Political institutions and the development of telecomunications

It has traditionally been argued that the development of telecommunications infrastructure is dependent on the quality of countries’ political institutions. We estimate the effect of political institutions on the diffusion of three telecommunications services and find it to be much smaller in cellular telephony than in the others. By evaluating the importance of institutions for technologies rather than for industries, we reveal important growth opportunities for developing countries and offer policy implications for alleviating differences between countries in international telecommunications development.

Political alliances and organisational change in political parties: a framework for analysis

This article sets out a theoretical framework for the study of organisational change within political alliances. To achieve this objective it uses as a starting point a series of premises, the most notable of which include the definition of organisational change as a discrete, complex and focussed phenomenon of changes in power within the party. In accordance with these premises, it analyses the synthetic model of organisational change proposed by Panebianco (1988). After examining its limitations, a number of amendments are proposed to adapt it to the way political alliances operate. The above has resulted in the design of four new models. In order to test its validity and explanatory power in a preliminary manner, the second part looks at the organisational change of the UDC within the CiU alliance between 1978 and 2001. The discussion and conclusions reached demonstrate the problems of determinism of the Panebianco model and suggest, tentatively, the importance of the power balance within the alliance as a key factor.

Pharmacokinetic aspects of Tert-Butylaminoethyl disulfide, an experimental drug against schistosomiasis in mice

A preliminary study of the pharmacokinetic parameters of t-Butylaminoethyl disulfide was performed after administration of two different single doses (35 and 300 mg/kg) of either the cold or labelled drug. Plasma or blood samples were treated with dithiothreitol, perchloric acid, and, after filtration, submitted to further purification with anionic resein. In the final step, the drug was retained on a cationic resin column, eluted with NaCl 1M and detected according to the method of Ellman (1958). Alternatively, radioactive drug was detected by liquid scintillation counting. The results corresponding to the smaller dose of total drug suggested a pharmacokinetic behavior related to a one open compartment model with the following parameters: area under the intravenous curve (AUC i.v.):671 ± 14; AUC oral: 150 ± 40 µg.min. ml [raised to the power of -1]; elimination rate constant: 0.071 min [raised to the power of -1]; biological half life: 9.8 min; distribution volume: 0.74 ml/g. For the higher dose, the results seemed to obey a more complex undertermined model. Combining the results, the occurence of a dose-dependent pharmacokinetic behavior is suggested, the drug being rapidly absorbed and rapidly eliminated; the elimination process being related mainly to metabolization. The drug seems to be more toxic when administered I.V. because by this route it escapes first pass metabolism, while being quickly distributed to tissues. The maximum tolerated blood level seems to be around 16 µg/ml.

Political Risk, Economic Integration, and the Foreign Direct Investment Decision

In this paper we analyse the impact of policy uncertainty on foreign direct investment strategies. We also consider the impact of economic integration upon FDI decisions. The paper follows the real options approach, which allows investigating the value to a firm of waiting to invest and/or disinvest, when payoffs are stochastic due to political uncertainty and investments are partially reversible. Across the board we find that political uncertainty can be very detrimental to FDI decisions while economic integration leads to an increasing benefit of investing abroad.

Political economics and normative analysis

The approaches and opinions of economists often dominate public policy discussion. Economists have gained this privileged position partly (or perhaps mainly) because of the obvious relevance of their subject matter, but also because of the unified methodology (neo-classical economics) that the vast majority of modern economists bring to their analysis of policy problems and proposed solutions. The idea of Pareto efficiency and its potential trade-off with equity is a central idea that is understood by all economists and this common language provides the economics profession with a powerful voice in public affairs. The purpose of this paper is to review and reflect upon the way in which economists find themselves analysing and providing suggestions for social improvements and how this role has changed over roughly the last 60 years. We focus on the fundamental split in the public economics tradition between those that adhere to public finance and those that adhere to public choice. A pure public finance perspective views failures in society as failures of the market. The solutions are technical, as might be enacted by a benevolent dictator. The pure public choice view accepts (sometimes grudgingly) that markets may fail, but so, it insists, does politics. This signals institutional reforms to constrain the potential for political failure. Certain policy recommendations may be viewed as compatible with both traditions, but other policy proposals will be the opposite of that proposed within the other tradition. In recent years a political economics synthesis emerged. This accepts that institutions are very important and governments require constraints, but that some degree of benevolence on the part of policy makers should not be assumed non-existent. The implications for public policy from this approach are, however, much less clear and perhaps more piecemeal. We also discuss analyses of systematic failure, not so much on the part of markets or politicians, but by voters. Most clearly this could lead to populism and relaxing the idea that voters necessarily choose their interests. The implications for public policy are addressed. Throughout the paper we will relate the discussion to the experience of UK government policy-making.

Do political incentives matter for tax policies? Ideology, opportunism and the tax structure

This paper investigates the importance of political ideology and opportunism in the choice of the tax structure. In particular, we examine the effects of cabinet ideology and elections on the distribution of the tax burden across factors of production and consumption for 21 OECD countries over the period 1970-2000 by employing four alternative cabinet ideology measures and by using the methodology of effective tax rates. There is evidence of both opportunistic and partisan effects on tax policies. More precisely, we find that left-wing governments rely more on capital relative to labor income taxation and that they tend to increase consumption taxes. Moreover, we find that income tax rates (but not consumption taxes) tend to be reduced in preelectoral periods and that capital effective tax rates (defined broadly to include taxes on selfemployed income) are reduced by more than effective labor tax rates.

