Expert Information and Majority Decisions

This paper studies dichotomous majority voting in common interest committees where each member receives not only a private signal but also a public signal observed by all of them. The public signal represents, e.g. expert information presented to an entire committee and its quality is higher than that of each individual private signal. We identify two informative symmetric strategy equilibria, namely i) the mixed strategy equilibrium where each member randomizes between following the private and public signals should they disagree; and ii) the pure strategy equilibrium where they follow the public signal for certain. The former outperforms the latter. The presence of the public signal precludes the equilibrium where every member follows their own signal, which is an equilibrium in the absence of the public signal. The mixed strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal outperforms the sincere voting equilibrium without the public signal, but the latter may be more efficient than the pure strategy equilibrium in the presence of the public signal. We suggest that whether expert information improves committee decision making depends on equilibrium selection.

The Market for "Rough Diamonds": Information, Finance and Wage Inequality

During the past four decades both between and within group wage inequality increased significantly in the US. I provide a microfounded justification for this pattern, by introducing private employer learning in a model of signaling with credit constraints. In particular, I show that when financial constraints relax, talented individuals can acquire education and leave the uneducated pool, this decreases unskilled inexperienced wages and boosts wage inequality. This explanation is consistent with US data from 1970 to 1997, indicating that the rise of the skill and the experience premium coincides with a fall in unskilled-inexperienced wages, while at the same time skilled or experienced wages do not change much. The model accounts for: (i) the increase in the skill premium despite the growing supply of skills; (ii) the understudied aspect of rising inequality related to the increase in the experience premium; (iii) the sharp growth of the skill premium for inexperienced workers and its moderate expansion for the experienced ones; (iv) the puzzling coexistence of increasing experience premium within the group of unskilled workers and its stable pattern among the skilled ones. The results hold under various robustness checks and provide some interesting policy implications about the potential conflict between inequality of opportunity and substantial economic inequality, as well as the role of minimum wage policy in determining the equilibrium wage inequality.

How private is private information? The ability to spot deception in an economic game

We provide experimental evidence on the ability to detect deceit in a buyer-seller game with asymmetric information. Sellers have private information about the buyer's valuation of a good and sometimes have incentives to mislead buyers. We examine if buyers can spot deception in face-to-face encounters. We vary (1) whether or not the buyer can interrogate the seller, and (2) the contextual richness of the situation. We find that the buyers' prediction accuracy is above chance levels, and that interrogation and contextual richness are important factors determining the accuracy. These results show that there are circumstances in which part of the information asymmetry is eliminated by people's ability to spot deception.

What is the Causal Effect of Information and Learning about a Public Good on Willingness to Pay?

In this study we elicit agents’ prior information set regarding a public good, exogenously give information treatments to survey respondents and subsequently elicit willingness to pay for the good and posterior information sets. The design of this field experiment allows us to perform theoretically motivated hypothesis testing between different updating rules: non-informative updating, Bayesian updating, and incomplete updating. We find causal evidence that agents imperfectly update their information sets. We also field causal evidence that the amount of additional information provided to subjects relative to their pre-existing information levels can affect stated WTP in ways consistent overload from too much learning. This result raises important (though familiar) issues for the use of stated preference methods in policy analysis.

The Impact of Information Provision on Agglomeration Bonus Performance: An Experimental Study on Local Networks

The Agglomeration Bonus (AB) is a mechanism to induce adjacent landowners to spatially coordinate their land use for the delivery of ecosystem services from farmland. This paper uses laboratory experiments to explore the performance of the AB in achieving the socially optimal land management configuration in a local network environment where the information available to subjects varies. The AB poses a coordination problem between two Nash equilibria: a Pareto dominant and a risk dominant equilibrium. The experiments indicate that if subjects are informed about both their direct and indirect neighbors’ actions, they are more likely to coordinate on the Pareto dominant equilibrium relative to the case where subjects have information about their direct neighbors’ action only. However, the extra information can only delay – and not prevent – the transition to the socially inferior risk dominant Nash equilibrium. In the long run, the AB mechanism may only be partially effective in enhancing delivery of ecosystem services on farming landscapes featuring local networks.

Contribution à l'élaboration de mécanismes de détection, de contrôle et de lutte contre le blanchiment d'argent au regard de l'usage des technologies de l'information et de la communication "cas de l'Algérie"

Résumé : Désormais, la lutte contre le blanchiment d'argent constitue une priorité pour les Etats et les gouvernements dans le but, d'une part, de préserver l'économie et l'intégrité des places financières et, d'autre part, de priver les organisations criminelles des ressources financières. Dans ce contexte, la préoccupation majeure des autorités algériennes en charge de la lutte contre ce phénomène est de mettre en place un dispositif capable de détecter les mécanismes de blanchiment, d'en évaluer la menace et sur la base de cette connaissance, de définir et de déployer les moyens de riposte les plus efficaces et efficients. Mais nous constatons que mener des enquêtes de blanchiment en conséquence à un crime sous-jacent a montré ses limites en matière d'établissement de preuves, d'élucidation d'affaires et de recouvrement des avoirs. Par ailleurs, nous pensons qu'il serait plus judicieux de mettre en place en amont un contrôle «systématique» des flux financiers et des opérations inhabituelles et/ou suspectes et de là, identifier d'éventuelles opérations de blanchiment, sans forcément connaître le crime initial, en veillant au maintien de l'équilibre entre le «tout sécuritaire» orienté vers la surveillance accrue des flux et la préservation de la vie privée et des libertés individuelles. Notre thèse apporte un regard critique sur le dispositif actuel de lutte contre le blanchiment existant en Algérie que nous évaluons et sur lequel nous relevons plusieurs lacunes. Pour répondre aux problèmes identifiés nous proposons des solutions stratégiques, organisationnelles, méthodologiques et technologiques intégrées dans un cadre opérationnel cohérent au niveau national et international.

Dynamic Relational Contracts under Complete Information

This paper considers a long-term relationship between two agents who both undertake a costly action or investment that together produces a joint benefit. Agents have an opportunity to expropriate some of the joint benefit for their own use. Two cases are considered: (i) where agents are risk neutral and are subject to limited liability constraints and (ii) where agents are risk averse, have quasi-linear preferences in consumption and actions but where limited liability constraints do not bind. The question asked is how to structure the investments and division of the surplus over time so as to avoid expropriation. In the risk-neutral case, there may be an initial phase in which one agent overinvests and the other underinvests. However, both actions and surplus converge monotonically to a stationary state in which there is no overinvestment and surplus is at its maximum subject to the constraints. In the risk-averse case, there is no overinvestment. For this case, we establish that dynamics may or may not be monotonic depending on whether or not it is possible to sustain a first-best allocation. If the first-best allocation is not sustainable, then there is a trade-off between risk sharing and surplus maximization. In general, surplus will not be at its constrained maximum even in the long run.

Government information transparency

This paper studies a model of announcements by a privately informed government about the future state of the economic activity in an economy subject to recurrent shocks and with distortions due to income taxation. Although transparent communication would ex ante be desirable, we find that even a benevolent government may ex-post be non-informative, in an attempt to countervail the tax distortion with a "second best" compensating distortion in information. This result provides a rationale for independent national statistical offices, committed to truthful communication. We also find that whether inequality in income distribution favors or harms government transparency depends on labor supply elasticity.

Information Design

There are two ways of creating incentives for interacting agents to behave in a desired way. One is by providing appropriate payoff incentives, which is the subject of mechanism design. The other is by choosing the information that agents observe, which we refer to as information design. We consider a model of symmetric information where a designer chooses and announces the information structure about a payoff relevant state. The interacting agents observe the signal realizations and take actions which affect the welfare of both the designer and the agents. We characterize the general finite approach to deriving the optimal information structure for the designer - the one that maximizes the designer's ex ante expected utility subject to agents playing a Bayes Nash equilibrium. We then apply the general approach to a symmetric two state, two agent, and two actions environment in a parameterized underlying game and fully characterize the optimal information structure: it is never strictly optimal for the designer to use conditionally independent private signals; the optimal information structure may be a public signal or may consist of correlated private signals. Finally, we examine how changes in the underlying game affect the designer's maximum payoff. This exercise provides a joint mechanism/information design perspective.

Endovascular thoracic aortic aneurysm repair without angiography.

OBJECTIVE: : Intravascular ultrasound (IVUS) generates high definition circumferential cross-sectional images and provides real-time readout of vascular dimensions, including visualization of vessel branches. We have used it as an alternative to angiography in the endovascular thoracic aneurysm repair work-up. METHODS: : Out of consecutive 203 patients with descending thoracic aortic aneurysm, 89 (43.8%) received endovascular treatment [mean age, 68 ± 8 years; range, 29-82; male, 79 (88.7%); female, 10 (11.3%)] without using angiography during the endovascular procedure. IVUS (6 F, 12.5 MHz probe or 10 F 9 MHz) coupled with fluoroscopy for the placement of radiopaque markers was used for target site identification, landing zone measurement, device positioning, and assessment of endovascular repair. RESULTS: : Hospital mortality was 4/89 (4.5%). Number of devices implanted in each patient was 1.2 (range, 1-3). X-ray exposure time was 12 ± 8 minutes. Median procedure time was 63 ± 20 minutes. Conversion to open surgery was necessary in one patient (1.1%) because of aortic dissection. In nine patients (10.1%) left subclavian artery was covered because of a short neck. Two patients (2.2%) had vascular access lesions and required surgical repair. One patient developed paraplegia (1.1%). Early endoleak was observed in eight patients (8.9%) and 4 (4.5%) required additional procedures (proximal or distal extensions). Late conversion was necessary in one patient (1.1%). CONCLUSIONS: : IVUS provides all information necessary for device selection, target site identification as well as safe and correct deployment of thoracic endoprostheses and makes periprocedural angiography unnecessary, thus avoiding the risk of renal failure because of contrast medium.

The Optimal Degree of Monetary-Discretion in a New Keynesian Model with Private Information

This paper considers the optimal degree of discretion in monetary policy when the central bank conducts policy based on its private information about the state of the economy and is unable to commit. Society seeks to maximize social welfare by imposing restrictions on the central bank's actions over time, and the central bank takes these restrictions and the New Keynesian Phillips curve as constraints. By solving a dynamic mechanism design problem we find that it is optimal to grant "constrained discretion" to the central bank by imposing both upper and lower bounds on permissible inflation, and that these bounds must be set in a history-dependent way. The optimal degree of discretion varies over time with the severity of the time-inconsistency problem, and, although no discretion is optimal when the time-inconsistency problem is very severe, our numerical experiment suggests that no-discretion is a transient phenomenon, and that some discretion is granted eventually.

Testing low-altitude infrared digital photography from a mini-UAV to retrieve information for biological conservation

Satellite remote sensing imagery is used for forestry, conservation and environmental applications, but insufficient spatial resolution, and, in particular, unavailability of images at the precise timing required for a given application, often prevent achieving a fully operational stage. Airborne remote sensing has the advantage of custom-tuned sensors, resolution and timing, but its price prevents using it as a routine technique for the mentioned fields. Some Unmanned Aerial Vehicles might provide a “third way” solution as low-cost techniques for acquiring remotely sensed information, under close control of the end-user, albeit at the expense of lower quality instrumentation and instability. This report evaluates a light remote sensing system based on a remotely-controlled mini-UAV (ATMOS-3) equipped with a color infra-red camera (VEGCAM-1) designed and operated by CATUAV. We conducted a testing mission over a Mediterranean landscape dominated by an evergreen woodland of Aleppo pine (Pinus halepensis) and (Holm) oak (Quercus ilex) in the Montseny National Park (Catalonia, NE Spain). We took advantage of state-of-the-art ortho-rectified digital aerial imagery (acquired by the Institut Cartogràfic de Catalunya over the area during the previous year) and used it as quality reference. In particular, we paid attention to: 1) Operationality of flight and image acquisition according to a previously defined plan; 2) Radiometric and geometric quality of the images; and 3) Operational use of the images in the context of applications. We conclude that the system has achieved an operational stage regarding flight activities, although with meteorological limits set by wind speed and turbulence. Appropriate landing areas can be sometimes limiting also, but the system is able to land on small and relatively rough terrains such as patches of grassland or short matorral, and we have operated the UAV as far as 7 km from the control unit. Radiometric quality is sufficient for interactive analysis, but probably insufficient for automated processing. A forthcoming camera is supposed to greatly improve radiometric quality and consistency. Conventional GPS positioning through time synchronization provides coarse orientation of the images, with no roll information.