Hādhā Taqrīr-i farāʼiẓ [sic] : manuscript, [1747]

Paginated 94-101.

[ Islamic hymns] : manuscript, undated

Title supplied by cataloger

Majmūʻah : manuscript, 1401-1402

1. Tarih-i Al-i Osman bin Ertuğrul (dates of Ottoman Sultans) (f. 1r) -- 2. Suret-i arzname (ff. 1v--2v) -- 3. Arabic poem, awāʼil Muḥarram 804 [August 11-20, 1401] (copied by Ḥājjī Aḥmad ibn ... al-B.f.l.ghānī) (ff. 3r-11r) -- 4. Taʻrīfāt ʻilm usūl fiqh, Shawwāl 804 [May 1402] (ff. 11v-16v) -- 5. Arabic glossary (explanations in Arabic and Persian), 804 [1402] (copied by Idrīs b. Ḥasan b. Bayram) (ff. 17r-52r) -- 6. Sharḥ al-Farāʼiḍ al-Sirājīyah / ʻAbd al-Karīm b. Muḥammad b. al-Ḥasan al-Hamadānī al-Tabrīzī, awāsiṭ Dhī al-Ḥijja 804 [July 1402] (copied by Idrīs b. Ḥasan b. Bayram) (ff. 52v-94r) -- 7. Lughat-i ḥurūf (ff. 94v-95r) -- 8. Mufradāt-i Pārsī (A list of Persian verbs) (ff. 95v-97v).

Behcet ül-fetava maan-nükul

[Abdullah Yenişehirli].

Nova ac verissima Maris Caspii ante hac maximam fere partem nobis incogniti ac regionum adjacentium delineatio: jussu invictissimi principis Petri Alexii fil. magni Russorum imperatoris

immenso labore et maximis sumptibus facta, atque ex autographo in lucem edita per Reinerum Ottens geographum Amstelaedam ; Iacob Keyser sculp.

Prof. C. Haussknecht's Routen im Orient 1865-1869: III. Kurdistan und Irak

nach dessen Originalskizzen redigirt von H. Kiepert.

Tarjamah-ʹi Tārīkh-i Yangī Dunyā : manuscript, 18th cent

Title supplied by the cataloger.

Rawda al-Ushshaq (Garden of Lovers) of Arifi, with three paintings : manuscript, ca. 1560-1575

Artist unknown.

Recent Armenian Developments

The War has brought us into a close relation with Armenia. The annihilation of her people in 1915 and 1916 aroused universal sympathy. For the most of us Armenia, hitherto, had been relegated to a position of partial obscurity in the Near East. We were acquainted with the fact that they had suffered persecution beore at Turkish hands but an indifference born of unfamiliarity with her history, customs and people still continued with us. However much the gulf separating ourselves and these people has been narrowed by the war it is only by an actual journey into their life past and present that we can ever come into a full appreciation of a people who despite persecution and oppression are potentially fine citizens.

Turkey's boycott of the Cyprus EU presidency: context, meaning and its consequences. EU Centre in Singapore Working Paper No. 9, September 2012

In 2011 Turkish officials began indicating their intention to suspend all contact with Cyprus’s presidency of the Council of the European Union (EU), slated for the second half of 2012, given the issues surrounding the unresolved Cyprus conflict. This came as the latest development in a long and arduous path of Turkey’s application for EU membership that began in 1987. This paper provides the context – the Cyprus conflict, Turkey’s EU accession negotiations, and the Cyprus reunification talks – in understanding the reasons and consequences of Ankara’s boycott of the Cyprus presidency. The article also considers the evolving nature and the role of the rotating presidency of the Council of the EU, especially after the implementation of the Lisbon Treaty, and how this may have played into Turkey’s calculations in calling for the boycott.

Will the readmission agreement bring the EU and Turkey together or pull them apart? CEPS Commentary, 4 February 2014

Following a period when EU-Turkish relations have not been particularly close, the readmission agreement signed in December 2013 by the Home Affairs Commissioner Cecilia Malmstrom and the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmet Davutoglu could help inject some sorely needed goodwill and trust into the relationship. Yet, as pointed out in this commentary, there is always the risk that the challenges faced in the actual implementation of the agreement will aggravate the relationship.

