Drosophilids (Diptera) from an Atlantic Forest Area in Santa Catarina, Southern Brazil

The present work aims at knowing the faunal composition of drosophilids in forest areas of southern Brazil. Besides, estimation of species richness for this fauna is briefly discussed. The sampling were carried out in three well-preserved areas of the Atlantic Rain Forest in the State of Santa Catarina. In this study, 136,931 specimens were captured and 96.6% of them were identified in the specific level. The observed species richness (153 species) is the largest that has been registered in faunal inventories conducted in Brazil. Sixty-three of the captured species did not fit to the available descriptions, and we believe that most of them are non-described species. The incidence-based estimators tended to give rise to the largest richness estimates while the abundance based give rise to the smallest ones. Such estimators suggest the presence from 172.28 to 220.65 species in the studied area. Based on these values, from 69.35 to 88.81% of the expected species richness were sampled. We suggest that the large richness recorded in this study is a consequence of the large sampling effort, the capture method, recent advances in the taxonomy of drosophilids, the high preservation level and the large extension of the sampled fragment and the high complexity of the Atlantic Rain forest. Finally, our data set suggest that the employment of estimators of richness for drosophilid assemblages is useful but it requires caution.

Psychological pressure in competitive environments: Evidence from a randomized natural experiment

Much like cognitive abilities, emotional skills can have major effects on performance and economic outcomes. This paper studies the behavior of professionalsubjects involved in a dynamic competition in their own natural environment. Thesetting is a penalty shoot-out in soccer where two teams compete in a tournamentframework taking turns in a sequence of five penalty kicks each. As the kicking order is determined by the random outcome of a coin flip, the treatment and control groups are determined via explicit randomization. Therefore, absent any psychological effects, both teams should have the same probability of winning regardless of the kicking order. Yet, we find a systematic first-kicker advantage. Using data on 2,731 penalty kicks from 262 shoot-outs for a three decade period, we find that teams kicking first win the penalty shoot-out 60.5% of the time. A dynamic panel data analysis shows that the psychological mechanism underlying this result arises from the asymmetry in the partial score. As most kicks are scored, kicking first typically means having the opportunity to lead in the partial score, whereas kicking second typically means lagging in the score and having the opportunity to, at most, get even. Having a worse prospect than the opponent hinders subjects' performance.Further, we also find that professionals are self-aware of their own psychological effects. When a recent change in regulations gives winners of the coin toss the chance to choose the kicking order, they rationally react to it by systematically choosing to kick first. A survey of professional players reveals that when asked to explain why they prefer to kick first, they precisely identify the psychological mechanism for which we find empirical support in the data: they want to lead in the score inorder to put pressure on the opponent.

On Rothschild-Stiglitz as competitive pooling

Dubey and Geanakoplos [2002] have developed a theory of competitive pooling, which incorporates adverse selection and signaling into general equilibrium. By recasting the Rothschild-Stiglitz model of insurance in this framework, they find that a separating equilibrium always exists and is unique.We prove that their uniqueness result is not a consequence of the framework, but rather of their definition of refined equilibria. When other types of perturbations are used, the model allows for many pooling allocations to be supported as such: in particular, this is the case for pooling allocations that Pareto dominate the separating equilibrium.

Consumer choice in competitive location models: Formulations and heuristics

A new direction of research in Competitive Location theory incorporatestheories of Consumer Choice Behavior in its models. Following thisdirection, this paper studies the importance of consumer behavior withrespect to distance or transportation costs in the optimality oflocations obtained by traditional Competitive Location models. To dothis, it considers different ways of defining a key parameter in thebasic Maximum Capture model (MAXCAP). This parameter will reflectvarious ways of taking into account distance based on several ConsumerChoice Behavior theories. The optimal locations and the deviation indemand captured when the optimal locations of the other models are usedinstead of the true ones, are computed for each model. A metaheuristicbased on GRASP and Tabu search procedure is presented to solve all themodels. Computational experience and an application to 55-node networkare also presented.

