How political economies affect immigrants' socio-economic incorporation. A comparative analysis of immigrants’ poverty risks across advanced industrialised countries

Immigration and the resulting increasing ethnic diversity have become an important characteristic of advanced industrialised countries. At the same time, the majority of the countries in question are confronted with structural transformation such as deindustrialisation and changes in family structures as well as economic downturn, which limit the capacities of nation-states in addressing rising inequality and supporting those individuals at the margins of the society. This paper addresses both issues, immigration and inequality, by focusing on immigrants’ socio-economic incorporation into the receiving societies of advanced industrialised countries. The aim of this paper is to explain cross-national variation in immigrants’ poverty risks. Drawing on the political economy as well as the migration literature, the paper develops a theoretical framework that considers how the impact of the national labour market and welfare system on immigrants’ poverty risks is moderated by the integration policies, which regulate immigrants’ access to the labour market and social programs (or immigrants’ economic and social rights). The empirical analysis draws on income surveys as well as a newly collected data set on economic and social rights of immigrants in 19 advanced industrialised countries, including European countries as well as Australia, and North America, for the year 2007. As the results from multilevel analysis show, integration policies concerning immigrants’ access to the labour market and social programs can partly explain cross-national variations in immigrants’ poverty risks. In line with the hypothesis, stricter labour market regulations such as minimum wage setting reduce immigrants’ poverty risks stronger in countries where they are granted easier access to the labour market. However, concerning the impact of more generous social programs the reductive poverty effect is stronger in countries with less inclusive access of immigrants to social programs. The paper concludes by discussing possible explanations for this puzzling finding.

Labour Market Prospects of Swiss Career Entrants after Completion of Vocational Education and Training

This study seeks to find the reasons for the rising risk of unemployment for people who have completed basic vocational education and training (VET) in Switzerland. We focus on the long-term structural shift on the demand side of the labour market and its consequences for new entrants? chances of employment in the labour force. A detailed analysis of the development of vacancies for such ?career entrants? in the time period 2001 to 2011 suggests that neither a growing occupational mismatch nor a general shift in the level of education to the disadvantage of workers with vocational education can be made responsible for the rising unemployment of labour market entrants. Instead, the available evidence indicates that a diminishing part of the vacancies suited for VET graduates remains open to entrants because of the increasing job requirements with regard to work experience and further education. Basic vocational education and training alone is increasingly less a guarantee for a smooth entry into the working world.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

Technical Efficiency and Stock Market Reaction to Horizontal Mergers

This study examines the relationship between stock market reaction to horizontal merger announcements and technical efficiency levels of the participating firms. The analysis is based on data pertaining to eighty mergers between firms in the U.S. manufacturing industry during the 1990s. We employ Data Envelopment Analysis (DEA) to measure technical efficiency, which capture the firms. competence to produce the maximum output given certain productive resources. Abnormal returns related to the merger announcements provide the investor.s re-evaluation on the future performance of the participating firms. In order to avoid the problem of nonnormality, heteroskedasticity in the regression analysis, bootstrap method is employed for estimations and inferences. We found that there is a significant relationship between technical efficiency and market response. The market apparently welcomes the merger as an arrangement to improve resource utilizations.

Technical Efficiency in the Indian Textiles Industry: A Nonparametric Analysis of Firm-Level Data

The Indian textiles industry is now at the crossroads with the phasing out of quota regime that prevailed under the Multi-Fiber Agreement (MFA) until the end of 2004. In the face of a full integration of the textiles sector in the WTO, maintaining and enhancing productive efficiency is a precondition for competitiveness of the Indian firms in the new liberalized world market. In this paper we use data obtained from the Annual Survey of Industries for a number of years to measure the levels of technical efficiency in the Indian textiles industry at the firm level. We use both a grand frontier applicable to all firms and a group frontier specific to firms from any individual state, ownership, or organization type in order to evaluate their efficiencies. This permits us to separately identify how locational, proprietary, and organizational characteristics of a firm affect its performance.

Dynamic Stock Market Interactions between the Canadian, Mexican, and the United States Markets: The NAFTA Experience

This paper explores the dynamic linkages that portray different facets of the joint probability distribution of stock market returns in NAFTA (i.e., Canada, Mexico, and the US). Our examination of interactions of the NAFTA stock markets considers three issues. First, we examine the long-run relationship between the three markets, using cointegration techniques. Second, we evaluate the dynamic relationships between the three markets, using impulse-response analysis. Finally, we explore the volatility transmission process between the three markets, using a variety of multivariate GARCH models. Our results also exhibit significant volatility transmission between the second moments of the NAFTA stock markets, albeit not homogenous. The magnitude and trend of the conditional correlations indicate that in the last few years, the Mexican stock market exhibited a tendency toward increased integration with the US market. Finally, we do note that evidence exists that the Peso and Asian financial crises as well as the stock-market crash in the US affect the return and volatility time-series relationships.