Turkey votes: Part I - The storm before the election. EPC Commentary, 26 March 2014

At an election rally on 20 March 2014, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared he wanted to “root out Twitter, no matter what the international community thought”. A few hours later Twitter was shut down. The decision backfired. Turkey’s some 12 million Twitter users immediately found ways to circumnavigate the ban; it highlighted the increasingly authoritarian trend of Erdoğan; and it brought immediate condemnation from numerous foreign leaders. The move has been viewed by many Turks as part of an operation to cover up a corruption probe that has consumed Turkey since 17 December, before key local elections on 30 March. The elections, which will be followed by Presidential election in August and political ones expected in 2015, have become a referendum on Erdoğan’s popularity, and are set to shape Turkey’s political landscape. A lot is at stake as a big win for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) may not only be used by Erdoğan to justify his response to the corruption scandal but also risks consolidating his increasingly authoritarian style of governance.

Turkey votes: Part III - President Erdoğan - A foregone conclusion? EPC Commentary, 10 July 2014

On 1 July, after months of speculation, Turkey’s Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, announced he would run in the country’s first direct presidential elections on 10 August. Erdoğan, who has dominated Turkish politics for over a decade, is viewed as the clear favourite. With current polls suggesting he could take as much as 52% of the vote, an outright victory in the first round is possible. His main rival, Ekmeleddin İhsanoğlu, is very much the underdog. Until recently, an international diplomat with no experience in politics, he is the joint candidate of Turkey’s two main opposition parties, the Republican People’s Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP). Selahattin Demirtaş, the Co-Chairman of the Kurdish Peoples Democratic Party (HDP) is also in the race, but is not expected to make it into double digits. The Kurdish vote however, could prove to be crucial if the ballot goes to a second round on 24 August. With Erdoğan wanting to increase Presidential powers, the stakes are high. With his belief in majoritarian rule, and increasingly authoritarian style of governance there has been an erosion of democracy and civil liberties. Many observers fear this trend may increase.

MODEL COUNTRIES IN POLITICAL ANALYSIS. Is Turkey a Model for State-Building in the Arab World? Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 10/2014

This study analyzes the Turkish case as a model country for the state-building processes in the Arab world in the aftermath of the Arab revolts that took place in Tunisia, Egypt and Libya. To this end, it deals with the Turkish case in three phases: the founding of the Turkish Republic, political developments until 2002, and the post-2002 Justice and Development Party period. The study focuses on state-society relations manifested in the form of a secular-religious cleavage intertwined with problematic civil-military relations. Each phase of Turkey’s history is compared to cleavages and civil-military relations in Egypt, Tunisia and Libya. After analyzing the constitution-making processes in the latter three countries following the Arab revolts, the study concludes by discussing the viability of the Turkish model in the light of Turkey’s search for a new constitution.

Helpless and lonely: Turkey's attitude towards the war in Syria. OSW Commentary No. 136, 09.05.2014

The conflict in Syria, which has lasted since 2011, has become the most significant test of the efficiency of Turkey’s foreign policy and the biggest challenge to Turkey’s security in recent decades. The lack of a clear prospect of an end to the war does not allow us to come to a final conclusion regarding the Syrian civil war’s importance for Turkey. However, it can be said today that with the exception of the initial phase of the conflict, Ankara’s influence over the course of events in Syria has been limited, and the war itself is evolving in a direction that is unfavourable for Turkey: the hostile regime of Bashar al-Assad is still in power, the opposition has proved to be an unreliable or even a dangerous ally, and in northern Syria militant jihadist groups and Kurds are gaining importance. It is also quite unlikely that the West will take any greater responsibility for stabilising the situation in the region. In response to such an unfortunate situation, and out of fear of risking deeper involvement in the conflict, during the past year Turkey’s policy towards Syria has been restrained, reactive and focused mainly on defending Turkey’s territory. However, this policy offers no security guarantees and does not prevent the country’s regional position from weakening, especially in the context of the reinforcement of the jihadist militants and the Kurdish autonomy in northern Syria. The arguments for Turkey continuing its defensive policy are strong: the country fears the possible results of an open confrontation with Assad’s forces; most probably it could not count on support for such actions from within its own society or its Western allies. It also does not have enough acceptance within the anti-Assad opposition circles. On the other hand, though, the risk of uncontrolled development of events is still present; the risk of confrontations with armed jihadist militants is growing; and the potential operation of Turkish forces, either against the jihadists or against Assad’s army, could be considered as a method of diverting attention from the political problems with which the AKP government has been struggling at home.