Product market deregulation and labor market outcomes

We consider the dynamic relationship between product market entry regulationand equilibrium unemployment. The main theoretical contribution is combininga Mortensen-Pissarides model with monopolistic competition in the goods marketand individual wage bargaining. Product market competition affects unemploymentvia two channels: the output expansion effect and a countervailing effect dueto a hiring externality. Competition is then linked to barriers to entry. Acalibrated model compares a high-regulation European regime to a low-regulationAnglo-American one. Our quantitative analysis suggests that under individualbargaining, no more than half a percentage point of European unemployment ratescan be attributed to entry regulation.

Estimating the probability of leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-section data

We propose a new econometric estimation method for analyzing the probabilityof leaving unemployment using uncompleted spells from repeated cross-sectiondata, which can be especially useful when panel data are not available. Theproposed method-of-moments-based estimator has two important features:(1) it estimates the exit probability at the individual level and(2) it does not rely on the stationarity assumption of the inflowcomposition. We illustrate and gauge the performance of the proposedestimator using the Spanish Labor Force Survey data, and analyze the changesin distribution of unemployment between the 1980s and 1990s during a periodof labor market reform. We find that the relative probability of leavingunemployment of the short-term unemployed versus the long-term unemployedbecomes significantly higher in the 1990s.

Rethinking the effects of financial liberalization

During the last few decades, many emerging markets have lifted restrictions on cross-borderfinancial transactions. The conventional view was that this would allow these countries to: (i)receive capital inflows from advanced countries that would finance higher investment and growth;(ii) insure against aggregate shocks and reduce consumption volatility; and (iii) accelerate thedevelopment of domestic financial markets and achieve a more efficient domestic allocationof capital and better sharing of individual risks. However, the evidence suggests that thisconventional view was wrong.In this paper, we present a simple model that can account for the observed effects of financialliberalization. The model emphasizes the role of imperfect enforcement of domestic debts and theinteractions between domestic and international financial transactions. In the model, financialliberalization might lead to different outcomes: (i) domestic capital flight and ambiguous effectson net capital flows, investment, and growth; (ii) large capital inflows and higher investmentand growth; or (iii) volatile capital flows and unstable domestic financial markets. The modelshows how these outcomes depend on the level of development, the depth of domestic financialmarkets, and the quality of institutions.

Human capital and externalities in cities

We combine growth theory with US Census data on individual schooling and wages to estimate the aggregate return to human capital and human capital externalities in cities. Our estimates imply that a one-year increase in average schooling in cities increases their aggregate labor productivity by 8 to 11 percent. We find no evidence for aggregate human capital externalities in cities however althoughwe use three different approaches. Our main theoretical contribution is to show how human capital externalities can be identified (non-parametically) even if workers with different levels of human capital are imperfect substitutes in production.

Combining multivariate density forecasts using predictive criteria

This paper combines multivariate density forecasts of output growth, inflationand interest rates from a suite of models. An out-of-sample weighting scheme based onthe predictive likelihood as proposed by Eklund and Karlsson (2005) and Andersson andKarlsson (2007) is used to combine the models. Three classes of models are considered: aBayesian vector autoregression (BVAR), a factor-augmented vector autoregression (FAVAR)and a medium-scale dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model. Using Australiandata, we find that, at short forecast horizons, the Bayesian VAR model is assignedthe most weight, while at intermediate and longer horizons the factor model is preferred.The DSGE model is assigned little weight at all horizons, a result that can be attributedto the DSGE model producing density forecasts that are very wide when compared withthe actual distribution of observations. While a density forecast evaluation exercise revealslittle formal evidence that the optimally combined densities are superior to those from thebest-performing individual model, or a simple equal-weighting scheme, this may be a resultof the short sample available.

The persistence of inflation in OECD countries: A fractionally integrated approach

The statistical properties of inflation and, in particular, its degree of persistence and stability over time is a subject of intense debate and no consensus has been achieved yet. The goal of this paper is to analyze this controversy using a general approach, with the aim of providing a plausible explanation for the existing contradictory results. We consider the inflation rates of 21 OECD countries which are modelled as fractionally integrated (FI) processes. First, we show analytically that FI can appear in inflation rates after aggregating individual prices from firms that face different costs of adjusting their prices. Then, we provide robust empirical evidence supporting the FI hypothesis using both classical and Bayesian techniques. Next, we estimate impulse response functions and other scalar measures of persistence, achieving an accurate picture of this property and its variation across countries. It is shown that the application of some popular tools for measuring persistence, such as the sum of the AR coefficients, could lead to erroneous conclusions if fractional integration is present. Finally, we explore the existence of changes in inflation inertia using a novel approach. We conclude that the persistence of inflation is very high (although non-permanent) in most post-industrial countries and that it has remained basically unchanged over the last four decades.

