Manipulation via endowments in exchange markets with indivisible goods

We consider exchange markets with heterogeneous indivisible goods. We are interested in exchange rules that are efficient and immune to manipulations via endowments (either with respect to hiding or destroying part of the endowment or transferring part of the endowment to another trader). We consider three manipulability axioms: hiding-proofness, destruction-proofness, and transfer-proofness. We prove that no rule satisfying efficiency and hiding-proofness (which implies individual rationality) exists. For two-agent exchange markets with separable and responsive preferences, we show that efficient, individually rational, and destruction-proof rules exist. However, for separable preferences, no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and destruction-proofness. In the case of transfer-proofness the compatibility with efficiency and individual rationality for the two-agent case extends to the unrestricted domain. For exchange markets with separable preferences and more than two agents no rule satisfies efficiency, individual rationality, and transfer-proofness.

An alternative way to model merit good arguments

Besley (1988) uses a scaling approach to model merit good arguments in commodity tax policy. In this paper, I question this approach on the grounds that it produces 'wrong' recommendations--taxation (subsidisation) of merit (demerit) goods--whenever the demand for the (de)merit good is inelastic. I propose an alternative approach that does not suffer from this deficiency, and derive the ensuing first and second best tax rules, as well as the marginal cost expressions to perform tax reform analysis.

Manipulation of optimal matchings via predonation of endowment

In this paper we answer a question posed by Sertel and Özkal-Sanver (2002) on the manipulability of optimal matching rules in matching problems with endowments. We characterize the classes of consumption rules under which optimal matching rules can be manipulated via predonation of endowment.

Stability and manipulation in representative democracies

This paper is devoted to the analysis of all constitutions equipped with electoral systems involving two step procedures. First, one candidate is elected in every jurisdiction by the electors in that jurisdiction, according to some aggregation procedure. Second, another aggregation procedure collects the names of the jurisdictional winners in order to designate the final winner. It appears that whenever individuals are allowed to change jurisdiction when casting their ballot, they are able to manipulate the result of the election except in very few cases. When imposing a paretian condition on every jurisdictions voting rule, it is shown that, in the case of any finite number of candidates, any two steps voting rule that is not manipulable by movement of the electors necessarily gives to every voter the power of overruling the unanimity on its own. A characterization of the set of these rules is next provided in the case of two candidates.

Organisational status and efficiency: the case of the spanish SOE "Paradores"

The purpose of this paper is to provide new evidence on the issue of the effect on public enterprises economic performance of the introduction of some given changes in organisational status and management practices, while keeping the enterprises under public control. Our approach is case study type and relies on comparative efficiency literature. We identify relevant changes on the organisational status of a State owned large hotel group along a period of twenty years, next we measure its annual efficiency indicators, and then evaluate to which extent the observed changes in economic performance can be attributable to the corresponding management reforms carried out. As a result we find that the formally more relevant change in organisational status (the enterprise passing to be a Limited Company), which implied a substantial increase in the enterprise autonomy, did not produce a significant improvement in its economic performance; a finding contrary to what we expected according to agency theory. However, a second relevant organisational change –five years later- when both the principal (government) and the agent (firm’s CEO) changed is consistently related to a significant improvement in economic performance. As a research implication we abide for use more precise agency theory statements; and as a practical implication we argue here that potentialities of improvement brought about by a formal-legal change in the status of the enterprise may require also –in order to actually improve firm’s efficiency- some changes in the firm’s key personal positions: supervisor (principal) and CEO (agent), in the sense that a change to a greater-autonomy for the enterprise it seems should come together a parallel new ‘management culture’. Practical implications Management good practises to apply to other public enterprise’s restructuring in order to improve their efficiency. It’s the first study on organizational changes and efficiency for an important Spanish public enterprise.

