The WTO and Food Security: What’s Wrong with the Rules?

The WTO Agreement on Agriculture (AoA) is the predominant multilateral legal framework governing agricultural trade. The objective of the AoA is to liberalise trade in agriculture through reductions in tariffs, domestic support and export subsidies. The AoA has not, however, ‘levelled the playing field’ and has not resulted in the equitable distribution of food, particularly for the poorer developing countries. On the other hand, support for small farmers does not ensure food security for the poor. While food security has no simple solutions such as “free trade is good for you”, reform proposals for trade rules which only address agricultural policy instruments fail to account for consumer and other interests: neither tariff reductions and subsidy disciplines, nor safeguards and other measures of producer protection can automatically increase food security. Rather, what is needed is the full and proper implementation of a number of commitments which the international community has already entered into in various human rights treaties, but which even the envisaged results of the now failed Doha Round negotiations could not ensure without revisiting relevant multilateral trade and investment rules.

Do WTO rules improve or impair the right to food?

The global food crisis of 2007–08 seems to be forgotten. Media attention at the time focused on food riots in Haiti and Mozambique, while world leaders and more than a dozen international organizations gathered for several food summits, calling for immediate relief measures. But not a single government seems to remember its obligations under the Right to Food (R2F) which the United Nations (UN) had enshrined back in 1948. Today we have to acknowledge that the R2F still lacks an adequate response under the present multilateral rules and disciplines applying to food production and trade. This chapter examines the present rules and disciplines under the AoA and of those contemplated in the Doha Development Round. Here we find that despite claims to the contrary they contribute precious little to the R2F. Some of the present rules, or the lack thereof, can even act as disincentives for global and national food security. Various forms of production and export subsidies, food aid abuse and export restrictions, are still WTO-legal, with few remedies available to food insecure developing countries. This amounts to a violation of their R2F obligations by many WTO Members.

Periodising globalisation: Mauritian integration into the sugar commodity chain (1825-2005)

Using the case study of Mauritius, and its integration into the international sugar commodity chain, this paper shows that the analysis of commodity chains can be fruitfully employed to respond to recent calls in the field of global/world history for a periodisation of globalisation. The entry of Mauritius into the British Empire brought about a particular kind of integration of the island into the capitalist world system. Central to this integration was the production of sugar under the West Indian Sugar Protocol, with this ultimately turning Mauritius from a free port into a plantation economy. This shaped the island's economic and political practice, and brought the formation of a range of institutions that sustained a high degree of inequality among Mauritians by finding ever newer ways of conciliating socio-economic mobility with exploitation. The paper discusses Mauritian history through the framework of bilateral and multilateral trading agreements that had a significant impact on the sugar industry, and kept the island economically dependent on this single crop. This only changed when the postcolonial state succeeded in diversifying the Mauritian economy during the 1970s and 1980s.

Seals and the Need for more Deference to Vienna by WTO Adjudicators

This paper asks how World Trade Organization (WTO) panels and the Appellate Body (AB) take public international law (PIL) into account when interpreting WTO rules as a part of international economic law (IEL). Splendid isolation of the latter is not new; indeed it is intended by the negotiators of the Understanding on the Settlement of Disputes (DSU). At the same time, the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT) is quite clear when it provides the general rules and the supplementary means of treaty interpretation. Despite such mandatory guidance, WTO adjudicators (when given a choice and assuming they see the conflict) prefer deference to WTO law over deference to Vienna and take a dogmatic way out of interpretation quandaries. The AB and panels make abundant reference to Vienna, though less so to substantive PIL. Often times, however, they do so simply in order to buttress their findings of violations of WTO rules. Perhaps tellingly, however, none of the reports in EC – Seals contains even a single mention of VCLT, despite numerous references to international standards addressing indigenous rights and animal welfare. In the longer term, and absent a breakthrough on the negotiation front, this pattern of carefully eschewing international treaty law and using PIL just for the sake of convenience could have serious consequences for the credibility and acceptance of the multilateral trading system. Following the adage ‘negotiate or litigate’ recourse to WTO dispute settlement increases when governments are less ready to make treaty commitments commensurate with the challenges of globalisation. This is true even for ‘societal choice’ cases on the margins of classic trade disputes. We will argue here that it is precisely for cases such as these that VCLT and PIL should be used more systematically by panels and the AB. Failing that, instead of building bridges for more coherent international regulation, WTO adjudicators could burn those same bridges which the DSU interpretation margin leaves open for accomplishing their job which is to find a ‘positive solution’. Worse, judicial incoherence could return to WTO dispute settlement like a boomerang and damage the credibility and thus the level of acceptance of the multilateral trading system per se.