Intravitreal ranibizumab for age-related macular degeneration : optical coherence tomography guided retreatment intervals and their intra- and inter-individual variability

Purpose: To determine whether the need for retreatment after an initial phase of 3 monthly intravitreal injections of ranibizumab shows an intra-individual regular rhythm and to what degree it varies between different patients. Methods: Prospective study with 42 patients with exudative AMD, treatment naïve. Loading dose of 3 monthly doses of ranibizumab (0,5 mg), followed by a 12 months pro re nata (PRN) regimen according to early exudative signs on HD-OCT Cirrus, Zeiss. The follow-up visits were intensified (week 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 12, 14, 16, 20, etc after each injection) in order to detect recurrences early, and injection followed within 3 days in cases of subretinal fluid, cysts, or central thickness increase of>50microns. Intervals were calculated between injections for the 12 month follow-up with PRN treatment. Variability was expressed as standard deviation (SD). Results: Visual acuity (VA) improved from a mean ETDRS score of 61.6 (SD 10.8) at baseline to 68.0 (SD 10.2) at month 3 and to 74.7(SD 9.0) at month 12. The 15 patients who have already completed the study showed maintenance of the VA improvement. Central foveal thickness improved from a mean value of 366 microns (baseline) to 253 microns (month 3), well maintained thereafter. Mean number of injections was 8.8 (SD 3.5,range 0-12) per 12 months of follow-up (after 3 doses), with mean individual treatment-recurrence (TR) intervals ranging from 28->365 days (mean 58). Intraindividual variability of TR intervals (SD) was 7.1 days as a mean value (range 1.7¡V22.6). It ranged within 20% of the mean intra-individual interval for 30 (91%) and within 15% for 21 patients (64%). The first interval was within 1 week of the mean intra-individual interval in 64% and within 2 weeks in 89% of patients. Conclusions: The majority of AMD patients showed a relatively stable rhythm for PRN injections of ranibizumab after initial loading phase, associated with excellent functional/anatomical results. The initial interval last loading dose-first recurrence may have a predictive value for further need of treatment, potentially facilitating follow-up and patient care.

Algunos factores que inciden en el rendimiento y en la evaluación de los alumnos en las PAAU

The context where the university admissions exams are performed is presented and the main concerns about this exams are outlined and discussed from a statistical point of view. The paper offers an illustration of the use of random coefficient models in the study of educational data. The association between two individual scores (one internal and the other external to the school) and the effect of the school in the external exam is analized by a regression model with random intercept and fixed slope. A variance component model for the analysis of the grading process is also presented. The paper ends with an outline of the main findings and the presentation of some specific proposals to improve and control the equity of the system. Some pedagogic reflections are also included.

Individual responses to converting enzyme inhibitors and calcium antagonists.

This study was designed to assess whether the acute blood pressure response of an individual hypertensive patient to a calcium antagonist or an angiotensin converting enzyme (ACE) inhibitor is a good predictor of the long-term efficacy of these drug classes in this particular patient. The concept that good responses to ACE inhibitors and calcium antagonists may be mutually exclusive was also tested. Sixteen patients were included in a randomized crossover trial of enalapril, 20 mg daily, and diltiazem, 120 mg daily, for 6 weeks each. Blood pressure was measured by ambulatory blood pressure recording. During the washout phase, the acute effect of nifedipine, 10 mg p.o., and enalaprilat, 5 mg i.v., was evaluated. Nifedipine and enalaprilat reduced blood pressure equally well. The long-term blood pressure reduction induced by enalapril and diltiazem was similar. The acute blood pressure response to a given drug was not a good predictor of the result obtained with long-term therapy. No age dependency of the antihypertensive effect of either drug class was apparent. There was no evidence that a good response to one drug excluded a similarly good response to the other.

Strategic delegation in monetary unions

In monetary unions, monetary policy is typically made by delegates of the member countries. This procedure raises the possibility of strategic delegation - that countries may choose the types of delegates to influence outcomes in their favor. We show that without commitment in monetary policy, strategic delegation arises if and only if three conditions are met: shocks affecting individual countries are not perfectly correlated, risk-sharing across countries is imperfect, and the Phillips Curve is nonlinear. Moreover, inflation rates are inefficiently high. We argue that ways of solving the commitment problem, including the emphasis on price stability in the agreements constituting the European Union are especially valuable when strategic delegation is a problem.

Ex post bargaining, labor coordination and wage formation at the firm level

We lay out a model of wage bargaining with two leading features:bargaining is ex post to relevant investments and there isindividual bargaining in firms without a Union. We compareindividual ex post bargaining to coordinated ex post bargainingand we analyze the effects on wage formation. As opposed to exante bargaining models, the costs of destroying the employmentrelationship play a crucial role in determining wages. Highfiring costs in particular yield a rent for employees. Ourtheory points to a employer size-wage effect that is independentof the production function and market power. We derive a simpleleast squares specification from the theoretical model thatallow us to estimate components of the wage premium fromcoordination. We reject the hypothesis that labor coordinationdoes not alter the extensive form of the bargaining game. Laborcoordination substantially increases bargaining power butdecreases labor's ability to pose costly threats to the firm.

Satisfaction in choice as a function of the number of alternatives: When "goods satiate" but "bads escalate"

Whereas people are typically thought to be better off with more choices, studiesshow that they often prefer to choose from small as opposed to large sets of alternatives.We propose that satisfaction from choice is an inverted U-shaped function of thenumber of alternatives. This proposition is derived theoretically by considering thebenefits and costs of different numbers of alternatives and is supported by fourexperimental studies. We also manipulate the perceptual costs of information processingand demonstrate how this affects the resulting satisfaction function. We furtherindicate that satisfaction when choosing from a given set is diminished if people aremade aware of the existence of other choice sets. The role of individual differences insatisfaction from choice is documented by noting effects due to gender and culture. Weconclude by emphasizing the need to have an explicit rationale for knowing how muchchoice is enough.

Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.