The Cultural Olympiad of Barcelona in 1992: Good points and bad points. Lessons for the Future

This text was presented at the Symposium “Olympic Arts and Culture Festivals: Recent Experiences and Future Design”, held in Chicago on the 23-24 June 2008. It provides with an analysis of good and bad points of the Cultural Olympiad of Barcelona’92 in order to discover, from that past experience, any lessons for future Cultural Olympiads and Olympic Movement cultural policy in general, as well as to rethink, in a critical way, Catalan cultural policies.

Diabetes care in Switzerland: good, but perfectible: a population-based cross-sectional survey.

BACKGROUND: While Switzerland invests a lot of money in its healthcare system, little is known about the quality of care delivered. The objective of this study was to assess the quality of care provided to patients with diabetes in the Canton of Vaud, Switzerland. METHODS: Cross-sectional study of 406 non-institutionalized adults with type 1 or 2 diabetes. Patients' characteristics, diabetes and process of care indicators were collected using a self-administered questionnaire. Process indicators (past 12 months) included HbA1C check among HbA1C-aware patients, eye assessment by ophtalmologist, microalbuminuria check, feet examination, lipid test, blood pressure and weight measurement, influenza immunization, physical activity recommendations, and dietary recommendations. Item-by-item (each process of care indicator: percentage of patients having received it), composite (mean percentage of recommended care: sum of received processes of care / sum of possible recommended care), and all-or-none (percentage of patients receiving all specified recommended care) measures were computed. RESULTS: Mean age was 64.4 years; 59% were men. Type 1 and type 2 diabetes were reported by 18.2% and 68.5% of patients, respectively, but diabetes type remained undetermined for almost 20% of patients. Patients were treated with oral anti-diabetic drugs (50%), insulin (23%) or both (27%). Of 219 HbA1C-aware patients, 98% reported ≥ one HbA1C check during the last year. Also, ≥94% reported ≥ one blood pressure measurement, ≥ one weight measurement or lipid test, and 68%, 64% and 56% had feet examination, microalbuminuria check and eye assessment, respectively. Influenza immunization was reported by 62% of the patients.The percentage of patients receiving all processes of care ranged between 14.2%-16.9%, and 46.6%-50.7%, when considering ten and four indicators, respectively. Ambulatory care utilization showed little use of multidisciplinary care, and low levels of participation in diabetes-education classes. CONCLUSIONS: While routine processes-of-care were performed annually in most patients, diabetes-specific risk screenings, influenza immunization, physical activity and dietary recommendations were less often reported; this was also the case for multidisciplinary care and participation in education classes. There is room for diabetes care improvement in Switzerland. These results should help define priorities and further develop country-specific chronic disease management initiatives for diabetes.

Gastric supply manipulation to modulate ghrelin production and enhance vascularization to the cardia: proof of the concept in a porcine model.

Introduction. Selective embolization of the left-gastric artery (LGA) reduces levels of ghrelin and achieves significant short-term weight loss. However, embolization of the LGA would prevent the performance of bariatric procedures because the high-risk leakage area (gastroesophageal junction [GEJ]) would be devascularized. Aim. To assess an alternative vascular approach to the modulation of ghrelin levels and generate a blood flow manipulation, consequently increasing the vascular supply to the GEJ. Materials and methods. A total of 6 pigs underwent a laparoscopic clipping of the left gastroepiploic artery. Preoperative and postoperative CT angiographies were performed. Ghrelin levels were assessed perioperatively and then once per week for 3 weeks. Reactive oxygen species (ROS; expressed as ROS/mg of dry weight [DW]), mitochondria respiratory rate, and capillary lactates were assessed before and 1 hour after clipping (T0 and T1) and after 3 weeks of survival (T2), on seromuscular biopsies. A celiac trunk angiography was performed at 3 weeks. Results. Mean (±standard deviation) ghrelin levels were significantly reduced 1 hour after clipping (1902 ± 307.8 pg/mL vs 1084 ± 680.0; P = .04) and at 3 weeks (954.5 ± 473.2 pg/mL; P = .01). Mean ROS levels were statistically significantly decreased at the cardia at T2 when compared with T0 (0.018 ± 0.006 mg/DW vs 0.02957 ± 0.0096 mg/DW; P = .01) and T1 (0.0376 ± 0.008mg/DW; P = .007). Capillary lactates were significantly decreased after 3 weeks, and the mitochondria respiratory rate remained constant over time at the cardia and pylorus, showing significant regional differences. Conclusions. Manipulation of the gastric flow targeting the gastroepiploic arcade induces ghrelin reduction. An endovascular approach is currently under evaluation.