After Bali: WTO Rules Applying to Public Food Reserves

Once more, agriculture threatened to prevent all progress in multilateral trade rule-making at the Ninth WTO Ministerial Conference in December 2013. But this time, the “magic of Bali” worked. After the clock had been stopped mainly because of the food security file, the ministers adopted a comprehensive package of decisions and declarations mainly in respect of development issues. Five are about agriculture. Decision 38 on Public Stockholding for Food Security Purposes contains a “peace clause” which will now be shielding certain stockpile programmes from subsidy complaints in formal litigation. This article provides contextual background and analyses this decision from a legal perspective. It finds that, at best, Decision 38 provides a starting point for a WTO Work Programme for food security, for review at the Eleventh Ministerial Conference which will probably take place in 2017. At worst, it may unduly widen the limited window for government-financed competition existing under present rules in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture – yet without increasing global food security or even guaranteeing that no subsidy claims will be launched, or entertained, under the WTO dispute settlement mechanism. Hence, the Work Programme should find more coherence between farm support and socio-economic and trade objectives when it comes to stockpiles. This also encompasses a review of the present WTO rules applying to other forms of food reserves and to regional or “virtual” stockpiles. Another “low hanging fruit” would be a decision to exempt food aid purchases from export restrictions.

Resilient Adaptation to Climate Change in African Agriculture

Africa’s agriculture faces varying climate change impacts which mainly worsen production conditions and adversely affect its economies. Adaptations thus need to build the resilience of farming systems. Using “resilient adaptation” as a concept, this study analyses how adaptations at farm and policy/institutional-levels contribute to the resilience of Sub-Saharan African agriculture. The developed tool, “the Resilience Check”, provides socio-economic data which complements existing adaptation tools. The underlying development gaps such as insecure property rights, poverty, low self-organisation, inadequate climate data and infrastructure limit resilient adaptations. If farmers could implement recommended practices, existing measures and improved crops can address most impacts expected in the medium-term. However, resource use efficiency remains critical for all farm management types. Development-oriented adaptation measures are needed to provide the robust foundations for building resilience. Reaching the very poor remains a challenge and the externally driven nature of many interventions raises concern about their sustainability. The study recommends practical measures such as decentralising various services and integrating the action plans of the multilateral environmental agreements into one national action plan.

Labour Migration, Trade and Investment: From Fragmentation to Coherence

Trade, investment and migration are strongly intertwined, being three key factors in international production. Yet, law and regulation of the three has remained highly fragmented. Trade is regulated by the WTO on the multilateral level, and through preferential trade agreements on the regional and bilateral levels – it is fragmented and complex in its own right. Investment, on the other hand, is mainly regulated through bilateral investment treaties with no strong links to the regulation of trade or migration. And, finally, migration is regulated by a web of different international, regional and bilateral agreements which focus on a variety of different aspects of migration ranging from humanitarian to economic. The problems of institutional fragmentation in international law are well known. There is no organizational forum for coherent strategy-making on the multilateral level covering all three areas. Normative regulations may thus contradict each other. Trade regulation may bring about liberalization of access for service providers, but eventually faces problems in recruiting the best people from abroad. Investors may withdraw investment without being held liable for disruptions to labour and to the livelihood and infrastructure of towns and communities affected by disinvestment. Finally, migration policies do not seem to have a significant impact as long as trade policies and investment policies are not working in a way that is conducive to reducing migration pressure, as trade and investment are simply more powerful on the regulatory level than migration. This chapter addresses the question as to how fragmentation of the three fields could be reme-died and greater coherence between these three areas of factor allocation in international economic relations and law could be achieved. It shows that migration regulation on the international level is lagging behind that on trade and investment. Stronger coordination and consideration of migration in trade and investment policy, and stronger international cooperation in migration, will provide the foundations for a coherent international architecture in the field.

A Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement: Implications for Swiss Agriculture

To say that regionalism is gaining momentum has become an understatement. To mourn the lack of progress in multilateral trade rule-making is a commonplace in the discourse of politicians regretting the WTO negotiation standstill, and of “know-what-to-do” academics. The real problem is the uneven level-playing field resulting from increasing differences of rules and obligations. The Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership Agreement (TTIP) is a very ambitious project. WTI studies in 2014 have shown that the implications for Switzerland could be enormous. But even the combined market power of the two TTIP participants – the EU and the USA – will not level the playing field impairing the regulatory framework, and the market access barriers for trade in agriculture. Such differences will remain in three areas which, incidentally, are also vital for a global response to the food security challenge to feed 9 billion people before the year 2050: market access, non-tariff barriers, and trade-distorting domestic support programmes. This means that without multilateral progress the TTIP and other so-called mega-regionals, if successfully concluded, will exacerbate rather than lessen trade distortions. While this makes farmers in rich countries safer from competition, competitive production in all countries will be hampered. Consequently, and notwithstanding the many affirmations to the contrary, farm policies worldwide will continue to only address farmer security without increasing global food security. What are the implications of the TTIP for Swiss agriculture? This article, commissioned by Waseda University in Tokyo, finds that the failure to achieve further reforms – including a number of areas where earlier reforms have been reversed – is presenting Switzerland and Swiss agriculture with a terrible dilemma in the eventuality of a successful conclusion of the TTIP. If Swiss farm production is to survive for more than another generation, continuous reform efforts are required, and over-reliance on the traditional instruments of border protection and product support is to be avoided. Without a substantial TTIP obliging Switzerland to follow suit, autonomous reforms will remain extremely fragile.

Bargaining for power and information : an experimental and theoretical analysis of the interaction between institutions, externalities and adverse selection

