Higher Standards Lead to Better Results, Data Download, Iowa Department of Corrections, February 2010

Like many businesses and government agencies, the Iowa Department of Corrections has been measuring our results for some years now. Certain performance measures are collected and reported to the Governor as part of the Director’s Flexible Performance Agreement used to evaluate the DOC Director. Updates of these measures are forwarded to DOC staff on a quarterly basis. In addition, the Iowa Department of Management requires each state agency to report on certain performance measures as part of Iowa’s effort to ensure accountability in state government. These measures and their progress are posted to www.ResultsIowa.org

Nursing Facility Accountability Measure Work group Membership List, March 19, 2009

Recognize facilities that provide quality of life and appropriate access to medical assistance program beneficiaries in a cost-effective manner. Each measure is intended to represent nursing facility characteristics in each of the four domains.

A note on the coincidence between Stackelberg and Nash equilibria in a differential game between government and firms

[cat] A Navas i Marín Solano es va demostrar la coincidència entre els equilibris de Nash i de Stackelberg per a una versi´o modificada del joc diferencial proposat por Lancaster (1973). Amb l’objectiu d’obtenir una solució interior, es van imposar restriccions importants sobre el valors dels paràmetres del model. En aquest treball estenem aquest resultat, en el límit en que la taxa de descompte és igual a zero, eliminant les restriccions i considerant totes les solucions possibles.

Towards better Olympic accountability

Ten years after the corruption scandal that shook the International Olympic Committee (IOC) in 1999, this article presents the current situation regarding accountability for this non-governmental organization based in Switzerland. The IOC is responsible for ensuring that the Olympic Games are held regularly, and since its foundation has endeavoured to promote sport without discrimination in service of sustainable human development and a better world. Olympic accountability is examined by means of four facets within a theoretical framework. The analysis of each of them shows that although considerable progress has been made by the IOC since 1999, improvements regarding accountability remain both possible and desirable. A mechanism for making improvements is proposed in the Conclusion.

State Public Defender's Office Performance Report, FY 2013

This report pursuant to Department of Management procedures provides an overview of the State Public Defender’s fiscal year 2013 operations related to court-appointed counsel, claims processing, and other indigent defense matters. This information, in accordance with the Accountable Government Act, is meant to help improve decision making and increase accountability to stakeholders and the citizens of Iowa. Iowa’s indigent defense system remains strong. The more than 200 employees of the State Public Defender System have been efficiently providing high quality representation on more cases than ever before. In Fiscal Year 2013, public defender offices closed more than 91,000 cases, at an average cost per case of $282.02, and there was a final finding of ineffective assistance of counsel in less than .002% of these cases. Similarly, more than 1,000 contract attorneys continue to provide high quality representation throughout all 99 of Iowa’s counties. In Fiscal Year 2013, 60,929 claims were submitted to the indigent defense fund, at an average cost per claim of $507.86. This was an decrease of nearly 350 claims from Fiscal Year 2012, and the total amount spent from the indigent defense fund increased slightly.

Department of Human Rights Division of Central Administration Performance Plan, FY2005

This report provides valuable information about Central Administration’s coordination and provision of quality administrative, personnel, and financial services for all DHR divisions. Information is being provided in accordance with the Accountable Government Act to improve decision-making and increase accountability to stakeholders and citizens of Iowa. This report includes performance information for the division’s core function - resource management. The two services, products, and activities provided by the division – financial services and human resources services - also are reviewed. The division is comprised of seven full-time employees. The division’s FY2005 operating budget was $ 604,888 of which $292,660 was from the State General Fund. The additional $ 312,228 was received via intra-state transfers from the non-state funded programs administered by the Department of Human Rights. Central Administration oversaw expenditures of $ 66,868,806 for the entire department, and coordinated the personnel and payroll transactions of 56 FTEs. As we review the results from this year’s report we will continue to refine how we measure our successes and modify plans to improve results.

Iowa Department of Transportation Strategic Plan, 2012-2013

To provide safe and modern transportation systems and services to individuals who travel in Iowa, the Iowa Department of Transportation has identified three broad-based and far-reaching strategic goals: accessibility, responsiveness and accountability. These goals are outlined in this plan, which is aligned with the Accountable Government Act. In addition, the plan specifically addresses strategic needs to serve our customers, and to respond to trends of a growing population and the ever changing need to enhance and expand Iowa's transportation systems. This plan is a living document, and therefore, will be updated periodically.

Executive Order Number Eighty-Five March, 2014

In this order the governor declares that accountability, openness and transparency are essential to the efficient operation of state government and in the best interest of taxpayers as relates to personnel settlement agreements.

Planning for disaster : local government's role in civil preparedness,1975

This handbook deals with the duties and responsibilities of a mayor of a city, a member of a county board of supervisor or a sheriff of a county from the standpoint of their relationship with a county/municipal civil defense and emergency planing administration.

Local Public-Services Provision under Public-Private Partnerships : Contractual Design and Contracting Parties Incentives

When deciding to resort to a PPP contract for the provision of a local public service, local governments have to consider the demand risk allocation between the contracting parties. In this article, I investigate the effects of demand risk allocation on the accountability of procuring authorities regarding consumers changing demand, as well as on the cost-reducing effort incentives of the private public-service provider. I show that contracts in which the private provider bears demand risk motivate more the public authority from responding to customer needs. This is due to the fact that consumers are empowered when the private provider bears demand risk, that is, they have the possibility to oust the private provider in case of non-satisfaction with the service provision, which provides procuring authorities with more credibility in side-trading and then more incentives to be responsive. As a consequence, I show that there is a lower matching with consumers' preferences over time when demand risk is on the public authority rather than on the private provider, and this is corroborated in the light of two famous case studies. However, contracts in which the private provider does not bear demand risk motivate more the private provider from investing in cost-reducing efforts. I highlight then a tradeoff in the allocation of demand risk between productive and allocative efficiency. The striking policy implication of this article for local governments would be that the current trend towards a greater resort to contracts where private providers bear little or no demand risk may not be optimal. Local governments should impose demand risk on private providers within PPP contracts when they expect that consumers' preferences over the service provision will change over time.