The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

Estudi d'un sistema integrat en una empresa tecnològica

El projecte que es presenta és l’estudi de diferents sistemes integrats (ERP) per a la seva implementació en una empresa de desenvolupament de software. Els sistemes integrats són sistemes de gestió de la informació que integren i automatitzen moltes de les pràctiques del negoci d’una empresa per a facilitar-ne l’intercanvi d’informació entre les diferents parts. El projecte ha estat desenvolupat seguint la metodologia METRICA per a la implementació de software, i a partir d’aquesta metodologia s’han estudiat les característiques de l’empresa i posteriorment s’ha fet un anàlisi dels diferents sistemes integrats que podrien ser bones opcions per a implementar-los en l’empresa estudiada. Finalment, s’ha escollit el sistema integrat que més requisits acomplia per a ser instal·lat en l’empresa.

Correlated equilibria, good and bad: an experimental study

We report results from an experiment that explores the empirical validity of correlated equilibrium, an important generalization of the Nash equilibrium concept. Specifically, we seek to understand the conditions under which subjects playing the game of Chicken will condition their behavior on private, third–party recommendations drawn from known distributions. In a “good–recommendations” treatment, the distribution we use is a correlated equilibrium with payoffs better than any symmetric payoff in the convex hull of Nash equilibrium payoff vectors. In a “bad–recommendations” treatment, the distribution is a correlated equilibrium with payoffs worse than any Nash equilibrium payoff vector. In a “Nash–recommendations” treatment, the distribution is a convex combination of Nash equilibrium outcomes (which is also a correlated equilibrium), and in a fourth “very–good–recommendations” treatment, the distribution yields high payoffs, but is not a correlated equilibrium. We compare behavior in all of these treatments to the case where subjects do not receive recommendations. We find that when recommendations are not given to subjects, behavior is very close to mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium play. When recommendations are given, behavior does differ from mixed–strategy Nash equilibrium, with the nature of the differ- ences varying according to the treatment. Our main finding is that subjects will follow third–party recommendations only if those recommendations derive from a correlated equilibrium, and further, if that correlated equilibrium is payoff–enhancing relative to the available Nash equilibria.

No Good Deals - No Bad Models

Faced with the problem of pricing complex contingent claims, an investor seeks to make his valuations robust to model uncertainty. We construct a notion of a model- uncertainty-induced utility function and show that model uncertainty increases the investor's eff ective risk aversion. Using the model-uncertainty-induced utility function, we extend the \No Good Deals" methodology of Cochrane and Sa a-Requejo [2000] to compute lower and upper good deal bounds in the presence of model uncertainty. We illustrate the methodology using some numerical examples.

Coordination in Public Good Provision: How Individual Volunteering is Impacted by the Volunteering of Others

In this analysis, we examine the relationship between an individual's decision to volunteer and the average level of volunteering in the community where the individual resides. Our theoretical model is based on a coordination game , in which volunteering by others is informative regarding the benefit from volunteering. We demonstrate that the interaction between this information and one's private information makes it more likely that he or she will volunteer, given a higher level of contributions by his or her peers. We complement this theoretical work with an empirical analysis using Census 2000 Summary File 3 and Current Population Survey (CPS) 2004-2007 September supplement file data. We control for various individual and community characteristics, and employ robustness checks to verify the results of the baseline analysis. We additionally use an innovative instrumental variables strategy to account for reflection bias and endogeneity caused by selective sorting by individuals into neighborhoods, which allows us to argue for a causal interpretation. The empirical results in the baseline, as well as all robustness analyses, verify the main result of our theoretical model, and we employ a more general structure to further strengthen our results.