Reaction-diffusion lattice gas: Theory and computer results

We report on the study of nonequilibrium ordering in the reaction-diffusion lattice gas. It is a kinetic model that relaxes towards steady states under the simultaneous competition of a thermally activated creation-annihilation $(reaction$) process at temperature T, and a diffusion process driven by a heat bath at temperature T?T. The phase diagram as one varies T and T, the system dimension d, the relative priori probabilities for the two processes, and their dynamical rates is investigated. We compare mean-field theory, new Monte Carlo data, and known exact results for some limiting cases. In particular, no evidence of Landau critical behavior is found numerically when d=2 for Metropolis rates but Onsager critical points and a variety of first-order phase transitions.

Cooperation and game theory, free software or the #15m movement: Two examples for universities

Closing talk of the Open Access Week 2011 at the UOC, by Josep Jover. Why do altruistic strategies beat selfish ones in the spheres of both free software and the #15m movement? The #15m movement, like software but unlike tangible goods, cannot be owned. It can be used (by joining it) by an indeterminate number of people without depriving anyone else of the chance to do the same. And that turns everything on its head: how universities manage information and what their mission is in this new society. In the immediate future, universities will be valued not for the information they harbour, which will always be richer and more extensive beyond their walls, but rather for their capacity to create critical masses, whether of knowledge research, skill-building, or networks of peers... universities must implement the new model or risk becoming obsolete.

Reconstruction of the join time-delay Doppler-scale reflectivity density in the wide-band regime. A frame theory based approach

The inverse scattering problem concerning the determination of the joint time-delayDoppler-scale reflectivity density characterizing continuous target environments is addressed by recourse to the generalized frame theory. A reconstruction formula,involving the echoes of a frame of outgoing signals and its corresponding reciprocalframe, is developed. A ‘‘realistic’’ situation with respect to the transmission ofa finite number of signals is further considered. In such a case, our reconstruction formula is shown to yield the orthogonal projection of the reflectivity density onto a subspace generated by the transmitted signals.

Blind channel estimation and data detection using hidden Markov models theory

In this correspondence, we propose applying the hiddenMarkov models (HMM) theory to the problem of blind channel estimationand data detection. The Baum–Welch (BW) algorithm, which is able toestimate all the parameters of the model, is enriched by introducingsome linear constraints emerging from a linear FIR hypothesis on thechannel. Additionally, a version of the algorithm that is suitable for timevaryingchannels is also presented. Performance is analyzed in a GSMenvironment using standard test channels and is found to be close to thatobtained with a nonblind receiver.

Consumers' use of nutrition-related endorsement symbol to help their purchase decisions: An extension of the theory of planned behaviour

Tutkimuksessa haluttiin selvittää, mitkä tekijät vaikuttavat ravintoon liittyvän suositusmerkin käyttöön kuluttajan ostopäätöksen apuna. Tutkimuksen viitekehyksen pohjaksi valittiin suunnitellun toiminnan teoria, joka on osoittautunut selittämään hyvin useaa ravintoon- ja terveyteen liittyvää käyttäytymistä. Tutkimustoteutettiin kyselytutkimuksella, jonka aineisto kerättiin Internetissä julkaistulla kyselylomakkeella. Tulokset osoittivat, että kuluttajan aikomus käyttää suositusmerkkiä oli mallin vahvin selittäjä. Lisäksi merkin käyttöä selitti kuluttajan kokema sisäinen kontrolli, johon ulkoinen kontrolli vahvasti vaikuttaa. Ostopäätössitoutumisen havaittiin vaikuttavan aikomuksen ja todellisen merkin käytön väliseen yhteyteen. Yleisesti tulokset osoittivat, että kuluttajilla on aikomusta käyttää merkkiä, mutta todellinen käyttö on huomattavasti vähäisempää.

Analyzing dynamic intellectual capital: System-based theory and application

This research report presents an application of systems theory to evaluating intellectual capital (IC) as organization's ability for self-renewal. As renewal ability is a dynamic capability of an organization as a whole, rather than a static asset or an atomistic competence of separate individuals within the organization, it needs to be understood systemically. Consequently, renewal ability has to be measured with systemic methods that are based on a thorough conceptual analysis of systemic characteristics of organizations. The aim of this report is to demonstrate the theory and analysis methodology for grasping companies' systemic efficiency and renewal ability. The volume is divided into three parts. The first deals with the theory of organizations as self-renewing systems. In the second part, the principles of quantitative analysis of organizations are laid down. Finally, the detailed mathematics of the renewal indices are presented. We also assert that the indices produced by the analysis are an effective tool for the management and valuation of knowledge-intensive companies.

Scheduling an European basketball competition. An application of graph theory

The object of this project is to schedule a ctitious European basketball competition with many teams situated a long distances. The schedule must be fair, feasible and economical, which means that the total distance trav- eled by every team must be the minimal possible. First, we de ne the sport competition terminology and study di erent competition systems, focusing on the NBA and the Euroleague systems. Then we de ne concepts of graph theory and spherical distance that will be needed. Next we propose a com- petition system, explaining where will be allocated the teams and how will be the scheduling. Then there is a description of the programs that have been implemented, and, nally, the complete schedule is displayed, and some possible improvements are mentioned.

