Aspects thérapeutiques de la vitamine D: quels taux cibler avec quels traitements [Therapeutic goal of vitamin D: optimal serum level and dose requirements].

Therapeutic goal of vitamin D: optimal serum level and dose requirements Results of randomized controlled trials and meta-analyses investigating the effect of vitamin D supplementation on falls and fractures are inconsistent. The optimal serum level 25(OH) vitamin D for musculoskeletal and global health is > or = 30 ng/ml (75 nmol/l) for some experts and 20 ng/ml (50 nmol/l) for some others. A daily dose of vitamin D is better than high intermittent doses to reach this goal. High dose once-yearly vitamin D therapy may increase the incidence of fractures and falls. High serum level of vitamin D is probably harmful for the musculoskeletal system and health at large. The optimal benefits for musculoskeletal health are obtained with an 800 UI daily dose and a serum level of near 30 ng/ml (75 nmol/l).

The optimal length of contracts with application to outsourcing

This paper resolves three empirical puzzles in outsourcing by formalizing the adaptationcost of long-term performance contracts. Side-trading with a new partner alongside a long-term contract (to exploit an adaptation-requiring investment) is usually less effective than switching to the new partner when the contract expires. So long-term contracts that prevent holdup of specific investments may induce holdup of adaptation investments. Contract length therefore trades of specific and adaptation investments. Length should increase with the importance and specificity of self-investments, and decrease with the importance of adaptation investments for which side-trading is ineffective. My general model also shows how optimal length falls with cross-investments and wasteful investments.

Teaching, research and service: Experience and opinions of accounting Spanish academics

Research, teaching and service are the main activities carried out in almost all European universities. Previous research, which has been mainlycentred in North-American universities, has found solid results indicatingthat research and teaching are not equally valued when deciding on facultypromotion. This conclusion creates a potential conflict for accountingacademics on how to distribute working time in order to accomplish personalcareer objectives. This paper presents the results of a survey realisedin two European countries: Spain and the United Kingdom, which intendedto explore the opinions and personal experience of accounting academicsworking in these countries. Specifically, we focus on the following issues:(i) The impact of teaching and service on time available for research;(ii) The integration of teaching and research; (iii) The perceived valueof teaching and research for career success and (iv) The interaction betweenprofessional accounting and accounting research. The results show thatboth in Spain and in the United Kingdom there is a conflict between teachingand research, which has its origin in the importance attached to researchactivities on promotion decisions. It also seems evident that so far, theconflict is being solved in favour of research in prejudice of teaching.

Partial cricotracheal resection for severe pediatric subglottic stenosis: update of the Lausanne experience.

Until recently, severe pediatric subglottic stenosis (SGS) has been treated almost exclusively by laryngotracheoplasty procedures. Even in the most experienced centers, the results of single-stage operations for Cotton's grade III and IV stenoses have been disappointing. This paper reports our experience on 31 partial cricotracheal resections for severe SGS in infants and children. The stenosis was congenital in 6 cases and acquired after prolonged intubation in 25 cases. Twenty-seven patients were tracheotomy-dependent at the time of surgery. Twenty-two cases were classified as grade III and 9 cases as grade IV stenoses according to Cotton. The decannulation rate was 97% (30 of 31 cases) after an open procedure. There were no fatalities and no lesions to the recurrent laryngeal nerves, but there was 1 complete restenosis. Twenty-seven patients show no exertional dyspnea, 3 have a slight stridor with some dyspnea while exercising, and 1 patient is not decannulated. The voice is normal in 21 cases, a dysphonia is present in 9 cases, and the patient with complete restenosis acquired an esophageal voice. Postoperative follow-up is longer than 10 years in 8 cases and longer than 5 years in an additional 6 cases. All patients who reached adulthood show normal growth of the larynx and trachea. Considering the excellent results obtained in this consecutive series of 31 cases, partial cricoid resection with primary thyrotracheal anastomosis should be considered an important treatment option for severe SGS in infants and children.

Optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a currency union

We lay out a tractable model for fiscal and monetary policy analysis in a currency union, and study its implications for the optimal design of such policies. Monetary policy is conducted by a common central bank, which sets the interest rate for the union as a whole. Fiscal policy is implemented at the countrylevel, through the choice of government spending. The model incorporates country-specific shocks and nominal rigidities. Under our assumptions, the optimal cooperative policy arrangement requires that inflation be stabilized at the union level by the common central bank, while fiscal policy is used by each country for stabilization purposes. By contrast, when the fiscal authorities act in a non-coordinated way, their joint actions lead to a suboptimal outcome, and make the common central bank face a trade-off between inflation and output gap stabilization at the union level.