An Archival Case Study: Revisiting The Life and Political Economy of Lauchlin Currie

This paper forms part of a wider project to show the significance of archival material on distinguished economists, in this case Lauchlin Currie (1902-93), who studied and taught at Harvard before entering government service at the US Treasury and Federal Reserve Board as the intellectual leader of Roosevelt’s New Deal, 1934-39, as FDR’s White House economic adviser in peace and war, 1939-45, and as a post-war development economist. It discusses the uses made of the written and oral material available when the author was writing his intellectual biography of Currie (Duke University Press 1990) while Currie was still alive, and the significance of the material that has come to light after Currie’s death.

The Good, the Bad and the Populist: A Model of Political Agency with Emotional Voters

This paper attempts to extend existing models of political agency to an environment in which voting may be divided between informed and instrumental, informed and ‘expressive’ (Brennan and Lomasky (1993)) and uninformed due to ‘rational irrationality’ (Caplan (2007)). It constructs a model where politicians may be good, bad or populist. Populists are more willing than good politicians to pander to voters who may choose inferior policies in a large-group electoral setting because their vote is insignificant compared with those that voters would choose were their vote decisive in determining the electoral outcome. Bad politicians would ideally like to extract tax revenue for their own ends. Initially we assume the existence of only good and populist politicians. The paper investigates the incentives for good politicians to pool with or separate from populists and focuses on three key issues – (1) how far the majority of voter’s preferences are from those held by the better informed incumbent politician (2) the extent to which the population exhibits rational irrationality and expressiveness (jointly labelled as emotional) and (3) the cost involved in persuading uninformed voters to change their views in terms of composing messages and spreading them. This paper goes on to consider how the inclusion of bad politicians may affect the behaviour of good politicians and suggests that a small amount of potential corruption may be socially useful. It is also argued that where bad politicians have an incentive to mimic the behaviour of good and populist politicians, the latter types of politician may have an incentive to separate from bad politicians by investing in costly public education signals. The paper also discusses the implications of the model for whether fiscal restraints should be soft or hard.

Expressive Political Behaviour: Foundations, Scope and Implications

A growing literature has focussed attention on ‘expressive’ rather than ‘instrumental’ behaviour in political settings - particularly voting A common criticism of the expressive idea is that its myriad possibilities make it rather ad hoc and lacking in both predictive and normative bite. We agree that no single clear definition of expressive behaviour has emerged to date, and no detailed foundations of specific expressive motivations have been provided, so that there are rather few specific implications drawn from the analysis of expressive behaviour. In response, we provide a foundational discussion and definition of expressive behaviour that accounts for a range of factors. We also discuss the content of expressive choice distinguishing between moral, social and emotional cases, and relate this more general account to the specific theories of expressive choice in the literature. Finally, we discuss the normative and institutional implications of expressive behaviour.

Rationalising ‘Irrational’ Support for Political Violence

This paper provides a rationale for group support for political violence when violence does not provide a material benefi t. A theory of fairness is adopted to demonstrate that although group violence may not be the equilibrium of a material game it may be a fairness equilibrium in a game containing psychological payoffs. For this to happen the material stakes must be perceived as low and psychological payoffs are expressive. Although the material stakes are actually high, members of each group may choose expressively to support the use of violence because the probability of being decisive is low. The paper also considers the possibility of peace emerging as a fairness equilibrium. This can only happen if each group perceives the other as making some sacrifi ce in choosing peace.

Distinct ultrastructural aspects in different biopsies of a single patient with diffuse cutaneous leishmaniasis

The authors investigated the relation between parasites and host-cells in active and regressed lesions of a patient with diffuse cutaneous leishmaniasis, evaluating the frequency of different cell types, and the location and integrity of amastigotes. No correlation was found between parasite integrity and size of parasitophorous vacuoles. They observed ultrastructural findings characterizing a cell mediated immune response: macrophages lysis, parasitic destruction inside macrophages, close contact between parasitized macrophages and lymphocytes and between parasites and lymphocytes, lymphocytic infiltration and fibrosis. They suggest that in DCL there is a limited cellular immune response, although insufficient to control infection.

Histogical and ultrastructural aspects of the brindley's glands of pantrongylus megistus (Burmeister, 1835) (Hemiptera: Reduviidae)

The Brindley's glands of Panstrongylus megistus were studied under the antomic, histologic and ultrastructural point of view. These glands located in the insect's methatorax are paired and have an opening near the third parir of the feet. Beside this aperture, ther are evaporation areas. Shape, sixe and aspect of the gland vary according to the feeding status. The glands are composed by a tubular part corresponding to the duct and a sack-like portion corrsponding to the secretory part. By electron microscopy we observed that the basal part of the epithelium has many interdigitations associated with mitochondria. On the apical surface where epicuticular foldings are located an electonlucent space is often seen. The glands are composed of the following elements: 1) superficial epithelial cells, located just below the apical surface foldings; 2) secretory cells; which are long and have an intracellular canalicule which changes according to the functional state of the cell; 3) a collecting duct to the secretory cells and covered with an epicuticle, reaching up to the gland's lumen; and 4) cells around the duct.