986 resultados para political costs
Resumo:
Hermit crabs use empty gastropod shells as protective armour and enlarged chelipeds as signals and weapons. However, carrying armour and arms may impose energy costs that result in increased lactate and hence potential fatigue and there may be consequent effects on general activity. We investigated whether variation in shell and cheliped size influences lactate levels in hermit crabs. Lactate was positively related to residual cheliped size for both sexes and was higher in males than females; when we controlled for body size, the former had larger chelipeds. Shell weight unexpectedly had no effect on lactate but crabs in small shells had high lactate, possibly because of reduced ability to maintain a respiratory current. The size of natural shells had no effect on activity but the addition of food odour increased locomotion. However, activity was not related to lactate. We conclude that possession of larger chelipeds than expected for body size imposes significant costs and may limit development of sexual dimorphism. (C) 2010 The Association for the Study of Animal Behaviour. Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Resumo:
The present paper examines the role of organisational learning and transaction costs economics in strategic outsourcing decisions. Interorganisational learning is critical to competitive success, and organisations often learn more effectively by collaborating with other organisations. However, learning processes may also complicate the process of forming interorganisational partnerships which may increase transaction costs. Based on the literature, the authors develop refutable implications for outsourcing supply chain logistics and a sample of 121 firms in the supply chain logistics industry is used to test the hypotheses. The results show that trust and transaction costs are significant and substantial drivers of strategic outsourcing of supply chain logistics (a strategic flexibility action). Learning intent and knowledge acquisition have no significant influence on the decision to outsource supply chain logistics. The paper concludes with a discussion of the different and often conflicting implications for managing interorganisational learning processes.
Resumo:
Customs are generally perceived as a time-consuming impediment to international trade. However, few studies have empirically examined the determinants and the impact of this type of government-imposed transaction costs. This paper analyses the role of firm size as a determinant of customs-related transaction costs, as well as the effect of firm size on the relationship between these costs and the international trade intensity of firms. The results of this study indicate that customs-related transaction costs repress international trade activities of firms, even at low levels of these costs. The paper identifies transaction-related economies of scale, simplified customs procedures and advanced information and communication technology as main determinants of customs-related transaction costs. It is shown that when these factors are taken into account, firm size has no effect on customs-related transaction costs. Policy implications are considered for firm strategy and public policy.
Resumo:
The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) speaks of the importance of an “effective political democracy” in its Preamble, though it is only in Article 3 of Protocol 1 (P1-3) that we find a right to free elections. This paper discusses the role of “positive obligations” under P1-3. This paper outlines the positive obligations in P1-3 focusing on obligations where the state is required to do more than just change the law. This may mean providing resources or facilities, adopting regulatory frameworks or creating new institutions. The paper highlights specific positive obligations that need to be further developed in the jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR). Sometimes these can be developed by analogy with positive obligations recognised in other areas of ECtHR jurisprudence. However, beyond these cases, states should ensure that members of vulnerable and disadvantaged minorities are able to participate in the electoral process and should ensure that dominant political groups cannot abuse their political power to exclude other parties unfairly. This is necessary to realise equal political rights. The second section of this paper sketches some preliminary points about the Strasbourg institutions’ approach to P1-3. After that, the third section identifies circumstances where the ECtHR should apply a more intense scrutiny in P1-3 cases. The fourth, fifth and sixth sections look at positive obligations relating to the right to vote, the right to run for election and the regulation of political parties.