Banks, liquidity crises and economic growth

How do the liquidity functions of banks affect investment and growth at different stages ofeconomic development? How do financial fragility and the costs of banking crises evolve with the level of wealth of countries? We analyze these issues using an overlapping generations growth model where agents, who experience idiosyncratic liquidity shocks, can invest in a liquid storage technology or in a partially illiquid Cobb Douglas technology. By pooling liquidity risk, banks play a growth enhancing role in reducing inefficient liquidation of long term projects, but they may face liquidity crises associated with severe output losses. We show that middle income economies may find optimal to be exposed to liquidity crises, while poor and rich economies have more incentives to develop a fully covered banking system. Therefore, middle income economies could experience banking crises in the process of their development and, as they get richer, they eventually converge to a financially safe long run steady state. Finally, the model replicates the empirical fact of higher costs of banking crises for middle income economies.

Optimal negligence rule under limited liability

We study the standard economic model of unilateral accidents, in its simplest form, assumingthat the injurers have limited assets.We identify a second-best optimal rule that selects as duecare the minimum of first-best care, and a level of care that takes into account the wealth ofthe injurer. We show that such a rule in fact maximizes the precautionary effort by a potentialinjurer. The idea is counterintuitive: Being softer on an injurer, in terms of the required level ofcare, actually improves the incentives to take care when he is potentially insolvent. We extendthe basic result to an entire population of potentially insolvent injurers, and find that the optimalgeneral standards of care do depend on wealth, and distribution of income. We also show theconditions for the result that higher income levels in a given society call for higher levels of carefor accidents.

Optimal second-degree price discrimination and arbitrage: On the role of asymetric information among buyers

The traditional theory of monopolistic screening tackles individualself-selection but does not address the possibility that buyers couldform a coalition to coordinate their purchases and to reallocate thegoods. In this paper, we design the optimal sale mechanism which takesinto account both individual and coalition incentive compatibilityfocusing on the role of asymmetric information among buyers. We showthat when a coalition of buyers is formed under asymmetric information,the monopolist can do as well as when there is no coalition. Although inthe optimal sale mechanism marginal rates of substitution are notequalized across buyers (hence there exists room for arbitrage), theyfail to realize the gains from arbitrage because of the transaction costsin coalition formation generated by asymmetric information.

Selection of artificial hosts for oviposition by wild Anastrepha obliqua (Macquart) (Diptera, Tephritidae): influence of adult food and effect of experience

Several factors influence the selection of oviposition substrates by insects. The aim of the present work was to find answers to the following questions related to the oviposition behavior of Anastrepha obliqua. Can carbohydrates (glucose or sucrose) present in the adult diet have influence on the female preference for an oviposition substrate with similar composition? Can the previous experience with a host containing one of mentioned carbohydrates interfere in further selection of oviposition substrates? The results showed that the kind of carbohydrate present in the adult diet did not affect the female preference for an artificial oviposition substrate, neither when it was presented by itself nor in combination with brewer's yeast. The effect of experience in the oviposition behavior was observed when there was a previous contact with artificial oviposition substrates containing yeast and sucrose. The data are discussed in terms of the behavioral plasticity presented by this species in relation to feeding and oviposition behaviors.

Driver scheduling problem modelling

The Drivers Scheduling Problem (DSP) consists of selecting a set of duties for vehicle drivers, for example buses, trains, plane or boat drivers or pilots, for the transportation of passengers or goods. This is a complex problem because it involves several constraints related to labour and company rules and can also present different evaluation criteria and objectives. Being able to develop an adequate model for this problem that can represent the real problem as close as possible is an important research area.The main objective of this research work is to present new mathematical models to the DSP problem that represent all the complexity of the drivers scheduling problem, and also demonstrate that the solutions of these models can be easily implemented in real situations. This issue has been recognized by several authors and as important problem in Public Transportation. The most well-known and general formulation for the DSP is a Set Partition/Set Covering Model (SPP/SCP). However, to a large extend these models simplify some of the specific business aspects and issues of real problems. This makes it difficult to use these models as automatic planning systems because the schedules obtained must be modified manually to be implemented in real situations. Based on extensive passenger transportation experience in bus companies in Portugal, we propose new alternative models to formulate the DSP problem. These models are also based on Set Partitioning/Covering Models; however, they take into account the bus operator issues and the perspective opinions and environment of the user.We follow the steps of the Operations Research Methodology which consist of: Identify the Problem; Understand the System; Formulate a Mathematical Model; Verify the Model; Select the Best Alternative; Present the Results of theAnalysis and Implement and Evaluate. All the processes are done with close participation and involvement of the final users from different transportation companies. The planner s opinion and main criticisms are used to improve the proposed model in a continuous enrichment process. The final objective is to have a model that can be incorporated into an information system to be used as an automatic tool to produce driver schedules. Therefore, the criteria for evaluating the models is the capacity to generate real and useful schedules that can be implemented without many manual adjustments or modifications. We have considered the following as measures of the quality of the model: simplicity, solution quality and applicability. We tested the alternative models with a set of real data obtained from several different transportation companies and analyzed the optimal schedules obtained with respect to the applicability of the solution to the real situation. To do this, the schedules were analyzed by the planners to determine their quality and applicability. The main result of this work is the proposition of new mathematical models for the DSP that better represent the realities of the passenger transportation operators and lead to better schedules that can be implemented directly in real situations.

Optimal magnitude and probability of fines

The economic literature on crime and punishment focuses on the trade-off between probability and severity of punishment, and suggests that detection probability and fines are substitutes. In this paper it is shown that, in presence of substantial underdeterrence caused by costly detection and punishment, these instruments may become complements. When offenders are poor, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is low. Thus, the government does not invest a lot in detection. If offenders are rich, however, the deterrent value of monetary sanctions is high, so it is more profitable to prosecute them.

Competition and cost overruns. Optimal misspecification of procurement contracts

Most cases of cost overruns in public procurement are related to important changes in the initial project design. This paper deals with the problem of design specification in public procurement and provides a rationale for design misspecification. We propose a model in which the sponsor decides how much to invest in design specification and awards competitively the project to a contractor. After the project has been awarded the sponsor engages in bilateral renegotiation with the contractor, in order to accommodate changes in the initial project s design that new information makes desirable. When procurement takes place in the presence of horizontally differentiated contractors, the design s specification level is seen to affect the resulting degree of competition. The paper highlights this interaction between market competition and design specification and shows that the sponsor s optimal strategy, when facing an imperfectly competitive market supply, is to underinvest in design specification so as to make significant cost overruns likely. Since no such misspecification occurs in a perfectly competitive market, cost overruns are seen to arise as a consequence of lack of competition in the procurement market.

Research joint ventures and optimal R&D policy with asymmetric information

When to allow Research Joint Ventures (RJVs) or not is an importantinstrument in the development of an optimal R&D policy. Theregulator, however, is unlikely to know all the relevant informationto regulate R&D optimally. The extent to which there existappropriability problems between the firms is one such variable thatis private information to the firms in the industry. In a duopolysetting we analyze the characteristics of a second-best R&D policywhere the government can either allow RJVs or not and give lump-sumsubsidies to the parties involved. The second-best R&D policy withoutsubsidies will either block some welfare improving RJVs or allow somewelfare reducing ones. With lump-sum subsidies, the second-best policytrades off the expected subsidy cost with allowing welfare decreasingRJVs or blocking welfare increasing ones.

Optimal contracts, adverse selection and social preferences: An experiment

It has long been standard in agency theory to search for incentive-compatible mechanisms on the assumption that people care only about their own material wealth. However, this assumption is clearly refuted by numerous experiments, and we feel that it may be useful to consider nonpecuniary utility in mechanism design and contract theory. Accordingly, we devise an experiment to explore optimal contracts in an adverse-selection context. A principal proposes one of three contract menus, each of which offers a choice of two incentive-compatible contracts, to two agents whose types are unknown to the principal. The agents know the set of possible menus, and choose to either accept one of the two contracts offered in the proposed menu or to reject the menu altogether; a rejection by either agent leads to lower (and equal) reservation payoffs for all parties. While all three possible menus favor the principal, they do so to varying degrees. We observe numerous rejections of the more lopsided menus, and approach an equilibrium where one of the more equitable contract menus (which one depends on the reservation payoffs) is proposed and agents accept a contract, selecting actions according to their types. Behavior is largely consistent with all recent models of social preferences, strongly suggesting there is value in considering nonpecuniary utility in agency theory.