the armed forces and police, political will on the part of government for a sustained effort, citizen buy-in to the national strategy, including the resolve of the elite to pay more in taxes to bring change about, and the adoption of a sequenced approach to consolidated development in conflicted areas. Control of territory and effective state presence improved citizen security, strengthened confidence in democracy and the legitimate state, promoted economic development, and helped mitigate the effect of illegal drugs. Peru can benefit from the Colombian experience especially in terms of the importance of legitimate state authority, improved institutions, gaining the support of local citizens, and furthering development to wean communities away from drugs. State coordinated "integration" efforts in Peru as practiced in Colombia have the potential for success if properly calibrated to Peruvian reality, coordinated within government, and provided with sufficient resources. Peru's traditionally weak political institutions and lack of public confidence in the state in many areas of the country must be overcome if this effort is to be successful.

Altered Landscape or Arms Race? Making Sense of Military Spending in South America

In 2009, South American military spending reached a total of $51.8 billion, a fifty percent increased from 2000 expenditures. The five-year moving average of arms transfers to South America was 150 percent higher from 2005 to 2009 than figures for 2000 to 2004.[1] These figures and others have led some observers to conclude that Latin America is engaged in an arms race. Other reasons, however, account for Latin America’s large military expenditure. Among them: Several countries have undertaken long-prolonged modernization efforts, recently made possible by six years of consistent regional growth.[2] A generational shift is at hand. Armed Forces are beginning to shed the stigma and association with past dictatorial regimes.[3] Countries are pursuing specific individual strategies, rather than reacting to purchases made by neighbors. For example, Brazil wants to attain greater control of its Amazon rainforests and offshore territories, Colombia’s spending demonstrates a response to internal threats, and Chile is continuing a modernization process begun in the 1990s.[4] Concerns remain, however: Venezuela continues to demonstrate poor democratic governance and a lack of transparency; neighbor-state relations between Colombia and Venezuela, Peru and Chile, and Bolivia and Paraguay, must all continue to be monitored; and Brazil’s military purchases, although legitimate, will likely result in a large accumulation of equipment.[5] These concerns can be best addressed by strengthening and garnering greater participation in transparent procurement mechanism.[6] The United States can do its part by supporting Latin American efforts to embrace the transparency process. _________________ [1] Bromley, Mark, “An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and Implications of Military Expenditures in South America,” Brookings Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3rd, 2010, Transcript Pgs. 12,13, and 16 [2] Robledo, Marcos, “The Rearmament Debate: A Chilean Perspective,” Power Point presentation, slide 18, 2010 Western Hemisphere Security Colloquium, Miami, Florida, May 25th-26th, 2010 [3] Yopo, Boris, “¿Carrera Armamentista en la Regiόn?” La Tercera, November 2nd, 2009, http://www.latercera.com/contenido/895_197084_9.shtml, accessed October 8th, 2010 [4] Walser, Ray, “An Arms Race in Our Hemisphere? Discussing the Trends and Implications of Military Expenditures in South America,” Brookings Institution Conference, Washington, D.C., June 3rd, 2010, Transcript Pgs. 49,50,53 and 54 [5] Ibid., Guevara, Iñigo, Pg. 22 [6] Ibid., Bromley, Mark, Pgs. 18 and 19

Intracellular Signaling and Trafficking in Cancer: Role of Rab5-GTPase in Migration and Invasion of Breast Cells

Metastasis is characterized pathologically by uncontrolled cell invasion, proliferation, migration and angiogenesis. Steroid hormones, such as estrogen, and growth factors, which include insulin growth factor I/II (IGF-1/IGF-2) therapy has been associated with most if not all of the features of metastasis. It has been determined that IGF-1 increases cell survival of cancer cells and potentiate the effect of E2 and other ligand growth factors on breast cancer cells. However not much information is available that comprehensively expounds on the roles of insulin growth factor receptor (IGFR) and Rab GTPases may play in breast cancer. The latter, Rab GTPases, are small signaling molecules and critical in the regulation of many cellular processes including cell migration, growth via the endocytic pathway. This research involves the role of Rab GTPases, specifically Rab5 and its guanine exchange factors (GEFs), in the promotion of cancer cell migration and invasion. Two important questions abound: Are IGFR stimulation and downstream effect involved the endocytic pathway in carcinogenesis? What role does Rab5 play in cell migration and invasion of cancer cells? The hypothesis is that growth factor signaling is dependent on Rab5 activity in mediating the aggressiveness of cancer cells. The goal is to demonstrate that IGF-1 signaling is dependent on Rab5 function in breast cancer progression. Here, the results thus far, have shown that while activation of Rab5 may mediate increased cell proliferation, migration and invasion in breast cancer cells, the Rab5 GEF, RIN1 interacts with the IGFR thereby facilitating migration and invasion activities in breast cells. Furthermore, endocytosis of the IGFR in breast cancer cells seems to be caveolin dependent as the data has shown. This taken together, the data shows that IGF-1 signaling in breast cancer cells relies on IGF-1R phosphorylation, caveolae internalization and sequestration to the early endosome RIN1 function and Rab5 activation.