The euro crisis: ten roots, but fewer solutions. Bruegel Policy Contribution 2012/17, October 2012

Many factors have contributed to the euro crisis. Some have been addressed by policymakers, even if belatedly, and European Union member states have been willing to improve the functioning of the euro area by agreeing to relinquish national sovereignty in some important areas. However, the most pressing issue threatening the integrity, even the existence, of the euro, has not been addressed: the deepening economic contraction in southern euro-area member states. The common interest lies in preserving the integrity of the euro area and in offering these countries improved prospects. Domestic structural reform and appropriate fiscal consolidation, wage increases and slower fiscal consolidation in economically stronger euro-area countries, a weaker euro exchange rate, debt restructuring and an investment programme should be part of the arsenal. In the medium term, more institutional change will be necessary to complement the planned overhaul of the euro area institutional framework. This will include the deployment of a euro-area economic stabilising tool, managing the overall fiscal stance of the euro area, some form of Eurobonds and measures to make euro-area level decision making bodies more effective and democratically legitimate.

What distinguishes the euro crisis from a ‘normal’ financial crisis? CEPS Commentary, 6 November 2012

This Commentary attempts to discern the distinguishing features between the present euro crisis and the financial crisis brought on in the US by the subprime lending disaster and the ensuing collapse of banks and other financial institutions in 2007-08. It finds that whereas the US was able to bring its crisis to an end by socialising the dubious debt and stabilising its valuation so that it could migrate to other investors capable of bearing the risk, this pattern can be only partly repeated in the eurozone, where both debt socialisation and a return to normal risk assessment are more problematic.. It concludes, nevertheless, that the crisis should now abate somewhat given that most risk-averse institutions have by now sold their holdings of peripheral countries’ sovereign debt and especially in light of the ECB’s assurances that it will not allow the euro to disintegrate.

Reactive crisis management in construction projects

Patterns of communication and behaviour emerge within a construction project in response to a construction crisis. This paper investigates, within a grounded theory framework, the nature of these patterns, the sociological and psychological forces which shape them and their relationship with crisis management efficiency. A grounded theory is presented in four parts. The first part conceives a construction crisis as a period of social instability, arising from conflicting interest groups, seeking to exercise power in the pursuit of social structures which suit their political and economic interests. The second part sees a construction crisis as a de-sensitizing phenomenon which results in a period of behavioural instability and conflict which is self-perpetuating. The third part cites social structure as an important influence upon construction crisis management efficiency, in determining the efficiency of information flow, and the level of uncertainty between those affected. The fourth part points to the in-built defence mechanisms which construction crises have and to three managerial ironies which make construction crisis management difficult.