938 resultados para Comitês de máquinas


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Tesis (Maestro en Ciencias de la Ingeniería Mecánica con Especialidad en Térmica y Fluidos) U.A.N.L.

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Tesis (Maestría en la Enseñanza de las Ciencias con Especialidad en Matemáticas) U.A.N.L.

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Tesis (Maestría en la Enseñanza de las Ciencias con Especialidad en Matemáticas) U.A.N.L.

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Tesis (Maestría en la Enseñanza de las Ciencias con Especialidad en Matemáticas) U.A.N.L.

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Tesis (Maestría en la Enseñanza de las Ciencias con Especialidad en Física) U.A.N.L.

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Tesis (Maestría en Ciencias de la Ingeniería Mecánica con Especialidad en Diseño Mecánico) U.A.N.L. Facultad de Ingeniería Mecánica y Eléctrica, 1999.

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Tesis (Maestro en Ciencias de la Ingeniería Mecánica con Especialidad en Térmica y Fluidos) UANL Facultad de Ingeniería Mecánica y Eléctrica, 2001

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Tesis (Maestro en Ciencias de la Ingeniería Mecánica con Especialidad en Diseño Mecánico) UANL, 2000.

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Tesis ( Maestro en Ciencias de la Ingeniería Eléctrica con Especialidad en Potencia) - U.A.N.L., 2002

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Tesis (Maestro en Ciencias de la Ingeniería Mecánica con Especialidad en Diseño Mecánico) - Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, 2002

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Tesis (Maestro en Ciencias de la Ingeniería de Manufactura con Especialidad en Automatización) - Universidad Autónoma de Nuevo León, Facultad de Ingeniería Mecánica y Eléctrica.

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A group of agents located along a river have quasi-linear preferences over water and money. We ask how the water should be allocated and what money transfers should be performed. We are interested in efficiency, stability (in the sense of the core), and fairness (in a sense to be defined). We first show that the cooperative game associated with our problem is convex : its core is therefore large and easily described. Next, we propose the following fairness requirement : no group of agents should enjoy a welfare higher than what it could achieve in the absence of the remaining agents. We prove that only one welfare vector in the core satisfies this condition : it is the marginal contribution vector corresponding to the ordering of the agents along the river. We discuss how it could be decentralized or implemented.

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We provide a characterization of selection correspondences in two-person exchange economies that can be core rationalized in the sense that there exists a preference profile with some standard properties that generates the observed choices as the set of core elements of the economy for any given initial endowment vector. The approach followed in this paper deviates from the standard rational choice model in that a rationalization in terms of a profile of individual orderings rather than in terms of a single individual or social preference relation is analyzed.

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In spatial environments, we consider social welfare functions satisfying Arrow's requirements. i.e., weak Pareto and independence of irrelevant alternatives. When the policy space os a one-dimensional continuum, such a welfare function is determined by a collection of 2n strictly quasi-concave preferences and a tie-breaking rule. As a corrollary, we obtain that when the number of voters is odd, simple majority voting is transitive if and only if each voter's preference is strictly quasi-concave. When the policy space is multi-dimensional, we establish Arrow's impossibility theorem. Among others, we show that weak Pareto, independence of irrelevant alternatives, and non-dictatorship are inconsistent if the set of alternatives has a non-empty interior and it is compact and convex.

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In a linear production model, we characterize the class of efficient and strategy-proof allocation functions, and the class of efficient and coalition strategy-proof allocation functions. In the former class, requiring equal treatment of equals allows us to identify a unique allocation function. This function is also the unique member of the latter class which satisfies uniform treatment of uniforms.