Tracking the invisible hand: Convergence of double auctions to competitive equilibrium

Economics is the science of want and scarcity. We show that want andscarcity, operating within a simple exchange institution (double auction),are sufficient for an economy consisting of multiple inter--related marketsto attain competitive equilibrium (CE). We generalize Gode and Sunder's(1993a, 1993b) single--market finding to multi--market economies, andexplore the role of the scarcity constraint in convergence of economies to CE.When the scarcity constraint is relaxed by allowing arbitrageurs in multiple markets to enter speculative trades, prices still converge to CE,but allocative efficiency of the economy drops. \\Optimization by individual agents, often used to derive competitive equilibria,are unnecessary for an actual economy to approximately attain such equilibria.From the failure of humans to optimize in complex tasks, one need not concludethat the equilibria derived from the competitive model are descriptivelyirrelevant. We show that even in complex economic systems, such equilibriacan be attained under a range of surprisingly weak assumptions about agentbehavior.

Timing of seasonal sales

We present a model of timing of seasonal sales where stores chooseseveral designs at the beginning of the season without knowingwich one, if any, will be fashionable. Fashionable designs have achance to fetch high prices in fashion markets while non-fashionableones must be sold in a discount market. In the beginning of theseason, stores charge high prices in the hope of capturing theirfashion market. As the end of the season approaches with goods stillon the shelves, stores adjust downward their expectations that theyare carrying a fashionable design, and may have sales to capture thediscount market. Having a greater number of designs induces a storeto put one of them on sales earlier to test the market. Moreover,price competition in the discount market induces stores to startsales earlier because of a greater perceived first-mover advantage incapturing the discount market. More competition, perhaps due todecreases in the cost of product innovation, makes sales occur evenearlier. These results are consistent with the observation that thetrend toward earlier sales since mid-1970's coincides with increasingproduct varieties in fashion good markets and increasing storecompetition.

Measuring asymmetries in brand associations using correspondence analysis

Correspondence analysis is introduced in the brand associationliterature as an alternative tool to measure dominance, for theparticular case of free choice data. The method is also used to analysedifferences, or asymmetries, between brand-attribute associations whereattributes are associated with evoked brands, and brand-attributeassociations where brands are associated with the attributes. Anapplication to a sample of deodorants is used to illustrate the proposedmethodology.

Supply chain management as a competitive advantage in the Spanish grocery sector

Adversarial relationships have long dominated business relationships,but Supply Chain Management (SCM) entails a new perspective. SCM requiresa movement away from arms-length relationships toward partnership stylerelations. SCM involves integration, co-ordination and collaborationacross organisations and throughout the supply chain. It means that SCMrequires internal (intraorganisational) and external (interorganisational)integration. This paper analyses the relationship between internal andexternal integration processes, their effect on firms performance andtheir contribution to the achievement of a competitive advantage.Performance improvements are analysed through costs, stock out and leadtime reductions. And, the achievement of a better competitive positionis measured by comparing the firm s performance with its competitors performance. To analyse this, an empirical study has been conducted inthe Spanish grocery sector.

A note on the convergence to competitive equilibria in economies with moral hazard

We examine the conditions under which competitive equilibria can beobtained as the limit, when the number of strategic traders getslarge, of Nash equilibria in economies with asymmetric informationon agents' effort and possibly imperfect observability of agents'trades. Convergence always occur when either effort is publiclyobserved (no matter what is the information available tointermediaries on agents' trades); or effort is private informationbut agents' trades are perfectly observed; or no information at allis available on agents' trades. On the other hand, when eachintermediary can observe its trades with an agent, but not theagent's trades with other intermediaries, the (Nash) equilibriawith strategic intermediaries do not converge to any of thecompetitive equilibria, for an open set of economies. The source ofthe difficulties for convergence is the combination of asymmetricinformation and the restrictions on the observability of tradeswhich prevent the formation of exclusive contractual relationshipsand generate barriers to entry in the markets for contracts.

Incorporating waiting time in competitive location models: Formulations and heuristics

In this paper we propose a metaheuristic to solve a new version of the Maximum CaptureProblem. In the original MCP, market capture is obtained by lower traveling distances or lowertraveling time, in this new version not only the traveling time but also the waiting time willaffect the market share. This problem is hard to solve using standard optimization techniques.Metaheuristics are shown to offer accurate results within acceptable computing times.

