Improving the prediction of the functional impact of cancer mutations by baseline tolerance transformation

High-throughput prioritization of cancer-causing mutations (drivers) is a key challenge of cancer genome projects, due to the number of somatic variants detected in tumors. One important step in this task is to assess the functional impact of tumor somatic mutations. A number of computational methods have been employed for that purpose, although most were originally developed to distinguish disease-related nonsynonymous single nucleotide variants (nsSNVs) from polymorphisms. Our new method, transformed Functional Impact score for Cancer (transFIC), improves the assessment of the functional impact of tumor nsSNVs by taking into account the baseline tolerance of genes to functional variants.

Roster of State Officials, 2012

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 2011

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 2010

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 2009

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 2008

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 2006

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 2005

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

Roster of State Officials, 2004

Pursuant to Iowa Code section 2B.5, the State Roster is published as a correct list of state officers and deputies, members of boards and commissions, justices of the Supreme Court, judges of the Court of Appeals, judges of the district courts, including district associate judges and judicial magistrates, and members of the General Assembly. More specifically, the State Roster lists the membership of active, policy-making boards and commissions established by state law, executive order of the Governor, or Iowa Court Rule. The State Roster may also list advisory councils of a permanent nature whose members are appointed by the Governor, as well as other boards and commissions of interest to the public.

The Same, but Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics of Delegation to Independent Authorities

Independent regulatory agencies are the institutional foundations of the regulatory state that, during the past 15 years, has gained prominence throughout Europe. This article studies the rise of independent authorities in European countries by comparing regulatory agencies and central banks. Delegation to independent central banks and to independent regulatory agencies is similar in many respects. In both cases, agents are deliberately made independent from political principals through a specific institutional design. Moreover, it has been argued that delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies is linked to the need for policy-makers to improve the credibility of policy commitments, to the wish of incumbent politicians to tie the hands of future majorities, and to the extent to which the institutional contexts safeguard policy stability. Through an analysis of the formal independence of central banks and regulatory agencies in Western Europe, this article identifies an empirical puzzle that casts doubts on the accuracy of current explanations. Veto players and the uncertainty of incumbent policy-makers in respect to their re-election prospects matter for delegation to both central banks and regulatory agencies, but in opposite ways. Making sense of these anomalies is necessary to achieve a better understanding of delegation to independent authorities.

When supply travels far beyond demand: Causes of oversupply in Spain’s transport infrastructure

Spain’s transport infrastructure policy has become a paradigmatic case of oversupply and of mismatch with demand. The massive expansion of the country’s transport infrastructure over the last decade has not been a response to demand bottlenecks or previously identified needs. For this reason, the intensity of use today on all interurban modes of transport in Spain falls well below that of other EU countries. This paper analyzes the institutional and regulatory factors that have permitted this policy, allowing us to draw lessons from the Spanish case that should help other countries avoid the pitfalls and shortcomings of Spanish policy.

When supply travels far beyond demand: Causes of oversupply in Spain’s transport infrastructure

Spain’s transport infrastructure policy has become a paradigmatic case of oversupply and of mismatch with demand. The massive expansion of the country’s transport infrastructure over the last decade has not been a response to demand bottlenecks or previously identified needs. For this reason, the intensity of use today on all interurban modes of transport in Spain falls well below that of other EU countries. This paper analyzes the institutional and regulatory factors that have permitted this policy, allowing us to draw lessons from the Spanish case that should help other countries avoid the pitfalls and shortcomings of Spanish policy.

Three essays on the determinants of output, inflation and interest rates

Résumé: Output, inflation and interest rates are key macroeconomic variables, in particular for monetary policy. In modern macroeconomic models they are driven by random shocks which feed through the economy in various ways. Models differ in the nature of shocks and their transmission mechanisms. This is the common theme underlying the three essays of this thesis. Each essay takes a different perspective on the subject: First, the thesis shows empirically how different shocks lead to different behavior of interest rates over the business cycle. For commonly analyzed shocks (technology and monetary policy errors), the patterns square with standard models. The big unknown are sources of inflation persistence. Then the thesis presents a theory of monetary policy, when the central bank can better observe structural shocks than the public. The public will then seek to infer the bank's extra knowledge from its policy actions and expectation management becomes a key factor of optimal policy. In a simple New Keynesian model, monetary policy becomes more concerned with inflation persistence than otherwise. Finally, the thesis points to the huge uncertainties involved in estimating the responses to structural shocks with permanent effects.