Stability and manipulation in representative democracies

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdictions voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

The choice of banking firm: Are the interest rate a significant criteria?

The objective of the research is to know the factors that in Spain determine the choice of banking organization. The obtained results indicate that the dimension of the network of branches is the reason more valued. In spite of the increasing symmetry of the Spanish banking market, the preferences of the clients of the savings banks and those of the banks are not absolutely coincident, being the proximity - the main reason for election- much more valued by the former than by the latter. The existence of divergences in the preferences has also been detected according to the region and the typology of city of residence.

The Political Economy of Resource Rent Distribution

I model the link between political regime and level of diversification following a windfall of natural resource revenues. The explanatory variables I make use of are the political support functions embedded within each type of regime and the disparate levels of discretion, openness, transparency, and accountability of government. I show that a democratic government seeks to maximize the long-term consumption path of the representative consumer, in order to maximize its chances of re-election, while an authoritarian government, in the absence of any electoral mechanism of accountability, seeks to buy off and entrench a group of special interests loyal to the government and potent enough to ensure its short-term survival. Essentially the contrast in the approaches towards resource rent distribution comes down to a variation in political weights on aggregate welfare and rentierist special interests endogenized by distinct political support functions.

Inter-regional redistribution through infrastructure investment: tactical or programmatic?

In this paper we analyze the effects of both tactical and programmatic politics on the inter-regional allocation of infrastructure investment. We use a panel of data for the Spanish electoral districts during the period 1964-2004 to estimate an equation where investment depends both on economic and political variables. The results show that tactical politics do matter since, after controlling for economic traits, the districts with more ‘Political power’ still receive more investment. These districts are those where the incumbents’ Vote margin of victory/ defeat in the past election is low, where the Marginal seat price is low, where there is Partisan alignment between the executives at the central and regional layers of government, and where there are Pivotal regional parties which are influential in the formation of the central executive. However, the results also show that programmatic politics matter, since inter-regional redistribution (measured as the elasticity of investment to per capita income) is shown to increase with the arrival of the Democracy and EU Funds, with Left governments, and to decrease the higher is the correlation between a measure of ‘Political power’ and per capita income.

L'impacte dels sistemes multinivell en els sistemes de partits

Imaginemos que un observador quiere analizar el sistema político de los países de Europa Occidental. Si compara el sistema de partidos que hay a nivel nacional con los presentes en cada uno de los distritos de esta elección, apreciará notables diferencias entre países. Por ejemplo, si repara en Alemania, verá como los mismos cinco partidos presentes en el Bundestag compiten también en todos los distritos. Si por otra parte se fija en España, comprobará como en las Elecciones Generales españolas algunos partidos se presentan en todas las circunscripciones pero otros sólo lo hacen en una o en un puñado de ellas. Por lo tanto, mientras que en el primer caso tenemos que el sistema político nacional se reproduce de manera idéntica en cada distrito, en el segundo hay diferencias entre los partidos a nivel nacional y los presentes en determinados distritos. ¿Por qué existen estas divergencias? ¿Qué es lo que explica que esta situación sea estática o que cambie a lo largo del tiempo? En este anexo presento una memoria para justificar los principales avances en la investigación doctoral durante el periodo en que he disfrutado de la beca FI.

Italy's urban waste metabolism

The problem of waste management is causing growing concern due to increasing generation rates, the emissions into soil, water and air, the social conflicts derived from the election of disposal sites and the loss of resources and energy among others. In this work, an innovative methodology is used to enable a better understanding of the waste generation and management system in Italy. Two new waste indicators are built to complement the conventional indicators used by official statistics. Then a multi-scale analysis of the Density of Waste Disposed (DWD) is carried out to highlight the territorial diversity of waste performances and test its contribution to detect plausible risky areas. Starting from Italian regions, the scale down goes on to the provincial level and, only for the region of Campania, the municipal one. First, the analysis shows that the DWD is able to complement the information provided by the conventional waste indicators. Second, the analysis shows the limitations of using a unique institutional solution to waste management problems. In this sense the multi-scale analysis provides with a more realistic picture of Italian waste system than using a single scale.

A Political Agency Model of Coattail Voting

In this paper, I provide a formal justi…cation for a well-established coattail effect, when a popular candidate at one branch of government attracts votes to candidates from the same political party for other branches of government. A political agency frame- work with moral hazard is applied to analyze coattails in simultaneous presidential and congressional elections. I show that coattail voting is a natural outcome of the optimal reelection scheme adopted by a representative voter to motivate politicians' efforts in a retrospective voting environment. I assume that an office-motivated politician (executive or congressman) prefers her counterpart to be affiliated with the same political party. This correlation of incentives leads the voter to adopt a joint performance evaluation rule, which is conditioned on the politicians belonging to the same party or different parties. The two-sided coattail effects then arise. On the one hand, the executive's suc- cess/failure props up/drags down her partisan ally in congressional election, which implies presidential coattails. On the other hand, the executive's reelection itself is affected by the congressman's performance, which results in reverse coattails. JEL classi…fication: D72, D86. Keywords: Coattail voting; Presidential coattails; Reverse coattails; Simultaneous elections; Political Agency; Retrospective voting.

