A business reborn;

Mode of access: Internet.

Abuses in federal student aid programs : hearings before the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the Committee on Governmental Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred First Congress, second session.

Hearings held Feb. 20, 1990-

Report of the superintendent of banks

1941-<49> also called 91st-<99th> annual report

Report.

"Beginning with rpt. for 1878 (and occasionally in previous years), each rpt. [up to 1910] cont. a compilation of the laws rel. to banks, savings banks, trust and investment cos. and building and loan ass'ns.

Report

None issued 1955

Report

Successively Issued by: Supervisor of Loan Agencies; Bureau of Loan Agencies

Old man Curry, Race track stories.

Levelling with Elisha.- Playing even for Obadiah.- By a hair.- The last chance.- Sanguinary Jeremiah.- Eliphaz, late Fairfax- The redemption handicap.- A morning workout.- Egyptian corn.- The modern judgment of Solomon.

Federal housing enterprises : HUD's mission oversight needs to be strengthened : report to the Chairman, Subcommittee on Capital Markets, Securities, and Government Sponsored Enterprises, Committee on Banking and Financial Services, House of Representatives /

"B-278383"--P. 1.

Office of Thrift Supervision journal.

Title from cover.

Hearings relating to Madison Guaranty S & L and the Whitewater Development Corporation, Washington, DC phase : hearings before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, United States Senate, One Hundred Third Congress, second session.

Shipping list no.: 95-0029-P (v. 1), 95-0027-P (v. 2), 95-0194-P (v. 3, 11), 95-0187-P (v. 4, 9, 14), 95-0177-P (v. 5, 8, 13, 17), 95-0205-P (v. 6), 95-0176-P (v. 10, 15-16, 18), 95-0121-P (v. 12), 95-0188-P (v. 19), 95-0185-P (v. 20-21, 23), 95-0199-P (v. 22), 95-0195-P (v. 24).

An Inquiry into the Legal Standing of Rogue REMICs in Foreclosures

The business of privatized mortgage loan securitization (Real Estate Mortgage Investment Conduits or “REMICS”) is so arcane and specialized that few people outside of that realm of investment knowledge understand, or even care to understand how loan securitization functions. However, if the difference between a legitimate REMIC and a Rogue REMIC is adequately explained, one can begin to understand why Rogue REMICs must be exposed as unlawful enterprises whose affiliates are not only able to disregard existing federal securities and tax laws, but are also able to circumvent state and local foreclosure laws at will. These ongoing violations result from the intentional and commonplace shortcutting of the proper mortgage loan securitization processes during the several years preceding the 2008 financial crisis. This Inquiry will not focus primarily on how and why Rogue REMICS violate federal tax and securities laws; although those aspects are part of the discussion by necessity. I will argue that all Rogues lack the perquisite legal standing to prosecute both judicial and non-judicial foreclosures. I will present compelling evidence that, in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis, foreclosures by Rogues may have exceeded 10% of all foreclosures. I will further argue that county officials may be violating state laws by recording the documents that impart false legal standing to the Rogues. I will conclude with a suggestion to homeowners on how to proceed if a mortgage assignment to a Rogue turns up in the local County public records

Essays on Monetary Policy in Small Open Economies

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Washington, 2016-06

Why do US banks borrow from the Fed? A fresh look at the ‘reluctance’ phenomenon

The role of several theoretical factors in determining the demand of US banks for borrowed reserves from the Fed is empirically investigated. The main objective is to isolate the candidate(s) most likely responsible for the recent observed phenomenon of banks reluctance to borrow from the Fed, particularly since the mid-1980s. The results indicate that the declining number of banks due to mergers and consolidations holds much of the weight for explaining the weakened demand for borrowed reserves since the mid-1980s. Consistent evidence is found suggesting that US banks may have been unlawfully exploiting the discount window service for profit-taking purposes. This finding proves credible and suggests the need for further loan scrutiny at the Federal discount window.

Essays on Development Policy and the Political Economy of Conflict

Electoral Rules and Leader Selection: Experimental Evidence from Ugandan Community Groups. Despite a large body of work documenting how electoral systems affect policy outcomes, less is known about their impact on leader selection. We study this by comparing two types of participatory decision making in Ugandan community groups: (i) vote by secret ballot and (ii) open discussion with consensus. Random assignment allows us to estimate the causal impact of the rules on leader types and social service delivery. Vote groups are found to elect leaders more similar to the average member while discussion group leaders are positively selected on socio-economic characteristics. Further, dropout rates are significantly higher in discussion groups, particularly for poorer members. After 3.5 years, vote groups are larger in size and their members save less and get smaller loans. We conclude that the secret ballot vote creates more inclusive groups while open discussion groups favor the already economically successful. Preparing for Genocide: Community Meetings in Rwanda. How do political elites prepare the civilian population for participation in violent conflict? We empirically investigate this question using data from the Rwandan Genocide in 1994. Every Saturday before 1994, Rwandan villagers had to meet to work on community infrastructure. The practice was highly politicized and, according to anecdotal evidence, regularly used by the political elites for spreading propaganda in the years before the genocide. This paper presents the first quantitative evidence of this abuse of the community meetings. To establish causality, we exploit cross-sectional variation in meeting intensity induced by exogenous weather fluctuations. We find that an additional rainy Saturday resulted in a five percent lower civilian participation rate in genocide violence. Selection into Borrowing: Survey Evidence from Uganda. In this paper, I study how changes to the standard credit contract affect loan demand and selection into borrowing, using a representative sample of urban micro enterprises, most with no borrowing experience. Hypothetical loan demand questions are used to test whether firm owners respond to changes in loans' contractual terms and whether take-up varies by firms' risk type and other firm owner characteristics. The results indicate that contracts with lower interest rates and less stringent collateral requirements attract less risky borrowers, suggesting that there is scope for improvement of standard financial contract terms. Credit Contract Structure and Firm Growth: Evidence from a Randomized Control Trial. We study the effects of credit contract structure on firm outcomes among small and medium sized firms. A randomized control trial was carried out to distinguish between some of the key constraints to efficient credit use connected to the firms' business environment and production function, namely (i) backloaded returns (ii) uncertain returns and (iii) indivisible fixed costs. Each firm was followed for the 1-year loan cycle. We describe the experiment and present preliminary results from the first 754 out of 2,340 firms to have completed the loan cycle. Firms offered a grace period have higher profits and higher household income than firms receiving a rebate later on as well as the control group. They also increased the number of paid employees  and reduced the number of unpaid employees, an effect also found among firms that received a cash subsidy at the beginning of the loan cycle. We discuss potential mechanisms behind these effects.