A game theoretical approach to the algebraic counterpart of the Wagner hierarchy

La hiérarchie de Wagner constitue à ce jour la plus fine classification des langages ω-réguliers. Par ailleurs, l'approche algébrique de la théorie de langages formels montre que ces ensembles ω-réguliers correspondent précisément aux langages reconnaissables par des ω-semigroupes finis pointés. Ce travail s'inscrit dans ce contexte en fournissant une description complète de la contrepartie algébrique de la hiérarchie de Wagner, et ce par le biais de la théorie descriptive des jeux de Wadge. Plus précisément, nous montrons d'abord que le degré de Wagner d'un langage ω-régulier est effectivement un invariant syntaxique. Nous définissons ensuite une relation de réduction entre ω-semigroupes pointés par le biais d'un jeu infini de type Wadge. La collection de ces structures algébriques ordonnée par cette relation apparaît alors comme étant isomorphe à la hiérarchie de Wagner, soit un quasi bon ordre décidable de largeur 2 et de hauteur ω. Nous exposons par la suite une procédure de décidabilité de cette hiérarchie algébrique : on décrit une représentation graphique des ω-semigroupes finis pointés, puis un algorithme sur ces structures graphiques qui calcule le degré de Wagner de n'importe quel élément. Ainsi le degré de Wagner de tout langage ω-régulier peut être calculé de manière effective directement sur son image syntaxique. Nous montrons ensuite comment construire directement et inductivement une structure de n''importe quel degré. Nous terminons par une description détaillée des invariants algébriques qui caractérisent tous les degrés de cette hiérarchie. Abstract The Wagner hierarchy is known so far to be the most refined topological classification of ω-rational languages. Also, the algebraic study of formal languages shows that these ω-rational sets correspond precisely to the languages recognizable by finite pointed ω-semigroups. Within this framework, we provide a construction of the algebraic counterpart of the Wagner hierarchy. We adopt a hierarchical game approach, by translating the Wadge theory from the ω-rational language to the ω-semigroup context. More precisely, we first show that the Wagner degree is indeed a syntactic invariant. We then define a reduction relation on finite pointed ω-semigroups by means of a Wadge-like infinite two-player game. The collection of these algebraic structures ordered by this reduction is then proven to be isomorphic to the Wagner hierarchy, namely a well-founded and decidable partial ordering of width 2 and height $\omega^\omega$. We also describe a decidability procedure of this hierarchy: we introduce a graph representation of finite pointed ω-semigroups allowing to compute their precise Wagner degrees. The Wagner degree of every ω-rational language can therefore be computed directly on its syntactic image. We then show how to build a finite pointed ω-semigroup of any given Wagner degree. We finally describe the algebraic invariants characterizing every Wagner degree of this hierarchy.

Field Sales Management Control: Towards a Multi-Level Theory

The purpose of this dissertation is to increase the understanding and knowledge of field sales management control systems (i.e. sales managers monitoring, directing, evaluating and rewarding activities) and their potential consequences on salespeople. This topic is important because research conducted in the past has indicated that the choice of control system type can on the other hand have desirable consequences, such as high levels of motivation and performance, and on the other hand leadto harmful unintended consequences, such as opportunistic or unethical behaviors. Despite the fact that marketing and sales management control systems have been under rigorous research for over two decades, it still is at a very early stage of development, and several inconsistencies can be found in the research results. This dissertation argues that these inconsistencies are mainly derived from misspecification of the level of analysis in the past research. These different levels of analysis (i.e. strategic, tactical, and operational levels) involve very different decision-making situations regarding the control and motivation of sales force, which should be taken into consideration when conceptualizing the control. Moreover, the study of salesperson consequences of a field sales management control system is actually a cross-level phenomenon, which means that at least two levels of analysis are simultaneously involved. The results of this dissertation confirm the need to re-conceptualize the field sales management control system concept. It provides empirical evidence for the assertion that control should be conceptualized with more details atthe tactical/operational level of analysis than at the strategic levelof analysis. Moreover, the results show that some controls are more efficiently communicated to field salespeople than others. It is proposed that this difference is due to different purposes of control; some controls aredesigned for influencing salespersons' behavior (aim at motivating) whereas some controls are designed to aid decision-making (aim at providing information). According to the empirical results of this dissertation, the both types of controls have an impact to the sales force, but this impactis not as strong as expected. The results obtained in this dissertation shed some light to the nature of field sales management control systems, and their consequences on salespeopl

A Theory of Representative Behavior in the Dictator Game

In this paper we present a model of representative behavior in the dictator game. Individuals have simultaneous and non-contradictory preferences over monetary payoffs, altruistic actions and equity concerns. We require that these behaviors must be aggregated and founded in principles of representativeness and empathy. The model results match closely the observed mean split and replicate other empirical regularities (for instance, higher stakes reduce the willingness to give). In addition, we connect representative behavior with an allocation rule built on psychological and behavioral arguments. An approach consistently neglected in this literature. Key words: Dictator Game, Behavioral Allocation Rules, Altruism, Equity Concerns, Empathy, Self-interest JEL classification: C91, D03, D63, D74.