Bargaining is the building block of many economic interactions, ranging from bilateral to multilateral encounters and from situations in which the actors are individuals to negotiations between firms or countries. In all these settings, economists have been intrigued for a long time by the fact that some projects, trades or agreements are not realized even though they are mutually beneficial. On the one hand, this has been explained by incomplete information. A firm may not be willing to offer a wage that is acceptable to a qualified worker, because it knows that there are also unqualified workers and cannot distinguish between the two types. This phenomenon is known as adverse selection. On the other hand, it has been argued that even with complete information, the presence of externalities may impede efficient outcomes. To see this, consider the example of climate change. If a subset of countries agrees to curb emissions, non-participant regions benefit from the signatories’ efforts without incurring costs. These free riding opportunities give rise to incentives to strategically improve ones bargaining power that work against the formation of a global agreement. This thesis is concerned with extending our understanding of both factors, adverse selection and externalities. The findings are based on empirical evidence from original laboratory experiments as well as game theoretic modeling. On a very general note, it is demonstrated that the institutions through which agents interact matter to a large extent. Insights are provided about which institutions we should expect to perform better than others, at least in terms of aggregate welfare. Chapters 1 and 2 focus on the problem of adverse selection. Effective operation of markets and other institutions often depends on good information transmission properties. In terms of the example introduced above, a firm is only willing to offer high wages if it receives enough positive signals about the worker’s quality during the application and wage bargaining process. In Chapter 1, it will be shown that repeated interaction coupled with time costs facilitates information transmission. By making the wage bargaining process costly for the worker, the firm is able to obtain more accurate information about the worker’s type. The cost could be pure time cost from delaying agreement or cost of effort arising from a multi-step interviewing process. In Chapter 2, I abstract from time cost and show that communication can play a similar role. The simple fact that a worker states to be of high quality may be informative. In Chapter 3, the focus is on a different source of inefficiency. Agents strive for bargaining power and thus may be motivated by incentives that are at odds with the socially efficient outcome. I have already mentioned the example of climate change. Other examples are coalitions within committees that are formed to secure voting power to block outcomes or groups that commit to different technological standards although a single standard would be optimal (e.g. the format war between HD and BlueRay). It will be shown that such inefficiencies are directly linked to the presence of externalities and a certain degree of irreversibility in actions. I now discuss the three articles in more detail. In Chapter 1, Olivier Bochet and I study a simple bilateral bargaining institution that eliminates trade failures arising from incomplete information. In this setting, a buyer makes offers to a seller in order to acquire a good. Whenever an offer is rejected by the seller, the buyer may submit a further offer. Bargaining is costly, because both parties suffer a (small) time cost after any rejection. The difficulties arise, because the good can be of low or high quality and the quality of the good is only known to the seller. Indeed, without the possibility to make repeated offers, it is too risky for the buyer to offer prices that allow for trade of high quality goods. When allowing for repeated offers, however, at equilibrium both types of goods trade with probability one. We provide an experimental test of these predictions. Buyers gather information about sellers using specific price offers and rates of trade are high, much as the model’s qualitative predictions. We also observe a persistent over-delay before trade occurs, and this mitigates efficiency substantially. Possible channels for over-delay are identified in the form of two behavioral assumptions missing from the standard model, loss aversion (buyers) and haggling (sellers), which reconcile the data with the theoretical predictions. Chapter 2 also studies adverse selection, but interaction between buyers and sellers now takes place within a market rather than isolated pairs. Remarkably, in a market it suffices to let agents communicate in a very simple manner to mitigate trade failures. The key insight is that better informed agents (sellers) are willing to truthfully reveal their private information, because by doing so they are able to reduce search frictions and attract more buyers. Behavior observed in the experimental sessions closely follows the theoretical predictions. As a consequence, costless and non-binding communication (cheap talk) significantly raises rates of trade and welfare. Previous experiments have documented that cheap talk alleviates inefficiencies due to asymmetric information. These findings are explained by pro-social preferences and lie aversion. I use appropriate control treatments to show that such consideration play only a minor role in our market. Instead, the experiment highlights the ability to organize markets as a new channel through which communication can facilitate trade in the presence of private information. In Chapter 3, I theoretically explore coalition formation via multilateral bargaining under complete information. The environment studied is extremely rich in the sense that the model allows for all kinds of externalities. This is achieved by using so-called partition functions, which pin down a coalitional worth for each possible coalition in each possible coalition structure. It is found that although binding agreements can be written, efficiency is not guaranteed, because the negotiation process is inherently non-cooperative. The prospects of cooperation are shown to crucially depend on i) the degree to which players can renegotiate and gradually build up agreements and ii) the absence of a certain type of externalities that can loosely be described as incentives to free ride. Moreover, the willingness to concede bargaining power is identified as a novel reason for gradualism. Another key contribution of the study is that it identifies a strong connection between the Core, one of the most important concepts in cooperative game theory, and the set of environments for which efficiency is attained even without renegotiation.

An International Regulatory Framework for National Employment Policies

Employment-related policies are sensitive by any standard, and they remain basically national despite international labour standards (ILS) being even older than the United Nations. Globalization is changing this situation where countries may have to choose between ‘more’ or ‘better’ jobs. The multilateral framework of the World Trade Organization (WTO) can only have an indirect impact. But Regional Trade Agreements (RTA) and International Investment Agreements (IIA) are emerging as a new way of gradually enhancing the impact of certain labour standards. In addition, unilateral measures both by governments and importers driven by social and environmental consumer preferences and pressure groups increasingly shape the international regulatory framework for national employment policies. Even small, locally operating enterprises risk marginalization and market exclusion by ignoring these developments. The long-term influence of this new ‘network approach’ on employment-related policies, including job location, gender issues, social coherence and migration remains to be seen. Nonetheless, the still flimsy evidence gathered here seems to indicate that this new, international framework might increase sustainable employment where and when supporting measures, including through unilateral preferences and even sanctions, form a ‘cocktail’ which export-oriented industries and their suppliers will find palatable.

The Role of Goods Trade Networks for Services Trade Volume

In this paper, we address the role of countries’ goods-trade networks for their services-trade volume. The paper employs a large cross section of bilateral trade data on aggregate cross-border goods and services sales and illustrates that the depth and overlap of two countries’ services networks induce a positive direct impact on their services-trade volume. The evidence takes into account that goods trade flows and networks are potentially endogenous so that the estimated direct effects support a causal interpretation. We find that the magnitude of the multilateral goods-trade network effect on the bilateral services-trade volume is much larger than that of bilateral goods-trade volume.

