Aristotelian predicables, universality and realism: the logic of comparison in topics as denying the view that Aristotle was a realist

Aristotle is reportedly held to have been a Moderate Realist in that he would maintain that a concept derives from an act of grasping a mind-independent universal object that exists somehow inside of the many different things which the concept is predicated of. As far as a universal is independent of mind, it would stand for the proper object of a concept that subsumes a given number of things as its own instantiations. But we claim that Aristotle rejected such a view and instead did perceive and comprehend universality as a feature of thought rather than as a feature of reality in its own right. As showed in the chapters of Topics regarding the so-called logic of comparison (with the support of Albert the Great’s commentary), each predicate can be more or less consistent with the attribute of the subject of which it may be predicated. Both essential and accidental attributes assume a definite degree of being related to the degree of belonging to substance. Unlike particular things, the universality of a concept is to be understood always in comparison with another concept according to a hierarchy of predicates in terms of universality degree arranged by comparative terms such as ‘more’, ‘less’, and ‘likewise’. What is really mind-independent are the truth conditions which make a universal true when exclusively referring to a set of things identically meant by the same predicate whose universality is given by the place occupied in the hierarchy of predicates.

El uso aristotélico de variables en lógica y sus supuestos ontológicos

A logical reading on Aristotle’s Organon discovers some inconsistencies in the text which have to be solved by reducing them to metaphysical decisions of the author, if they are not just identified as deficiencies in the exposition that should be corrected. The present article tries to display a line of reading paying attention to those so-called inconsistencies, in an attempt to understand them as specific steps in Aristotle’s research. In order to this goal it focuses on the exposition procedure of the Aristotelian figures: the use of variables, whose introduction by Aristotle has been celebrated all over logical tradition. An analysis of the distinctive and internal features in this procedure will allow us to link Aristotle’s logos research and the “being qua being” investigation, and to determine also –though in a negative way– the connection between this reading and the logical-traditional one on Aristotle’s Organon.

A proposta (i)modesta de Berkeley. Um mundo sem matéria

Berkeley’s general tenet about immaterialism is presented and discussed. I examined apart the several theses that concur to the immaterialist theory. After that, the general argument is presented and discussed. In particular, I stress Berkeley’s assumption that a world without matter and a world with matter would be indistinguishable from the point of view of (i) the content of perceptions, (ii) natural science (viz. Newtonian mechanics). I stress that this assumption depends on a relative account of circular motion, generating the centrifugal forces, as Newton shows in his bucket experiment. In spite of the efforts by Leibniz and Huygens, such a relative account of rotational motion was never presented. So the thesis about the scientific and perceptual identity between worlds with and without matter remains a simple case of wishful thinking in need for a justification.

La distribución de la naturaleza humana en temperamentos. Modos de sentir y ejercicio de la libertad en la antropología en sentido pragmático de Kant

El artículo se ocupa de analizar la función que la noción kantiana de temperamento desempeña en el interior de la teoría de la libertad práctica. Para ello, se relacionará la exposición de Kant con el planteamiento clásico griego de los temperamentos, con la intención de reconocer en estas condiciones del modo en que sentimos el paso del tiempo y nos relacionamos con el mundo un presupuesto empírico-fisiológico del ejercicio de la propia libertad, que, sin llegar a ser moral, introduce contenidos que la razón sólo intentará reformar, sin tener derecho a eliminarlos enteramente. Con ello, nos proponemos obtener observaciones relevantes para responder suficientemente a la pregunta kantiana ¿qué es el hombre?

O conceito de Klugheit em Kant

This paper aims to analyze Kant’s concept of Klugheit and how it relates to morality. For Kant, this concept does not belong to the field of morality as it is, according to him, an interested act, therefore only capable of hypothetical imperatives. In this sense, prudence generates at most one’s own happiness, but not necessarily goodness. On the other hand, we reason that prudence plays an important role in promoting man’s moral improvement towards the exercise of virtue. Prudence only holds good, therefore, if understood from a Kantian anthropological point of view.

Opacidade e limite na antropologia de Helmuth Plessner

Le projet d’une Anthropologie Philosophique en tant que philosophie fondamentale defini par Helmuth Plessner, se base sur la catégorie d’excentricité: l’homme occupe une place à la fois centrée et décentrée, soit en tant qu’être au monde, soit dans le rapport à son corps, tantôt vécu comme identité personnelle, tantôt usé en tant qu’instrument. Cette dualité fondamentale de la condition humaine et de son existence dialectique mène à une compréhension de l’expressivité en tant que double. Ou bien l’expression suit une voie indicative (par le langage, les gestes et la mimique) quand l’homme est son corps, ou bien, quand le corps est usé en tant qu’instrument de réponse, l’expressivité devient opaque. L’article propose une lecture de ce point spécifique de la théorie de l’expression, thème central du livre de 1941, Rire et pleurer. Une étude des limites du comportement humain. Décrire la signification et le processus déclencheur du rire et du pleurer c’est donc saisir l’homme au sein même de son ambivalence.

El corte epistemológico en una teoría filosófica sobre la política

Se analiza aquí cómo la posición filosófica de Rawls implica un corte epistemológico con las concepciones clásicas que unían el contrato social a una determinada idea de hombre o de sociedad naturales. En su propuesta, la idea de justicia, en una sociedad, se establece con hombres razonables, con diversos bienes, que realizan libremente un pacto social, poseyendo iguales derechos políticos. Rawls prefiere no optar por la disyuntiva “libertad o igualdad”; sino por la opción enunciada como “libertad y justicia”. La igualdad no es un valor en sí mismo, sino dependiente de la idea de justicia; pero esta justicia desde le punto de vista social es una justicia política; esto es, constituida libremente por los socios, con iguales derechos, en un pacto. Se analiza su concepción no revolucionara para solucionar injusticias ya históricamente establecidas, sino progresiva, utilizando la libertad para avanzar hacia una igualdad justa.

Os livros filosóficos inacabados de Pessoa. Problemas e critérios para a publicação dos escritos filosóficos de Pessoa

O presente artigo debate o alcance filosófico da obra de Fernando Pessoa. Com efeito, no espólio de Pessoa encontramos inúmeros projectos destinados a futuros livros, ensaios, pequenas produções e diálogos filosóficos. Assim, partindo de uma análise dos documentos, em grande parte inéditos, do espólio de Pessoa, pretende demonstrar-se que a dimensão filosófica da obra deste autor se estende muito além dos ecos de leituras filosóficas presentes na sua poesia e nas suas ficções.

Il cielo stellato sopra di me e la legge morale in me. Osservazioni sul sublime e sulla logica dell’irrazionale in Kant

«Duas coisas enchem o ânimo de uma admiração e veneração sempre nova e tanto mais crescente quanto mais frequente e mais demoradamente a reflexão se ocupa delas: o céu estrelado acima de mim e a lei moral em mim.” Com estas famosíssimas palavras escritas no papel e incisas em pedra, Immanuel Kant conclui a Crítica da razão prática. No presente artigo pretendo mostrar como esta frase está estreitamente ligada: 1) à doutrina kantiana do sublime e 2) à fundação da lógica do irracional na Critica do Juízo.

DAS GESPRÄCH ZWISCHEN HÖLDERLIN, HEGEL UND SCHELLING ÜBER KANTS ANTINOMIEN

«Die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur mit ihrer Zweckmäßigkeit vereiniget, scheint mir eigentlich den ganzen Geist seines Systems zu enthalten»: This quotation, which originated the present essay, is solely extracted from a letter sent by Hölderlin to Hegel, and yet, it condensates three different approaches from the three Tübingen friends to the problem of Kant’s philosophy of religion and to its possible resolution between 1795 and 1796. From this epistolary dialogue emerges a simultaneous study of Kant, originated by the growing dissension towards the orthodox thought of the Stift. The turning point – or the maximum cumulative point – of this discordance happens precisely with the discovery of the «spirit of Kant’s system», as a combined explanation of the religious and philosophical phenomena [«Die Art, wie er den Mechanismus der Natur mit ihrer Zweckmässigkeit vereiniget»]. This, I think, is something which the three friends discover gradually and not independently from the concept of «providence», which Kant himself, according to Hölderlin, had used to «attenuate his antinomies», which Hegel uses in his first religious writings and the initial formation of his own philosophy and which Schelling will later explore in his System of Transcendental Idealism. In a word, providence is consensually the comprehension axis between man, God and nature and, thus, the explanatory link between the antinomical poles which regulate human existence. On the other hand, however – this being the aspect I would like to stress –, this decisive moment for a whole generation, for the history of philosophy itself, means the consummation of a new revolutionary perspective born in Kant, a new vision of the absolute and the divine and, therefore, a new way to write philosophy about philosophy, less philosophical than before, to the extent that the new situation of man and his reflection within the problem ultimately destined them – as is the case in the three young philosophers – to silence and death. The final aim of this essay is, therefore, to know what this «last step of philosophy» is and what dies along with it, what such a step may have meant and what it already foretold in terms of the development of philosophy.

David Harvey e Friedrich Nietzsche: Pós modernidade ou extemporaneidade

O artigo contrapõe a distinção entre uma eternidade imanente e uma eternidade transcendente ao conceito de compressão tempo-espaço de David Harvey, procurando mostrar que esse autor, a partir de uma análise nietzschiana de suas considerações acerca da condição pós-moderna, utiliza um aparato conceptual da tradição para avaliar essa condição. Situamos, assim, o conceito de compressão tempo-espaço harveyano em uma eternidade transcendente, consoante com a tradição, conforme a interpretação que seguimos a partir de Nietzsche.