Turning univalent stimuli bivalent: Synesthesia can cause cognitive conflict in task switching

In this study we investigated whether synesthetic color experiences have similar effects as real colors in cognitive conflict adaptation. We tested 24 synesthetes and two yoke-matched control groups in a task-switching experiment that involved regular switches between three simple decision tasks (a color decision, a form decision, and a size decision). In most of the trials the stimuli were univalent, that is, specific for each task. However, occasionally, black graphemes were presented for the size decisions and we tested whether they would trigger synesthetic color experiences and thus, turn them into bivalent stimuli. The results confirmed this expectation. We were also interested in their effect for subsequent performance (i.e., the bivalency effect). The results showed that for synesthetic colors the bivalency effect was not as pronounced as for real colors. The latter result may be related to differences between synesthetes and controls in coping with color conflict.

More conflict does not trigger more adjustment of cognitive control for subsequent performance: A study of the bivalency effect

Encountering a conflict triggers an adjustment of cognitive control. This adjustment of cognitive control can even affect subsequent performance. The purpose of the present study was to determine whether more conflict triggers more adjustment of cognitive control for subsequent performance. To this end, we focussed on the bivalency effect, that is, the adjustment of cognitive control following the conflict induced by bivalent stimuli (i.e., stimuli with relevant features for two tasks). In two experiments, we tested whether the amount of conflict triggered by bivalent stimuli affected the bivalency effect. Bivalent stimuli were either compatible (i.e., affording one response) or incompatible (i.e., affording two different responses). Thus, compatible bivalent stimuli involved a task conflict, whereas incompatible bivalent stimuli involved a task and a response conflict. The results showed that the bivalency effect was not affected by this manipulation. This indicates that more conflict does not trigger more adjustment of cognitive control for subsequent performance. Therefore, only the occurrence of conflict – not its amount – is determinant for cognitive control

Collingwood on religious atonement

R. G. Collingwood’s philosophical analysis of religious atonement as a dialectical process of mortal repentance and divine forgiveness is explained and criticized. Collingwood’s Christian concept of atonement, in which Christ TeX the Atonement (and also TeX the Incarnation), is subject in turn to another kind of dialectic, in which some of Collingwood’s leading ideas are first surveyed, and then tested against objections in a philosophical evaluation of their virtues and defects, strengths and weaknesses. Collingwood’s efforts to synthesize objective and subjective aspects of atonement, and his proposal to solve the soteriological problem as to why God becomes flesh, as a dogma of some Christian belief systems, is finally exposed in adversarial exposition as inadequately supported by one of his main arguments, designated here as Collingwood’s Dilemma. The dilemma is that sin is either forgiven or unforgiven by God. If God forgives sin, then God’s justice is lax, whereas if God does not forgive sin, then, also contrary to divine nature, God lacks perfect loving compassion. The dilemma is supposed to drive philosophy toward a concept of atonement in which the sacrifice of Christ is required in order to absolve God of the lax judgment objection. God forgives sin only when the price of sin is paid, in this case, by the suffering and crucifixion of God’s avatar. The dilemma can be resolved in another way than Collingwood considers, undermining his motivation for synthesizing objective and subjective facets of the concept of atonement for the sake of avoiding inconsistency. Collingwood is philosophically important because he asks all the right questions about religious atonement, and points toward reasonable answers, even if he does not always deliver original philosophically satisfactory solutions.

Vultures vs livestock: conservation relationships in an emerging conflict between humans and wildlife

Human–wildlife conflict is emerging as an important topic in conservation. Carnivores and birds of prey are responsible for most conflicts with livestock and game but since the mid 1990s a new conflict is emerging in south-west Europe: the presumed killing of livestock by griffon vultures Gyps fulvus. Lack of scientific data and magnification of the problem by the media are increasing alarm amongst the public, and political pressures to implement management decisions have not been based on scientific evidence. We compiled information on 1,793 complaints about attacks by griffon vultures on livestock, lodged with Spanish authorities from 1996 to 2010. Spain is home to the majority (95%) of griffon vultures and other scavengers in the European Union. Most of the cases occurred in areas of high livestock density, affected principally sheep (49%) and cows (31%), and were associated with spring birthing times (April–June). On average 69% of the complaints made annually were rejected because of a lack of evidence about whether the animal was alive before being eaten. The total economic cost of compensation was EUR 278,590 from 2004 to 2010. We discuss possible ways to mitigate this emerging human–wildlife conflict. These need to include the participation of livestock farmers, authorities, scientists and conservation groups.

‘Idolatry’ and Religious Diversity: Thinking about the Other in Early Modern Europe

Idolatry is a key concept in the history of Western thinking about religion, as an all-encompassing category in which all religions more or less alien to the Christian tradition could be subsumed. From Late Antiquity to the Modern period, we can follow how the notion was put to work within Christian discourse to think about the religious “other. ” In fact, the word is almost ubiquitous in pre-modern debates on religion and the origins of religion. Theories on the nature and causes of “idolatry” framed much of the issue of “Religion” vs. the “religions,” and largely provided the conceptual space, in early modern Europe, in which religious anthropology would emerge. The present paper will investigate some aspects of the early modern discourse on idolatry, and its place in early modern discussions on the “diversity” of religions.

Traditional religious melodies

by Louis Freedberg