Highly efficient DNA incorporation of intratumourally injected [125I]iododeoxyuridine under thymidine synthesis blocking in human glioblastoma xenografts.

Intratumoural (i.t.) injection of radio-iododeoxyuridine (IdUrd), a thymidine (dThd) analogue, is envisaged for targeted Auger electron- or beta-radiation therapy of glioblastoma. Here, biodistribution of [(125)I]IdUrd was evaluated 5 hr after i.t. injection in subcutaneous human glioblastoma xenografts LN229 after different intravenous (i.v.) pretreatments with fluorodeoxyuridine (FdUrd). FdUrd is known to block de novo dThd synthesis, thus favouring DNA incorporation of radio-IdUrd. Results showed that pretreatment with 2 mg/kg FdUrd i.v. in 2 fractions 0.5 hr and 1 hr before injection of radio-IdUrd resulted in a mean tumour uptake of 19.8% of injected dose (% ID), representing 65.3% ID/g for tumours of approx. 0.35 g. Tumour uptake of radio-IdUrd in non-pretreated mice was only 4.1% ID. Very low uptake was observed in normal nondividing and dividing tissues with a maximum concentration of 2.9% ID/g measured in spleen. Pretreatment with a higher dose of FdUrd of 10 mg/kg prolonged the increased tumour uptake of radio-IdUrd up to 5 hr. A competition experiment was performed in FdUrd pretreated mice using i.t. co-injection of excess dThd that resulted in very low tumour retention of [(125)I]IdUrd. DNA isolation experiments showed that in the mean >95% of tumour (125)I activity was incorporated in DNA. In conclusion, these results show that close to 20% ID of radio-IdUrd injected i.t. was incorporated in tumour DNA after i.v. pretreatment with clinically relevant doses of FdUrd and that this approach may be further exploited for diffusion and therapy studies with Auger electron- and/or beta-radiation-emitting radio-IdUrd.

Ignorance promotes competition: An auction model with endogenous private valuations

We study a situation in which an auctioneer wishes to sell an object toone of N risk-neutral bidders with heterogeneous preferences. Theauctioneer does not know bidders preferences but has private informationabout the characteristics of the ob ject, and must decide how muchinformation to reveal prior to the auction. We show that the auctioneerhas incentives to release less information than would be efficient andthat the amount of information released increases with the level ofcompetition (as measured by the number of bidders). Furthermore, in aperfectly competitive market the auctioneer would provide the efficientlevel of information.

Competition and cost overruns in procurement

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in theinitial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design speciffication in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspeciffication. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design speciffication and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project's design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design's speciffication level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design speciffication and shows that the sponsor's optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design speciffication so as to make signifficant cost overrunslikely. Since no such misspeciffication occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Price regulation of plastic money: A critical assessment of Spanish rules

Recent decisions by the Spanish national competition authority (TDC) mandate paymentsystems to include only two costs when setting their domestic multilateral interchange fees(MIF): a fixed processing cost and a variable cost for the risk of fraud. This artificiallowering of MIFs will not lower consumer prices, because of uncompetitive retailing; but itwill however lead to higher cardholders fees and, likely, new prices for point of saleterminals, delaying the development of the immature Spanish card market. Also, to the extent that increased cardholders fees do not offset the fall in MIFs revenue, the task of issuing new cards will be underpaid relatively to the task of acquiring new merchants, causing an imbalance between the two sides of the networks. Moreover, the pricing scheme arising from the decisions will cause unbundling and underprovision of those services whose costs are excluded. Indeed, the payment guarantee and the free funding period will tend to be removed from the package of services currently provided, to be either provided by third parties, by issuers for a separate fee, or not provided at all, especially to smaller and medium-sized merchants. Transaction services will also suffer the consequences that the TDC precludes pricing them in variable terms.

Negativity effect in multiparty electoral competition

We construct a dynamic voting model of multiparty competition in order to capture the following facts: voters base their decision on past economicperformance of the parties, and parties and candidates have different objectives. This model may explain the emergence of parties' ideologies,and shows the compatibility of the different objectives of parties and candidates. Together, these results give rise to the formation ofpolitical parties, as infinetely-lived agents with a certain ideology, out of the competition of myopic candidates freely choosing policy positions. We also show that in multicandidate elections held under the plurality system, Hotelling's principle of minimum differentiation is no longer satisfied.

Connexins 43 and 26 are differentially increased after rat bladder outlet obstruction.

To evaluate the regulation of connexin expression by fluid pressure, we have studied the effects of elevated transmural urine pressure on Connexin43 (Cx43) and Cx26. We chose to focus on these two proteins out of the five connexins (Cx26, 43, 40, 37, and 45) which we found by RT-PCR to be expressed in the rat bladder, since in situ hybridization and immunofluorescence showed that Cx43 is the predominant connexin expressed by smooth muscle cells (SMC), whereas Cx26 is abundantly expressed only in the latter cell type. To evaluate whether these connexins are affected by changes in transmural urine pressure, we used a rat model of bladder outlet obstruction, in which a ligature is placed around the urethra. Under conditions of increased fluid pressure due to urine retention, we observed that the expression of both Cx43 and Cx26 increased at both transcript and protein levels, reaching a maximum 7-9 h after the ligature. Further analysis revealed that these changes were accounted for by a fourfold increase in Cx43 mRNA of SMC but not urothelial cell and by a fivefold increase in Cx26 mRNA of urothelium. Scrape-loading of propidium iodide showed that the latter change was paralleled by a twofold increase in coupling between urothelial cells. The data show that Cx43 and Cx26 are differentially regulated during bladder outlet obstruction and contribute to the response of the bladder wall to increased voiding pressure, possibly to control its elasticity.

On information and competition in private value auctions

How much information does an auctioneer want bidders to have in a private value environment?We address this question using a novel approach to ordering information structures based on the property that in private value settings more information leads to a more disperse distribution of buyers updated expected valuations. We define the class of precision criteria following this approach and different notions of dispersion, and relate them to existing criteria of informativeness. Using supermodular precision, we obtain three results: (1) a more precise information structure yields a more efficient allocation; (2) the auctioneer provides less than the efficient level of information since more information increases bidder informational rents; (3) there is a strategic complementarity between information and competition, so that both the socially efficient and the auctioneer s optimal choice of precision increase with the number of bidders, and both converge as the number of bidders goes to infinity.

How competition controls team production: The case of fishing firms

Under team production, those who monitor individual productivity areusually the only ones compensated with a residual that varies withthe performance of the team. This pattern is efficient, as is shownby the prevalence of conventional firms, except for small teams andwhen specialized monitoring is ineffective. Profit sharing in repeatedteam production induces all team members to take disciplinary actionagainst underperformers through switching and separation decisions,however. Such action provides effective self-enforcemnt when themarkets for team members are competitive, even for large teams usingspecialized monitoring. The traditional share system of fishing firmsshows that for this competition to provide powerful enough incentivesthe costs of switching teams and measuring team productivity must bebellow. Risk allocation may constrain the organizational designdefined by the use of a share system. It does not account for itsexistence, however.

Electoral platforms, implemented policies and abstention

Recent studies of American politics evidence that political polarization of both the electorate and the political elite have moved 'almost in tandem for the past half century' (McCarty et al., 2003, p.2), and that party polarization has steadily increased since the 1970s. On the other hand, the empirical literature on party platforms and implemented policies has consistently found an imperfect but nonnegligible correlation between electoral platforms and governmental policies: while platforms tend to be polarized, policies are moderate or centrist. However, existing theoretical models of political competition are not manifestly compatible with these observations.In this paper, we distinguish between electoral platforms and implemented policies by incorporating a non-trivial policy-setting process. It follows that voters may care not only about the implemented policy but also about the platform they support with their vote. We find that while parties tend to polarize their positions, the risk of alienating their constituency prevents them from radicalizing. The analysis evidences that the distribution of the electorate, and not only the (expected) location of a pivotal voter, matters in determining policies. Our results are consistent with the observation of polarized platforms and moderate policies, and the alienation and indifference components of abstention.

