Catalogue of the books, manuscripts, maps and drawings in the British museum (Natural history) ....

v.4:P-SN (1913)

Design of biped robot walking with double-support phase

Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Fakultät für Maschinenbau, Univ., Dissertation, 2015

Tropical and subtropical fruits / by B. E. Dahlgren, Curator Emeritus, Dept. of Botany, Drawings by Albert Frey.

no.26(1947)

Functional design of the air ventilation apparatus and overland excurions by teleosts / Karel F. Liem.

n.s. no.37(1987)

Digging into history : a brief account of fifteen years of archaeological work in New Mexico / by Paul S. Martin, Chief Curator, Dept. of Anthropology ; drawings by Gustaf Dalstrom, Artist, Dept. of Anthropology.

no.38(1959)

Vegetable materia medica of the United States, or, Medical botany :containing a botanical, general, and medical history of medicinal plants indigenous to the United States. Illustrated by coloured engravings, made after drawings from nature, done by the author /by William P.C. Barton.

v. 1

Vegetable materia medica of the United States, or, Medical botany :containing a botanical, general, and medical history of medicinal plants indigenous to the United States. Illustrated by coloured engravings, made after drawings from nature, done by the author /by William P.C. Barton.

v. 2

On the design of peer punishment experiments

We discuss how technologies of peer punishment might bias the results that are observed in experiments. A crucial parameter is the “fine-to-fee” ratio, which describes by how much the punished subjects income is reduced relatively to the fee the punishing subject has to pay to inflict punishment. We show that a punishment technology commonly used in experiments embeds a variable fine-to-fee ratio and show that it confounds the empirical findings about why, whom, and how much subjects punish.

Competition with forward contracts: a laboratory analysis motivated by electricity market design

We use experiments to study the efficiency effects for a market as a whole of adding the possibility of forward contracting to a pre-existing spot market. We deal separately with the cases where spot market competition is in quantities and where it is in supply functions. In both cases we compare the effect of adding a contract market with the introduction of an additional competitor, changing the market structure from a triopoly to a quadropoly. We find that, as theory suggests, for both types of competition the introduction of a forward market significantly lowers prices. The combination of supply function competition with a forward market leads to high efficiency levels.