A Documentação da União Europeia : acesso e disponibilização

Desde o aparecimento da Internet, têm surgido inúmeras oportunidades para os autores de artigos científicos disponibilizarem de forma livre e gratuita a sua produção intelectual. Tal produção poderá estar disponível nas mais diversas formas e inserida nos mais variados ambientes institucionais (Repositórios, Bases de Dados, entre outros). Tal constituiu uma verdadeira revolução informativa que, depois, ultrapassou em larga medida os meios limitados do mundo académico, tornando-se num fenómeno global. Consideramos que a disponibilização e o acesso à documentação da União Europeia constitui uma das faces visíveis dessa revolução. A nível da Informação, sempre houve uma necessidade dos dirigentes europeus em adotar uma Política de Informação adequada. Desde a necessidade de transmitir informação ao público e aos jornalistas nos primeiros tempos da Comunidade até à criação do Portal da União Europeia, vai um longo processo de amadurecimento do projeto europeu. A política de transparência que hoje se verifica e que se revela, acima de tudo, nas ligações proporcionadas pelo Portal é o resultado de um longo caminho de integração europeia. Assim, esta investigação consiste na identificação e na análise da documentação em acesso livre produzida pela União Europeia. O seu objetivo prioritário é tentar determinar até que ponto a documentação europeia consegue estar disponível e acessível a todos aqueles que a pretendam utilizar. Para tal, foram analisadas as mais diversas fontes institucionais, assim como as várias Bases de Dados e os vários sítios Web onde se pode aceder gratuitamente à Informação da União Europeia. As conclusões a que chegámos, assim como as considerações finais apresentadas no final deste trabalho de investigação levam-nos a perceber as políticas de acesso à documentação europeia e até que ponto elas servem de suporte à boa governação e à democracia.

A Participação da Marinha Grande no 18 de Janeiro de 1934

Portugal viveu um dos períodos mais sombrios da sua História no Século XX, com o regime autoritário liderado por António de Oliveira Salazar, que governou o país com «mão de ferro» durante mais de três décadas, concretamente entre 1933 e 1968, uma vez que se considera que há alteração de regime sempre que muda o referencial e a Constituição do Estado Novo é de 1933. Para além da ausência de democracia e liberdade, o povo português conviveu com a fome e a ignorância durante décadas, foi perseguido e torturado nas prisões continentais e ultramarinas, nomeadamente no Tarrafal, que se localiza no arquipélago de Cabo Verde. Em 18 de janeiro de 1934, o movimento operário português saiu à rua em várias cidades e vilas de Portugal, entre as quais a Marinha Grande. Na origem do movimento revolucionário esteve a decisão do Presidente do Conselho, através da Constituição de 1933, de impedir o funcionamento de sindicatos livres. Contudo, aquela que se previa ser unicamente uma greve geral contra a decisão do regime acabou por ir mais além, sobretudo na cidade vidreira, onde o quartel da GNR foi tomado, tal como a estação dos Correios, existindo ainda hoje dúvidas sobre a constituição de um soviete. Mais de sete décadas após o ato insurrecional continua muito por esclarecer. Esta Dissertação visa, precisamente, obter respostas a questões tão diversas como quem esteve realmente por detrás do 18 de janeiro de 1934 na Marinha Grande, que consequências teve para a política do Estado Novo e, finalmente, que importância teve na conjuntura. Importa ainda esclarecer por que razão esta derrota do movimento operário português é hoje recordada, com pompa e circunstância, na Marinha Grande, como se tivesse sido uma vitória. De facto, na atualidade, fala-se de uma jornada heroica, mas o Partido Comunista Português praticamente ignorou esse movimento até abril de 1974 e o seu líder à época, Bento Gonçalves (1971, p. 138), apelidou-o de “anarqueirada”.

El Ecuador y el ALCA: temas para la reflexión (Tema Central)

El artículo analiza los avances de las negociaciones comerciales del Área de Libre Comercio de las Américas. Se sostiene que Ecuador debe tomar previsiones, principalmente dada la dolarización. Falconí plantea un necesario cambio de perspectiva de la política pública y la gestión microeconómica para así generar un régimen especial para los países menores. Se propone también algunas líneas generales de un Programa de Cooperación Hemisférica. Dado que el ALCA podría implicar riesgos para la región, se enfatiza la necesidad de una estrategia a largo plazo.