Bundling and competition for slots: On the portfolio effects of bundling

We consider competition among sellers when each of them sells a portfolio ofdistinct products to a buyer having limited slots. We study how bundling affectscompetition for slots. Under independent pricing, equilibrium often does not existand hence the outcome is often inefficient. When bundling is allowed, each sellerhas an incentive to bundle his products and an efficient equilibrium always exists.Furthermore, in the case of digital goods, all equilibria are efficient if slotting contracts are prohibited. We also identify portfolio effects of bundling and analyze theconsequences on horizontal mergers. Finally, we derive clear-cut policy implications.

2008 Affirmative Action in Iowa Annual Review

In with accordance 19B.5 of the Code of Iowa, this item has submitted the fiscal year 2008 Affirmative Action in Iowa report. The report details the progress we have made to balance our workforce in FY 2008. Just as importantly, the plan describes steps to put into practice our continued commitment to increasing diversity in the state’ workforce and details our response to the challenges we face as a result of increased talent competition. The State's renewed emphases on recruitments. along with greater oversight of state agency hiring practices, are key strategies that we must aggressively employ in competing for talent and balancing our workforce.

Increasing returns, imperfect competition and factor prices

We show how, in general equilibrium models featuring increasing returns, imperfectcompetition and endogenous markups, changes in the scale of economic activity affectincome distribution across factors. Whenever final goods are gross-substitutes (gross-complements), a scale expansion raises (lowers) the relative reward of the scarce factoror the factor used intensively in the sector characterized by a higher degree of product differentiation and higher fixed costs. Under very reasonable hypothesis, our theory suggests that scale is skill-biased. This result provides a microfoundation for the secular increase in the relative demand for skilled labor. Moreover, it constitutes an important link among major explanations for the rise in wage inequality: skill-biased technical change, capital-skill complementarities and international trade. We provide new evidence on the mechanism underlying the skill bias of scale.

Conflicts of interest, information provision and competition in banking

In some markets, such as the market for drugs or for financial services, sellers have better information than buyersregarding the matching between the buyer's needs and the good's actual characteristics. Depending on the market structure,this may lead to conflicts of interest and/or the underprovision of information by the seller. This paper studies this issuein the market for financial services. The analysis presents a new model of competition between banks, as banks' pricecompetition influences the ensuing incentives for truthful information revelation. We compare two different firm structures,specialized banking, where financial institutions provide a unique financial product, and one-stop banking, where a financialinstitution is able to provide several financial products which are horizontally differentiated. We show first that, althoughconflicts of interest may prevent information disclosure under monopoly, competition forces full information provision forsufficiently high reputation costs. Second, in the presence of market power, one-stop banks will use information strategicallyto increase product differentiation and therefore will always provide reliable information and charge higher rices thanspecialized banks, thus providing a new justification for the creation of one-stop banks. Finally, we show that, ifindependent financial advisers are able to provide reliable information, this increases product differentiation and thereforemarket power, so that it is in the interest of financial intermediaries to promote external independent financial advice.

Corruption and competition in procurement

We consider a procurement problem in which the procurement agent is supposed to allocate the realization of a project according to a competitive mechanism that values bids in terms of the proposed price and quality. Potential bidders have private information about their production costs. Since the procurement agent is also in charge of verifying delivered quality, in exchange for a bribe, he can allow an arbitrary firm to be awarded the realization of the project and to produce a quality level lower than the announced. We compute the equilibrium level of corruption and we study the impact on corruption of the competitiveness of the environment, and in particular of: i) an increase in the number of potential suppliers of the good or service to be procured, ii) competitive (rather than collusive) behavior of procurement agents, and iii) an increase of competition in the market for procurement agents. We identify the effects that influence the equilibrium level of corruption and show that, contrary to conventional wisdom, corruption may well be increasing in competition.