945 resultados para Foreign Exchange Student


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Michael Friebe, editor ; Otto-von-Guericke-Universität Magdeburg, Institut für Medizintechnik, Lehrstuhl Kathetertechnologie und bildgesteuerte Therapie (INKA - Intelligente Katheter), Forschungscampus STIMULATE (Solution Centre for Image Guided Local Therapies)

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Authors working on "industrial metabolism" or "social metabolism" look at the economy in terms of flows of energy and materials. Together with the ecological economists, they see the economy as a subsystem of a larger physical system. Marx and Engels followed with a few years’ delay many of the remarkable scientific and technical novelties of their time.

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This study aims at analyzing the determinants of FDI (foreign direct investment) inflows for a group of European regions. The originality of this approach lies in the use of disaggregated regional data. First, we develop a qualitative description of our database and discuss the importance of the macroeconomic determinants in attracting FDI. Then, we provide an econometric exercise to identify the potential determinants of FDI. In spite of choosing regions presenting economic similarities, we show that regional FDI inflows rely on a combination of factors that differs from one region to another.

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We study situations of allocating positions or jobs to students or workers based on priorities. An example is the assignment of medical students to hospital residencies on the basis of one or several entrance exams. For markets without couples, e.g., for ``undergraduate student placement,'' acyclicity is a necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Ergin, 2002). We show that in the presence of couples, which introduces complementarities into the students' preferences, acyclicity is still necessary, but not sufficient (Theorem 4.1). A second necessary condition (Theorem 4.2) is ``priority-togetherness'' of couples. A priority structure that satisfies both necessary conditions is called pt-acyclic. For student placement problems where all quotas are equal to one we characterize pt-acyclicity (Lemma 5.1) and show that it is a sufficient condition for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.1). If in addition to pt-acyclicity we require ``reallocation-'' and ``vacancy-fairness'' for couples, the so-called dictator-bidictator placement mechanism is the unique fair and efficient placement mechanism (Theorem 5.2). Finally, for general student placement problems, we show that pt-acyclicity may not be sufficient for the existence of a fair and efficient placement mechanism (Examples 5.4, 5.5, and 5.6). We identify a sufficient condition such that the so-called sequential placement mechanism produces a fair and efficient allocation (Theorem 5.3).

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We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.