Compositional effects on productivity, labour cost and export adjustments. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/11, June 2012

Sectoral shifts, such as shrinkage of low labour productivity and the low-wage construction sector, can lead to apparent increased aggregate average labour productivity and average wages, especially when capital intensity differs across sectors. For 11 main sectors and 13 manufacturing sub-sectors, we quantify the compositional effects on productivity, wages and unit labour costs (ULCs) based and real effective exchange rates (REER), for 24 EU countries. Compositional effects are greatest in Ireland, where the pharmaceutical sector drives the growth of output and productivity, but other sectors have suffered greatly and have not yet recovered. Our new ULC-REER measurements, which are free from compositional effects, correlate well with export performance. Among the countries facing the most severe external adjustment challenges, Lithuania, Portugal and Ireland have been the most successful based on five indicators, and Latvia, Estonia and Greece the least successful. There is evidence of downward wage flexibility in some countries, but wage cuts have corrected just a small fraction of pre-crisis wage rises and came with massive reductions in employment even in the business sector excluding construction and real estate, highlighting the difficulty of adjusting wages downward.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.

Moving the EU from a Laggard to a Leader in Democracy Assistance: The Potential Role of the European Endowment for Democracy. CEPS Policy Brief No. 273, 15 June 2012

In their assessment of the proposed European Endowment for Democracy (EED), Hrant Kostanyan and Magdalena Nasieniak conclude that an instrument along the lines currently envisaged could and should take on the challenge to make the EU a truly committed, pro-active and effective leader of democracy assistance. A flexible and fast-track path of assessing needs and granting funds could become the most visible results of the EU’s assistance in this area, delivering almost immediate tangible results. They argue that the EED therefore needs to become an instrument free of nationally-driven decisions, European ‘turf wars’ and cumbersome bureaucracy.

Pre-empting technical barriers in the Single Market. CEPS Policy Brief No. 277, 11 July 2012

Effective enforcement and compliance with EU law is not just a legal necessity, it is also of economic interest since the potential of the Single Market will be fully exploited. Enforcement barriers generate unjustified costs and hindrances or uncertainty for cross-border business and might deprive consumers from receiving the full benefit of greater choice and/or cheaper offers. The EU has developed several types of enforcement efforts (preventive initiatives, pre-infringement initiatives and formal infringement procedures). More recently, the emphasis has been placed on effective prevention. This CEPS Policy Brief analyses the functioning of one preventive mechanism (the 98/34 Directive) and assesses its potential to detect and prevent technical or other barriers in the course of the last 25 years. Based on an empirical approach, it shows that this amazing mechanism has successfully prevented thousands of new technical barriers from arising in the internal goods market.

La protection des données à caractère personnel dans le cadre des activités d’une mission civile de gestion de crise ou la recherche de « l’inaccessible étoile » ? Data Protection within the context of one ESDP Mission - The search for the unreachable star

La question de la protection des données à caractère personnel posée dans le cadre des activités d’assistance et de soutien des missions civiles de gestion de crise ne semble guère avoir suscité l’intérêt des instances en charge de leur gestion et ce en dépit de son importance majeure au regard des tâches exécutées quotidiennement par les agents de ces missions dans le domaine de la coopération policière et judiciaire en matière pénale. S’appuyant sur une expérience de terrain, l’auteur s’efforcera, dans ces lignes, de démontrer la nécessité d’entamer une réflexion de fond sur ce sujet afin, le cas échéant, de prendre les initiatives utiles destinées à porter remède aux difficultés qui, en ce domaine, pourraient apparaître.

Free and Fair? A Challenge for the EU as Georgia and Ukraine gear up for elections. CEPS Commentary, 27 September 2012

In an important test for democracy, Georgia and Ukraine will go to the polls for parliamentary elections on the 1st and 28th of October, respectively. The political leaders of these two Eastern Partnership countries have committed themselves to European values and principles – rhetorically. In reality, the promise of their colour revolutions is unrealised and they have shifted further towards authoritarianism, albeit following different paths in their respective post-revolution periods.

Unleashing Competition in EU Business Services. CEPS Policy Brief No. 284, 24 September 2012

In most EU member states, the business services industry has booked no productivity growth during the last two decades. The industry’s performance in the other member states was weaker than that of its US counterparts. Exploring what may be causing this productivity stagnation, this policy brief reports that weak competition has contributed to the continuing malaise in European business services. The study analyzed the persistence (over time) of firm-level inefficiencies. The evidence further suggests that competition between small firms and large firms in business services is weak. Markets for business services work best in countries with flexible regulation on employment change and with low regulatory costs for firms that start up or close down a business. Countries that are more open to foreign competition perform better in terms of competitive selection and productivity. The policy simulations in this paper show that greater import openness strengthens competition in business services markets. The largest positive impact comes from lower regulatory barriers for growing and shrinking firms. More particularly, competitive selection would be fostered by a reduction of administrative and regulatory costs related to labour contracts, bankruptcy and start-up requirements. A key element of the European Commission’s Europe-2020 strategy is the Single European Market for Services. Business services form one of the largest industries in Europe – and given its productivity stagnation, it deserves to be a priority target of the Europe-2020 strategy. Improving the way the business services market functions may have large positive knock-on effects for the EU economy.

