The United Kingdom, the United Nations Human Rights Council and the first cycle of the Universal Periodic Review

The introduction of the Universal Periodic Review (UPR) mechanism as an innovative component of the new Human Rights Council in 2006 has suffered little academic scrutiny. This is partly because it holds as its objective an improvement in human rights situations on the ground, a goal that is difficult to test amongst so many possible causal factors attributable to law reform and policy change, and partly due to the fact that the mechanism has only completed one full cycle of review. This article seeks to remedy this absence of analysis by examining the experience of the United Kingdom during its first review. In doing so, the article first considers the conception of the UPR, before progressing to examine the procedure and recommendations made to the UK by its peers. Finally, the article considers the five year review of the UPR which occurred as a subset of the Human Rights Council Review in 2011 and the resulting changes to the process modalities.

Thanking the Greeks: The Crisis of the Rule of Law in EU Enlargement Regulation

This paper showcases the weaknesses of EU enlargement law and demonstrates how one Member State – namely, Greece – is notable for abusing this weakness, for harming the candidate countries, the EU, and the institutions alike, for stripping the EU position of its predictability, and for undermining the EU Commission’s efforts. Accordingly, Greece has severely incapacitated the key procedural rule of law component of the EU’s enlargement regulation, turning it into a randomised political game and ignoring any long-term goals of stability, prosperity, and peace that the process is to stand for. Following a walk through Greece’s engagement throughout a number of enlargement rounds, the paper concludes that the duty of loyalty – which is presumably able to discipline Member States that undermine the common effort – should find a new meaning in the context of EU enlargement.

The First Government of Northern Ireland, Education Reform, and the Failure of Anti-populist Unionism, 1921–1925

This article examines education reform under the first government of Northern Ireland (1921–5). This embryonic period offered the Ulster Unionist leadership a chance to construct a more inclusive society, one that might diminish sectarian animosities, and thereby secure the fledgling state through cooperation rather than coercion. Such aspirations were severely tested by the ruling party’s need to secure the state against insurgency, and, more lastingly, to assuage the concerns of its historic constituency. The former led to a draconian security policy, the latter to a dependency on populist strategies and rhetoric. It is argued here, however, that this dependency was not absolute until July 1925. Before that, the Belfast government withstood growing pressure from populist agitators to reverse controversial aspects of its education reforms, only relenting when Protestant disaffection threatened the unity of the governing party and the existence of the state.

Giving guilt: the aneconomy of law and justice

The concept of guilt is seen here as debt beyond repayment. Following Derrida, the gesture of giving is placed in the economy of gift, an aneconomical gift that is not part of the exchange cycle. At the same time, guilt is linked to desire, the desire to give and to be free from guilt. Desire is described as the urge to cross over, to apprehend the non-identical and to give oneself away. In this reinforced crossing, where the improbability of giving conditions the improbability of reaching out, guilt and its impetus are found locked up in claustrophobic self-reference. For this reason, the author consults Kierkegaard and Luhmann whose contributions show that the gesture of giving acquires its relevance not so much on account of its recipient, but precisely because of the absence of such a recipient. The combination of an absent recipient and an absented giver fills the gift with an emptiness that can only be channelled back upon itself, in the autopoietics of guilt. This is exactly the fate of the law, which can deal with the guilty but never with guilt (in the above sense). In its attempt to give away guilt, the law attempts to become other than itself: justice. The improbability of crossing over becomes more obvious than ever.