US Corporate Default Swap Valuation: The Market Liquidity Hypothesis and Autonomous Credit Risk

This paper develops a reduced form three-factor model which includes a liquidity proxy of market conditions which is then used to provide implicit prices. The model prices are then compared with observed market prices of credit default swaps to determine if swap rates adequately reflect market risks. The findings of the analysis illustrate the importance of liquidity in the valuation process. Moreover, market liquidity, a measure of investors. willingness to commit resources in the credit default swap (CDS) market, was also found to improve the valuation of investors. autonomous credit risk. Thus a failure to include a liquidity proxy could underestimate the implied autonomous credit risk. Autonomous credit risk is defined as the fractional credit risk which does not vary with changes in market risk and liquidity conditions.

Can a Newly Proposed Mechanism for Allocating Contracts in U.S. Electricity Wholesale Markets Lead to Lower Prices? A Game Theoretic Analysis

This study of the wholesale electricity market compares the cost-minimizing performance of the auction mechanism currently in place in U.S. markets with the performance of a proposed replacement. The current mechanism chooses an allocation of contracts that minimizes a fictional cost calculated using pay-as-offer pricing. Then suppliers are paid the market clearing price. The proposed mechanism uses the market clearing price in the allocation phase as well as in the payment phase. In concentrated markets, the proposed mechanism outperforms the current mechanism even when strategic behavior by suppliers is taken into account. The advantage of the proposed mechanism increases with increased price competition.

Endogenous Growth in the Presence of Informal Credit Markets: A Comparative Analysis Between Credit Rationing and Self-Revelation Regimes

This paper examines whether the presence of informal credit markets reduces the cost of credit rationing in terms of growth. In a dynamic general equilibrium framework, we assume that firms are heterogenous with different degrees of risk and households invest in human capital development. With the help of Indian household level data we show that the informal market reduces the cost of rationing by increasing the growth rate by 0.7 percent. This higher growth rate, in the presence of an informal sector, is due to the ability of the informal market to separate the high risk from the low risk firms thanks to better information. But even after such improvement we do not get the optimum outcome. The findings, based on our second question, suggest that the revelation of firms' type, based on incentive compatible pricing, can lead to almost 2 percent higher growth rate as compared to the credit rationing regime with informal sector.

A descriptive analysis of the consumers at farm stands outside WIC clinics

Because fruit and vegetable intake remains low in low-income populations, the attention of public health researchers has focused on different strategies to reach this population. One possible method of reaching low income populations is through government food assistance programs like the WIC's Farmers Market Nutrition Program (FMNP). This program provides vouchers to WIC recipients that are redeemable only at farmers' markets. In the summer of 2010, two farm stands near WIC clinics in Austin were surveyed in order to establish socio-demographic characteristics of the clientele of the markets. The overall purpose of this pilot study was to describe the clientele of the markets and to examine associations between food insecurity, acculturation, socio-demographic factors, and farmers' market participants' fruit and vegetable intake. The sample was a convenience sample of farmers' market customers. One hundred study participants completed self-administered surveys. Independent t-tests were used to explore the differences in means of fruit and vegetable intake according to acculturation and food insecurity levels. The overall mean (SD) of daily fruit and vegetable intake was 4.20±2.69 for customers of both markets. Significant differences were reported between the two markets in overall fruit and vegetable intake and specifically in the following: 100% juice (P=.023), fruit consumption (P=.028), green salad (P=.003), and salsa (P=.044). The differences showed that customers at the market in a more busy location were on average reporting eating more fruits and vegetables than customers at another market that was located in a more secluded location. When examined by level of food security, individuals who were more food secure consumed more fruit (P=.016). When examined by level of acculturation, the overall fruit and vegetable intake was not significantly different between levels of acculturation. The overall findings in this report suggest that the population at these markets consists of individuals who are food insecure and on government assistance programs. While there were no significant differences between fruit and vegetable intake, acculturation and food insecurity, this report suggests the need for culturally tailored interventions that serve the Hispanic population and would assist this population to become more food secure.^