A European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund - An Update. CEPS Policy Brief No. 283, 11 September 2012

Cross-border banking is currently not stable in Europe. Cross-border banks need a European safety net. Moreover, a truly integrated European level banking system may help to break the diabolical loop between the solvency of the domestic banking system and the fiscal standing of the national sovereign. This policy paper first sketches the building blocks of a banking union. Importantly, a new European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Authority (EDIRA) should start simultaneously with the ECB assuming supervisory powers. A combination of European supervision and local resolution cannot work because it is not ‘incentive compatible’. Next, this paper proposes a transition period to gradually phase in the European deposit insurance coverage. Finally, we calculate that a European Deposit Insurance Fund would amount to about €30-50 billion for the 75 euro area banks that were subject to the EBA stress tests. This Fund could be created over a period of time through risk-based deposit insurance premiums levied on these banks. Once up and running, the Fund would then turn into a European Deposit Insurance and Resolution Fund to also deal with the resolution of one or more of these European banks.

Fiscal rules: timing is everything. Bruegel Policy Brief 2012/02, September 2012

The strengthening of the European Union’s fiscal rules with the approval of the so-called ‘six-pack’, and the parallel worsening of economic conditions in Europe, re-opened the debate about the relationship between fiscal discipline and growth. Influential voices have argued against the EU’s perceived obsession with fiscal discipline, which risks being self-defeating in bad times. However, EU fiscal rules are not as rigid as commonly thought, but represent a sophisticated system of surveillance and ex-post control that provides sufficient room for manoeuvre under exceptional circumstances.

The known unknowns and the unknown unknowns of the EMU. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/18, October 2012

Extensive prior research on the economics of European monetary union highlighted some potential risks (the known unknowns) but overlooked others (the unknown unknowns). Asymmetries among participating countries, the potentially destabilising character of a one-size-fits all monetary policy, the weakness of adjustment mechanisms, the lack of incentives for fiscal discipline, the possibility of sovereign solvency crises and their adverse consequences were all known and understood. But policymakers often relied on a complacent reading of the evidence. • The potential for financial disruption was vastly underestimated. Economists generally did not consider, or underestimated, the possibility of balance of payment crises such as those experienced by southern European countries, or the risk of a feedback loop between banks and sovereigns. • Remedying EMU’s systemic deficiencies is on the policy agenda. Banking union would go a long way towards addressing the fault lines. The urgent question for economists is if it is going to be enough and, if not, what else should complement the ‘bare-bones’ EMU of Maastricht.

Smart choices for growth. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/21, November 2012

Recovery in Greece, Italy, Portugal and Spain is held back in part by structural barriers. Overcoming these requires structural reform and public investment. Given the limited availability of political and financial capital, prioritising reform efforts and spending is important, but difficult. The different success factors for individual sectors are complementary. Using the example of the high-tech industry, we make the case that only investing in one success factor (eg broadband infrastructure) without having a sufficient endowment of others (eg education) is unlikely to make the sector successful. One consequence of the complementarity of the different success factors is that public investment and reform efforts should be fine-tuned in order to match the endowment of other factors. This might imply an increase in efforts to tackle several structural barriers at the same time, but it might also imply reducing investment in less promising fields. This in turn requires strategic thinking about whether it is worthwhile pursuing development strategies that require investment in many success factors but that do not promise much success. Such a strategic approach to public investment and reform efforts might make the allocation of scarce public financial and political capital more efficient.

A budget for Europe's Monetary Union. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/22, December 2012

In a monetary union, national fiscal deficits are of limited help to counteract deep recessions; union-wide support is needed. A common euro-area budget (1) should provide a temporary but significant transfer of resources in case of large regional shocks, (2) would be an instrument to counteract severe recessions in the area as a whole, and (3) would ensure financial stability. The four main options for stabilisation of regional shocks to the euro area are: unemployment insurance, payments related to deviations of output from potential, the narrowing of large spreads, and discretionary spending. The common resource would need to be well-designed to be distributionally neutral, avoid free-riding behaviour and foster structural change while be of sufficient size to have an impact. Linking budget support to large deviations of output from potential appears to be the best option. A borrowing capacity equipped with a structural balanced budget rule could address area-wide shocks. It could serve as the fiscal backstop to the bank resolution authority. Resources amounting to 2 percent of euro-area GDP would be needed for stabilisation policy and financial stability.