A participação da United States Agency for international development (USAID) na reforma da universidade brasileira na década de 1960

O presente estudo propôs-se investigar de que forma os acordos assinados com a USAID sobre ensino superior no Brasil fizeram parte da estratégia dos Estados Unidos de construção de regimes internacionais mais amplos que deveriam sustentar a ordem mundial depois da Segunda Guerra Mundial. A hipótese central é a de que esses acordos estavam relacionados com a estratégia de promoção do desenvolvimento econômico e social que tinha, de um lado, a noção de que o desenvolvimento poderia ser planejado e implementado pelos governos e, de outro, uma visão de segurança internacional em que a promoção do desenvolvimento era entendida como fator essencial. Para a realização do estudo foram realizadas análise documental e entrevistas com pessoas que, de várias formas, estiveram ligadas às ações da USAID no ensino superior brasileiro na década de 1960, em especial ao caso de cooperação técnica com a Universidade Federal do Rio Grande do Sul. Os dados levantados pelo estudo permitiram confirmar em larga medida a hipótese levantada inicialmente, mas mostraram também que a questão é bem mais complexa. Os acordos da USAID sobre ensino superior no Brasil fizeram parte da estratégia de construção de regimes internacionais, mas representaram apenas uma etapa de um amplo programa de cooperação científica e tecnológica iniciada muito antes.

The United States and Latin America and the Caribbean: Highlights of economics and trade

Foreword by Alicia Bárcena

Hispanics in the United States

Includes bibliography

The United States and Latin America and the Caribbean: highlights of economy and trade

Document prepared on the occasion of the visit of President Barack Obama to Brazil, Chile and El Salvador in March 2011

The United States subprime mortgage crisis and its implications for the Caribbean

The bursting of the property bubble – subprime mortgage crisis – in 2007 in the United States has engendered panic, recession fears and turmoil in the global financial system. Although the United States economy grew by 0.6 per cent in the last quarter of 2007, down from 4.9 per cent in the previous quarter, day by day worsening scenarios emerge, from escalating oil prices, to a depreciating dollar and financial institutions’ bailout by the Federal Reserve. Many economists and policy makers share the view that a subprime-led recession – i.e. two consecutive quarters with negative growth – is inevitable and will be much deeper and longer than the 2001 dot-com downturn. Moreover, the critical situation of the financial system has driven some analysts to argue that should the monetary policy response fails to restore confidence among investors, the outcome would be the worst crisis seen since the Great Depression. This pessimism is not only among specialists. Indeed, in late March 2008 the Consumer Confidence Index in the United States recorded its lowest level since February 1992. A recession in the United States will undoubtedly have an important impact on the world economy, despite the continuous rapid growth experienced by emerging economies, particularly China and India. The purpose of this article is threefold: first, to characterize the current situation in the United States economy; second, to discuss the economic policy responses; and finally, to elaborate on how Caribbean economies may be affected.

Non-State United States Support For The Contras During The Reagan Era

Under President Ronald Reagan, the White House pursued a complex foreign policy towards the Contras, rebels in trying to overthrow the Sandinista regime in Nicaragua, in Nicaragua. In 1979, the leftist Sandinista government seized power in Nicaragua. The loss of the previous pro-United States Somoza military dictatorship deeply troubled the conservatives, for whom eradication of communism internationally was a top foreign policy goal. Consequently, the Reagan Administration sought to redress the policy of his predecessor, Jimmy Carter, and assume a hard line stance against leftist regimes in Central America. Reagan and the conservatives within his administration, therefore, supported the Contra through military arms, humanitarian aid, and financial contributions. This intervention in Nicaragua, however, failed to garner popular support from American citizens and Democrats. Consequently, between 1982 and 1984 Congress prohibited further funding to the Contras in a series of legislation called the Boland Amendments. These Amendments barred any military aid from reaching the Contras, including through intelligence agencies. Shortly after their passage, Central Intelligence Agency Director William Casey and influential members of Reagan¿s National Security Council (NSC) including National Security Advisor Robert McFarlane, NSC Aide Oliver North, and Deputy National Security Advisor John Poindexter cooperated to identify and exploit loopholes in the legislation. By recognizing the NSC as a non-intelligence body, these masterminds orchestrated a scheme in which third parties, including foreign countries and private donors, contributed both financially and through arms donations to sustain the Contras independently of Congressional oversight. This thesis explores the mechanism and process of soliciting donations from private individuals, recognizing the forces and actors that created a situation for covert action to continue without detection. Oliver North, the main actor of the state, worked within his role as an NSC bureaucrat to network with influential politicians and private individuals to execute the orders of his superiors and shape foreign policy. Although Reagan articulated his desire for the Contras to remain a military presence in Nicaragua, he delegated the details of policy to his subordinates, which allowed this scheme to flourish. Second, this thesis explores the individual donors, analyzing their role as private citizens in sustaining and encouraging the policy of the Reagan Administration. The Contra movement found non-state support from followers of the New Right, demonstrated through financial and organizational assistance, that allowed the Reagan Administration¿s statistically unpopular policy in Nicaragua to continue. I interpret these donors as politically involved, but politically philanthropic, individuals, donating to their charity of choice to further the principles of American freedom internationally in a Cold War environment. The thesis then proceeds to assess the balance of power between the executive and other political actors in shaping policy, concluding that the executive cannot act alone in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy.