The rate of return on equity across industrial sectors on the British stock market, 1825-70

This article assesses the contribution of the various industrial sectors to the growth of the British equity market in the 1825–70 period. It also provides estimates of the rates of return on these industrial sectors in this period. The article then proceeds to examine whether differences in rates of return across the various sectors can be explained by risk or other financial factors. One of the main findings is that the relatively high rates of return in the banking, insurance, and miscellaneous sectors appear to be in some measure explained by the presence of extended liability and uncalled capital.

The character and denomination of shares in the Victorian equity market

The seminal work of J. B. Jefferys highlighted two unusual features of the Victorian equity market, namely high share denomination and uncalled capital. This article examines the extent to which publicly traded company stocks in the nineteenth century had these features. It also analyses the effect of these features on stock returns using monthly data for the London Stock Market over the period 1825–70. We find that stocks with unpaid capital earned a higher return, which is consistent with investors being rewarded for the risk of a call on their personal assets. We also find that stocks with a high share denomination earned a lower return, which is consistent with the view that this feature was conducive to superior corporate governance.

Private equity and entrepreneurial management in management buy-outs

Critics claim that short-term profit orientation and high deal price strategies of private equity (PE) firms can negatively affect the ability of management buyouts to initiate and sustain entrepreneurial management. This study investigates this claim by comparing effects of majority PE backed and other buy-outs at different levels of financial leverage on post buy-out increases in entrepreneurial management. We propose that PE can be used as an organizational refocusing device that simultaneously increases entrepreneurial and administrative management. We find that majority PE-backed buy-outs significantly increase entrepreneurial management practices. Furthermore, the increased financial leverage positively affects administrative management in management buy-outs. However, the effect of high financial leverage is larger for majority PE-backed buy-outs. These results support the notion that PE firms help buy-out companies develop ambidextrous organizational change: i.e. simultaneously develop entrepreneurial and administrative management practices. The findings have important implications for practitioners and policy makers.