Hospital district viability and Medicaid /market changes

Hospital districts (HD) that serve the uninsured and the needy face new challenges with the implementation of Medicaid managed. The potential loss of Medicaid patients and revenues may affect the ability to cost-shift and subsequently decrease the ability of the HD to meet its legal obligation of providing care for the uninsured. ^ To investigate HD viability in the current market, the aims of this study were to: (1) describe HD's environment, (2) document the HDs strategic response, (3) document changes in the HD's performance (patient volume) and financial status, and (4) determine whether relationships or trends exist between HD strategy, performance and financial status. ^ To achieve these aims, three Texas HDs (Fort Worth, Lubbock, and San Antonio) were selected to be evaluated. For each HD four types of strategic responses were documented and evaluated for change. In addition, the ability of each HD to sustain operations was evaluated by documenting performance and financial status changes (patient volume and financial ratios). A pre-post case study design method was used in which the Medicaid managed care “rollout'” date, at each site, was the central date. First, a descriptive analysis was performed which documented the environment, strategy, financial status, and patient volume of each hospital district. Second, to compare hospital districts, each hospital district was: (i) classified by a risk index, (ii) classified by its strategic response profile, and (iii) given a performance score based upon pre-post changes in patient volume and financial indicators. ^ Results indicated that all three HDs operate in a high risk environment compared to the rest of the nation. Two HDs chose the “Status Quo” response whereas one HD chose the “Competitive Proactive” response. Medicaid patient volume decreased in two of three HDs whereas indigent patient volume increased in two of the three (an indication of increasing financial risk). Total patient revenues for all HDs increased over the study period; however, the rate of increase slowed for all three after the Medicaid rollout date. All HDs experienced a decline in financial status between pre-post periods with the greatest decline observed in the HD that saw the greatest increase in indigent patient volume. ^ The pre-post case study format used and the lack of control study sites do not allow for assignment of causality. However, the results suggest possible adverse effects of Medicaid managed care and the need for a larger study, based on a stronger evaluation research design. ^

A Comparative Study of Development Mechanisms in Korea and Taiwan: Introductory Analysis

This article is the introduction to a special issue of The Developing Economies which presented the results of a research project by the Institute of Developing Economies that examined the development mechanisms in Korea and Taiwan. Our conclusion in this article is that their development mechanisms, despite their similar development patterns of export-led industrialization, have been essentially different: a government-led mechanism in Korea as opposed to a market-led mechanism in Taiwan. We verified this difference through comparative studies of the two economies covering trade balances, the growth of total factor productivity, the scale of enterprises and business groups, and the development processes of individual manufacturing sectors. In our explanatory discussion we propose that the difference in the mechanisms is based on: 1) the amount of accumulation in the economy at the time postwar industrialization started, 2) the relationship between government and society, and 3) the mechanism of social network formation.

Imperfect Competition and Costly Screening in the Credit Market under Conditions of Asymmetric Information

This article provides an analysis of how banks determine levels of information production when they are in imperfect competition and there is a condition of information asymmetry between borrowers and banks. Specifically, the study concentrates on information production activities of banks in duopoly where they simultaneously determine intensity of pre-loan screening as well as interest rates. The preliminary model of this paper illustrates that due to strategic complementarities between banks, banking competition can result in inferior equilibrium out of multiple equilibria and insufficient information production. Policymakers must take into account the possible adverse effects of competition-enhancing policies on information production activities.

Inferring the Effects of Vertical Integration from Entry Games : An Analysis of the Generic Pharmaceutical Industry

This paper introduces a novel method for examining the effects of vertical integration. The basic idea is to estimate the parameters of a vertical entry game. By carefully specifying firms' payoff equations and constructing appropriate tests, it is possible to use estimates on rival profit effects to make inferences about the existence of vertical foreclosure. I estimate the vertical entry model using data from the US generic pharmaceutical industry. The estimates indicate that vertical integration is unlikely to generate anticompetitive foreclosure effects. On the other hand, significant efficiency effects are found to arise from vertical integration. I use the parameter estimates to simulate a policy that bans vertically integrated entry. The simulation results suggest that such a ban is counterproductive; it is likely to reduce entry into smaller markets.

Development of land rental market and its effect on household farming in rural China : an empirical study in Zhejiang Province

This paper investigates the impact of land rental market development on the efficiency of labor allocation and land utilization in rural China. To test the hypothesis that the shadow wage of a rent-in household with limited off-farm opportunities will increase with the development of a land rental market for households, a statistical comparison between the shadow wage and the estimated market wage was conducted. The results showed that the shadow wage for both rent-in households and non-rent-in households was significantly lower than the market wage, but that the wage for the rent-in households was statistically higher than that for non-rent-in households in Fenghua and Deqing, the two counties surveyed in this study. In addition, the estimated marginal product of farmland for rent-in households was statistically higher than the actual land rent that those households paid, while a null hypothesis that the actual rental fee accepted by rent-out households is equivalent to the marginal product of farmland for those households was not rejected in Fenghua county where land transactions by mutual agreement were more prevalent. These results indicate that the development of the land rental market facilitates the efficiency of labor allocation and farmland utilization in rural China.