Institutionen und Volksrechte

Mit der Wahl von Simonetta Sommaruga zur Bundespräsidentin sowie Claude Hêche zum Ständerats- und Stéphane Rossini zum Nationalratspräsidenten, werden 2015 die drei höchsten Ämter von der SP besetzt. - Verschiedene Skandale bei IT-Beschaffungen in der Bundesverwaltung führten zu Strafuntersuchungen und zahlreichen politischen Vorstössen. - 2014 wurden nicht weniger als elf neue Bundesparlamentarier vereidigt. - Verschiedene Geschäfte und der Rücktritt Christoph Blochers lösten eine Debatte über Miliz- vs. Berufsparlament aus. - Mit dem revidierten Bundesgesetz über die politischen Rechte werden die Sammelfristen bei Referenden nicht verlängert. - Angestossen von der SVP wird im Parlament über das Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und Landesrecht diskutiert; die Vorstösse der Volkspartei stossen auf Ablehnung. - Gegen E-Voting beginnt sich auch auf politischer Ebene leise Kritik zu regen.

Macroeconomics, economic crisis and electoral outcomes: A national European pool

An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an individual force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the hypothesis of economic voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing overall electoral outcomes, seems less sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at work, with the supposed individual economic vote effect not adding up to a national electoral effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty evidence linking macroeconomics and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a micrological fallacy through rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European nations. From these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. Further, this economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic crisis. Indeed, we show that economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater electoral effects than positive economic growth. Hard times clearly make governments more accountable to their electorates.

The economic voter and economic crisis

Theories of economic voting have a long tradition in political science and continue to inspire a large group of scholars. Classical economic voting theory assumes a reward-and-punishment mechanism (Key, 1966). This mechanism implies that incumbents are more likely to stay in power under a good economy, but are cast out under a bad economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). The economy has repeatedly been shown to be a major determinant of electoral behavior (see especially the recent book by Duch and Stevenson, 2008), but the current economic crisis seems to provide a marked illustration of how the economy affects voting. In recent elections across the Western industrialized world, most ruling coalitions lost their majority. Opposition parties, on the other hand, whether right wing or left wing, have appeared to benefit from the economic downturn.

Election Forecasting under Opaque Conditions

Election forecasting models assume retrospective economic voting and clear mechanisms of accountability. Previous research indeed indicates that incumbent political parties are being held accountable for the state of the economy. In this article we develop a ‘hard case’ for the assumptions of election forecasting models. Belgium is a multiparty system with perennial coalition governments. Furthermore, Belgium has two completely segregated party systems (Dutch and French language). Since the prime minister during the period 1974-2011 has always been a Dutch language politician, French language voters could not even vote for the prime minister, so this cognitive shortcut to establish political accountability is not available. Results of an analysis for the French speaking parties (1981-2010) show that even in these conditions of opaque accountability, retrospective economic voting occurs as election results respond to indicators with regard to GDP and unemployment levels. Party membership figures can be used to model the popularity function in election forecasting.

Punishing Local Incumbents for the Local Economy

After decennia of research on economic voting, it is now established that the state of the economy affects voting behaviour. Nevertheless, this conclusion is the result of a focus on predominantly national-level economies and national-level elections. In this paper, we show that at a local level as well, mechanisms of accountability linked to the economy are at work. The local economic context affected voting behaviour in the 2012 Belgian municipal elections, with a stronger increase of unemployment rates in their municipality significantly decreasing the probability that voters choose an incumbent party. Additionally, we observe that voters are not opportunistically voting for incumbents who lower tax rates. Instead, voters seem to be holding local incumbents accountable for local economic conditions. We hence conclude that voters care about economic outcomes, not about what specific policies are implemented to reach these outcomes.

1961 Commission on Civil Rights report.

Spine and cover title: 1961 United States Commission on Civil Rights report.

Thoughts on the ballot.

Mode of access: Internet.

The rise of professional proxy solicitors: Georgeson & Co. of Wall Street, et al.

Includes bibliography.

The influence of recent proxy contests on social and economic trends.

Mode of access: Internet.

Hinds' precedents of the House of representatives of the United States, including references to provisions of the Constitution, the laws, and decisions of the United States Senate.

v. 1. Organization, apportionment, qualifications, prima facie title, elections.--v. 2. Elections, members, speaker, prerogatives, contempts.--v. 3. Investigations, inquiries, electoral count, impeachments, privilege.-- v. 4. Quorurm, order of business, appropriation bills, committees, committee of the whole.--v. 5. Debate, motions, amendments, voting, conference.--v. 6-8. Index-digest ( A to G; H to P; Q-Z)

Absentee ballot legislation : hearing before the Subcommittee on Postal Operations and Services of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, second session ... March 13, 1980.

"Serial no. 96-77."

Statistical abstract for the United Kingdom.

Each no. contains statistics for each 15 preceding years.

Statistical abstract for the United Kingdom in each of the last fifteen years from ...

Each no. contains statistics for each of the 15 preceding years.

Updating on the Credences of Others: Disagreement, Agreement, and Synergy

We introduce a family of rules for adjusting one’s credences in response to learning the credences of others. These rules have a number of desirable features. 1. They yield the posterior credences that would result from updating by standard Bayesian conditionalization on one’s peers’ reported credences if one’s likelihood function takes a particular simple form. 2. In the simplest form, they are symmetric among the agents in the group. 3. They map neatly onto the familiar Condorcet voting results. 4. They preserve shared agreement about independence in a wide range of cases. 5. They commute with conditionalization and with multiple peer updates. Importantly, these rules have a surprising property that we call synergy — peer testimony of credences can provide mutually supporting evidence raising an individual’s credence higher than any peer’s initial prior report. At first, this may seem to be a strike against them. We argue, however, that synergy is actually a desirable feature and the failure of other updating rules to yield synergy is a strike against them.

Mixed-Member Electoral Systems in Constitutional Context : Taiwan, Japan, and Beyond /

After the electoral reform in 1994, Japan saw a gradual evolution from a multi-party system toward a two-party system over the course of five House of Representatives election cycles. In contrast, after Taiwan’s constitutional amendment in 2005, a two-party system emerged in the first post-reform legislative election in 2008. Critically, however, Taiwan’s president is directly elected while Japan’s prime minister is indirectly elected. The contributors conclude that the higher the payoffs of holding the executive office and the greater degree of cross-district coordination required to win it, the stronger the incentives for elites to form and stay in the major parties. In such a context, a country will move rapidly toward a two-party system. In Part II, the contributors apply this theoretical logic to other countries with mixed-member systems to demonstrate its generality. They find the effect of executive competition on legislative electoral rules in countries as disparate as Thailand, the Philippines, New Zealand, Bolivia, and Russia. The findings presented in this book have important implications for political reform. Often, reformers are motivated by high hopes of solving some political problems and enhancing the quality of democracy. But, as this group of scholars demonstrates, electoral reform alone is not a panacea. Whether and to what extent it achieves the advocated goals depends not only on the specification of new electoral rules per se but also on the political context—and especially the constitutional framework—within which such rules are embedded.