Making land-use fit to planning goals. Weaknesses and opportunities within the Swiss land management regime

In Switzerland, the issue of land consumption has made it to the front of the political agenda in recent years. Studies conducted on a national level have concluded that there is an excess of land zoned for construction (ARE, 2008), which is seen as contributing to urban sprawl. This situation is looked upon as a failure of the Federal Law on Spatial Planning (LAT, 1979) and there is a political push to change it in order to reinforce zoning regulations. In this article, we look on the issue from a different angle. While there may be large quantities of land zoned for construction, in many urban areas land actually available for development is scarce. Building on the idea that planning's efficiency is linked to its capacity of influencing actual land-use, we focus on how this situation can be dealt with within the current Swiss institutional context.

Organized vs. competitive corruption

We study bureaucratic corruption in a model in which a constituencysets required levels for a given set of activities. Each activity iscarried out by an external provider, and its realization is supervisedby a bureaucrat. While bureaucrats are supposed to act on behalf of theconstituency, they can decide to be corrupt and allow providers todeliver lower activity levels than contracted in exchange for a bribe.Given this, the constituency sets the optimal activity levels weighingoff the value of activity levels, their costs, as well as the possibilityfor the bureaucrats to be corrupt. We use this setup to study the impacton equilibrium corruption of the degree of decentralization of corruption.To do this we compute equilibrium corruption in two different settings:1) Each bureaucrat acts in such a way as to maximize his own individualutility (competitive corruption); 2) An illegal syndicate oversee thecorruption decisions of the population of bureaucrats in such a way asto maximize total proceeds from corruption (organized corruption). Weshow that, since average corruption payoff is increasing in the activitylevels set by the constituency, and since the latter responds to highlevels of corruption by reducing required activity levels, in equilibriumthe illegal syndicate acts in such a way as to restrain the total numberof corrupt transactions, so that corruption is lower when it is organizedthan when it is competitive.

Historical contingency affects signaling strategies and competitive abilities in evolving populations of simulated robots.

One of the key innovations during the evolution of life on earth has been the emergence of efficient communication systems, yet little is known about the causes and consequences of the great diversity within and between species. By conducting experimental evolution in 20 independently evolving populations of cooperatively foraging simulated robots, we found that historical contingency in the occurrence order of novel phenotypic traits resulted in the emergence of two distinct communication strategies. The more complex foraging strategy was less efficient than the simpler strategy. However, when the 20 populations were placed in competition with each other, the populations with the more complex strategy outperformed the populations with the less complex strategy. These results demonstrate a tradeoff between communication efficiency and robustness and suggest that stochastic events have important effects on signal evolution and the outcome of competition between distinct populations.

2008 Annual Report of the Iowa Railway Finance Authority

The Iowa Railway Finance Authority (IRFA) was created in 1980 by the 68th General Assembly to provide for the financing of rail facilities and to enhance and continue the operation of essential rail facilities. IRFA was authorized to offer financial assistance for the acquisition, rehabilitation, construction, refinancing, extension, replacement, maintenance, repair, or leasing of any rail facility. Rail Revolving Loan and Grant Program The 2005 legislative session amended Iowa Code 327H.20 by assigning all repayments of IRFA and other Iowa Department of Transportation (Iowa DOT) rail assistance loans to the Rail Revolving Loan and Grant Program (RRLGP). In addition, the following annual appropriations were allocated to the fund: • FY 2007: $235,000 • FY 2008: $2 million • FY 2009: $2 million Since the creation of the RRLGP in 2005, IRFA has awarded funding to 23 projects totaling over $7.2 million in grants and loans in its three rounds of competitive funding. These projects have pledged to create 1,672 jobs within two years of project completion and 1,361 jobs have been retained. Funded projects are associated with over $2 billion in total private capital investment. In 2008, the IRFA Board directed all available funds be used to help repair railroads devastated by summer flooding. On July 31, $3.9 million in deferred payment loans were offered to seven Iowa based railroads to allow for immediate repair of rail beds, including the cost of materials, labor and equipment.

A non-quasi-competitive Cournot oligopoly with stability

This paper presents a classical Cournot oligopoly model with some peculiar features: it is non--quasi--competitive as price under N-poly is greater than monopoly price; Cournot equilibrium exists and is unique with each new entry; the successive equilibria after new entries are stable under the adjustment mechanism that assumes that actual output of each seller is adjusted proportionally to the difference between actual output and profit maximizing output. Moreover, the model tends to perfect competition as N goes to infinity, reaching the monopoly price again.