Herpes simplex virus type 1 and Alzheimer's disease: the autophagy connection.

The causes of Alzheimer's disease (AD) and of the characteristic pathological features—amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles—of AD brain are unknown, despite the enormous resources provided over the years for their investigation. Indeed, the only generally accepted risk factors are age, Down syndrome, carriage of the type 4 allele of the apolipoprotein E gene (APOE-e 4), and possibly brain injury. Following the authors' previous studies implicating herpes simplex virus type 1 (HSV1) in brain of APOE-e 4 carriers as a major cause of AD, the authors propose here, on the basis of their and others' recent studies, that not only does HSV1 generate the main components of amyloid plaques and neurofibrillary tangles (NFTs)—ß -amyloid (Aß) and abnormally phosphorylated tau but also, by disrupting autophagy, it prevents degradation of these aberrant proteins, leading to their accumulation and deposition, and eventually to AD.

Novel loading tests on full-scale tapered member portal frames

This paper presents the experimental results of loading tests on two 18m span tapered member portal frames designed to BS 5950. Deflection test results for vertical, lateral and combined loading cases are compared with the predictions given by elastic analysis to BS 5950 and shown to be favourable. The predicted ultimate capacities and modes of failure, which were by lateral-torsional buckling of the columns, were also found to agree with the experimental behaviour. It was found that the method of modelling the tapered members as a series of prismatic elements gave good comparison with test results.

A bargaining set for monotonic simple games based on external and internal stability

A new bargaining set based on notions of both internal and external stability is developed in the context of endogenous coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This type of distinction is not present in current bargaining sets. For the class of monotonic proper simple games, the outcomes in the bargaining set are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of a minimal winning coalition and its complement.