Networks in Argentine agriculture: a multiple-case study approach

Argentina is among the four largest producers of soybeans, sunflower, corn, and wheat, among other agricultural products. Institutional and policy changes during the 1990s fostered the development of Argentine agriculture and the introduction of innovative process and product technologies (no-till, agrochemicals, GMO, GPS) and new investments in modern, large-scale sunflower and soybean processing plants. In addition to technological changes, a "quiet revolution" occurred in the way agricultural production was carried out and organized: from self-production or ownership agriculture to a contract-based agriculture. The objective of this paper is to explore and describe the emergence of networks in the Argentine crop production sector. The paper presents and describes four cases that currently represent about 50% of total grain and oilseed production in Argentina: "informal hybrid form", "agricultural trust fund", "investor-oriented corporate structure", and "network of networks". In all cases, hybrid forms involve a group of actors linked by common objectives, mainly to gain scale, share resources, and improve the profitability of the business. Informal contracts seem to be the most common way of organizing the agriculture process, but using short-term contracts and sequential interfirm collaboration. Networks of networks involve long-term relationships and social development, and reciprocal interfirm collaboration. Agricultural trust fund and investor-oriented corporate structures have combined interfirm collaboration and medium-term relationships. These organizational forms are highly flexible and show a great capacity to adapt to challenges; they are competitive because they enjoy aligned incentives, flexibility, and adaptability.

[Rapport sur l'agriculture, fait dans la séance du 16 vendémiaire an III, à la Convention nationale, au nom du Comité d'agriculture, par Pénière] ([Reprod.])

Collection : Les archives de la Révolution française ; 10.2.136

Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship, June 30, 2002

State Agency Audit Report

Report of Recommendations to the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship, June 30, 2003

State Agency Audit Report

Report of Recommendation to the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship, June 30, 2004

State Audit Reports

Sustainable Development and Concrete Technology, May 2004

For a variety of reasons, the concrete construction industry is not sustainable. First, it consumes huge quantities of virgin materials. Second, the principal binder in concrete is portland cement, the production of which is a major contributor to greenhouse gas emissions that are implicated in global warming and climate change. Third, many concrete structures suffer from lack of durability which has an adverse effect on the resource productivity of the industry. Because the high-volume fly ash concrete system addresses all three sustainability issues, its adoption will enable the concrete construction industry to become more sustainable. In this paper, a brief review is presented of the theory and construction practice with concrete mixtures containing more than 50% fly ash by mass of the cementitious material. Mechanisms are discussed by which the incorporation of high volume of fly ash in concrete reduces the water demand, improves the workability, minimizes cracking due to thermal and drying shrinkage, and enhances durability to reinforcement corrosion, sulfate attack, and alkali-silica expansion. For countries like China and India, this technology can play an important role in meeting the huge demand for infrastructure in a sustainable manner.

Cooperatives and Contracting in Agriculture: The Case of West Liberty Foods, October 2005

The West Liberty Foods turkey cooperative was formed in 1996 to purchase the assets and assume operations of Louis Rich Foods (an investor-owned processing rm), which, at the time, announced the imminent shutdown of its West Liberty, Iowa, processing facility. We study the creation and performance of this �new generation� cooperative using eld interviews with grower members and company management. We describe changes, before and after the buyout, in the contractual apparatus used for procuring live turkeys, and in the communication requirements, work expectations, and nancial positions of growers. During the private ownership period, most of the inputs (except labor and facilities) were provided by the rm; there was substantial supervision of the growers' actions; growers faced little price and production risk; and growers' equity was due largely to ownership of land and other farm assets. Our interviews reveal that, after cooperative formation, growers were exposed to considerable additional risk; monitoring of growers by the rm was less intensive; grower time and effort commitments to turkey production increased substantially; and a signicant fraction of rm (cooperative) equity came from growers' willingness to leverage their farm and personal assets (and hence indirectly their existing relationships with local lenders). We argue that some of these changes are consistent with a nancial contract where asset pledging and its corollary risk generate higher work effort by growers and a reduction in agency rents. These economies likely compensate for an organizational deadweight loss traditionally associated with cooperative governance.