Cronyism in Business, Public Sector and Politics

This paper contrasts the incentives for cronyism in business, the public sector and politics within an agency problem model with moral hazard. The analysis is focused on the institutional differences between private, public and political organizations. In business, when facing a residual claimant contract, a chief manager ends up with a relatively moderate …rst-best level of cronyism within a …firm. The institutional framework of the public sector does not allow explicit contracting, which leads to a more severe cronyism problem within public organizations. Finally, it is shown that the nature of political appointments (such that the subordinate's reappointment is conditioned on the chief's re-election) together with implicit contracting makes political cronyism the most extreme case. JEL classifi…cation: D72, D73, D86. Keywords: Cronyism; Meritocracy; Manager; Bureaucrat; Politician.

How The 1996 Hotel Majestic agreement may explain a future PP/CiU relationship in Madrid

Some historians have argued that 1996 marked a ‘second transition’ for Spain because of the return to power of the political right in Madrid and that the relationship and eventual pact between the Partido Popular (PP) and Convergència i Unió (CiU) meant that the state could finally escape the ghosts of its Francoist past. For this research, face-to-face interviews were conducted with Catalan Members of Parliament who served under either José María Aznar or Jordi Pujol in Madrid or Barcelona. Drawing upon both interviews and other evidence, including the analysis of election results and the 1996 Hotel Majestic Agreement, the research seeks to provide a better understanding of the previous relationships between the PP and CiU and their leaders in order to understand what lessons might be learnt that would contribute to anticipating and explaining possible future negotiations between the two parties. This is attempted by first examining the potential costs and benefits of political pacts between centre (Madrid) and periphery (Barcelona). Secondly, due to many interviewees making reference to Salvador Espriu’s work La Pell de Brau, the three routes of Espriu’s Catalan nationalism are put into the context of the political pacts. Finally, the likelihood of future agreements between PP and CiU are hypothesized, not only how those agreements may (or may not) come about, but also, what might the result of those negotiations be. Ultimately, it is concluded that the benefits of the Hotel Majestic Agreement outweighed the costs, thus leaving the door open for future negotiations, even if some of those interviewed disagreed.

IPH Manifesto for 2009 European Elections

The 2009 European Elections provide an opportunity to influence health at local and European Government level.  IPH has produced a short manifesto identifying 5 areas of action in public health for MEPs and political parties. The Institute of Public Health in Ireland (IPH) aims to improve health on the island of Ireland capitalising on benefits from North South cooperation. Our focus is tackling health inequalities and influencing public policies in favour of health.

Visió general i anàlisi de xarxes socials

El projecte realitza una visió general de les xarxes socials que existeixen actualment a Internet i analitza detalladament les característiques de set xarxes molt importants (Facebook, Twitter, LinkedIn, V Kontakte, MySpace, Tuenti, Flickr) amb l'únic objectiu de facilitar a l'usuari habitual la millor selecció pels seus interessos.

Does VAA popularity pay off ? : Smartvote users preferred candidates and their results in the 2007 Swiss federal elections

Voting is fundamental for democracy, however, this decisive democratic act requires quite an effort. Decision making at elections depends largely on the interest to gather information about candidates and parties, the effort to process the information at hand and the motivation to reach a vote choice. Especially in electoral systems with highly fragmented party systems and hundreds of candidates running for office, the process of decision making in the pre‐election sphere is highly demanding. In the age of information and communication technologies, new possibilities for gathering and processing such information are available. Voting Advice Applications (VAAs) provide guidance to voters prior to the act of voting and assist voters in choosing between different candidates and parties on the basis of issue congruence. Meanwhile widely used all over the world, scientific inquiry into the effect of such tools on electoral behavior is ongoing. This paper adds to the current debate by focusing on whether the popularity of candidates on the Swiss VAA smartvote eventually paid off at the 2007 Swiss federal elections and whether there is a direct link between the performance of a candidate on the tool and his or her electoral performance.

Department of Health Annual Report 2011

Annual Report 2011 Undoubtedly, 2011 was a year of significant change in the health services. The general election brought a new Government and a new direction and policies in healthcare with a commitment to introduce Universal Health Insurance. The health system is being reformed so as to guarantee equal access to healthcare for all, achieved through a single-tier system enabling access based on need and not on ability to pay. Click here to download PDF 353kb  

The Strength of Promissory Representation : What Makes MPs Change their Positions ?

The paper analyses the positional congruence between pre-election statements in the Swiss voting assistance application "smartvote" and post-election behaviour in the Swiss lower house between 2003 and 2009. For this purpose, we selected 34 smartvote questions which subsequently came up in parliament. Unlike previous studies which assessed the program-to-policy linkage of governments or party groups the paper examines the question at the level of individual MPs which seems appropriate for political systems which follow the idea of power dispersion. While the average rate of political congruence is at some 85 percent, a multivariate analysis detects the underlying factors which push or curb a candidate's propensity to change his or her mind once elections are over. The results show that positional changes are more likely if (1) MPs are freshmen, (2) individual voting behaviour is invisible to the public, (3) the vote is not about a party's core issue, (4) the MP belongs to a party which is located in the political centre, and (5) if the pre-election statement is in disagreement with the majority position of the legislative party group. The last-mentioned factor is paramount: the farer away a candidate's pre-election profile from his or her party is located, the weaker turns out to be the electoral link of promissory representation.

TFC de base de dades relacionals

El projecte consisteix en crear un disseny de base de dades segons els requeriments del client, en aquest cas la comunitat Europea, que emmagatzemi les dades de la futura aplicació que gestionarà les votacions ciutadanes. A més del disseny de la base de dades, el projecte haurà d'incorporar una sèrie de processos que consultin dades que podran ser demanades pel programari que faci la interacció amb els usuaris. Programari que no està inclòs en aquesta fase del pla de la Comunitat Europea.