Determinantes de la competitividad argentina entre 1980 y 2010

Mucho se ha hablado de las exportaciones de la República Argentina en los últimos años y es alrededor del concepto de competitividad en donde encontramos los elementos para tener una imagen general para encaminarnos a sacar conclusiones. El objetivo del presente trabajo es enumerar los factores que han contribuido o no a que Argentina sea un país más competitivo en diversos niveles (Mercosur, América Latina y el Caribe, el mundo). Los determinantes de la competitividad argentina que estudiaremos a continuación son: · Precios de los commodities que Argentina exporta · Producto Interno Bruto per cápita · Riesgo País comparado · Costo Laboral Unitario · Participación relativa del país · Tipo de Cambio Real Multilateral

Impuesto sobre los ingresos brutos

El presente trabajo trata sobre el Impuesto sobre los Ingresos Brutos, un impuesto vigente en la Provincia de Mendoza. Actualmente los temas de materia tributaria se modifican periódicamente, lo que dificulta a estudiantes, profesores, profesionales y contribuyentes. Además, obliga a mantenerse permanentemente informado sobre las nuevas disposiciones, lo que entorpece a su vez todo lo relativo al cumplimiento y recaudación del tributo en cuestión. Al estar este impuesto sujeto a modificaciones cada año por el Poder Ejecutivo provincial que actualiza la Ley Impositiva y mediante ésta el Código Fiscal que contiene las normas que rigen el Impuesto a los Ingresos Brutos, no existe bibliografía actualizada. La misma es general, y no trataaspectos específicos. Este trabajo intenta profundizar conceptos sobre el mencionado impuesto, pretendiendo ser un aporte particularmente a estudiantes avanzados de la carrera de Contador Público Nacional y Perito Partidor. Se intenta abarcar el estudio desde el aspecto normativo actual. El tema a desarrollar incluye conceptos básicos del Impuesto sobre los Ingresos Brutos, sus elementos como impuesto, antecedentes históricos nacionales, características, o bjeto, sujetos pasivos; lo concerniente a la inscripción y baja, liquidación para presentación y pago en el organismo competente, la Dirección General de Rentas. Este documento contiene además una breve referencia al Convenio Multilateral al cual la Provincia de Mendoza se encuentra adherida. Se agrega, un glosario y formularios que complementan el trabajo.

Exploring intra-commonwealth goods and services trade

A background paper for the Commonwealth Secretariat by Anirudh Shingal and Mohammad Razzaque: Existing work examining the trade effect of commonwealth membership does not account for sample selection, unobserved heterogeneity and multilateral resistance in estimation, leading to biased estimates. Our analyses improve on all these fronts. Unlike earlier work, we also consider services trade and assemble a much larger sample of trading partners (242 x 242, over 1995-2010). Commonwealth membership is found to increase goods exports by 18.5-33.2% and services exports by 42.8% in our results, ceteris paribus and on average. Our analyses on the determinants of intra-commonwealth trade suggest the positive role of common language (only for goods trade) and colonial relationships as well as the negative impact of geography, thereby confirming that commonwealth member states are not natural trading partners for each other. Finally, being one of Australia, Canada or the UK is associated with 98.2% greater merchandise trade than the commonwealth average; however, a similar effect is not observed for services trade.

Subsidies, Clean Energy, and Climate Change

Estimates show that fossil fuel subsidies average USD 400–600 billion annually worldwide while renewable energy (RE) subsidies amounted to USD 66 billion in 2010 and are predicted to rise to USD 250 billion annually by 2035. Domestic political rationales for energy subsidies include promoting innovation, job creation and economic growth, energy security, and independence. Energy subsidies may also serve social and environmental goals. Whether and to what extent subsidies are effective to achieve these goals or instead lead to market distortions is a matter of much debate and the trade effects of energy subsidies are complex. This paper offers an overview of the types of energy subsidies that are used in the conventional and renewable energy sectors, and their relationship with climate change, in particular greenhouse gas emissions. While the WTO’s Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM) is mostly concerned with harm to competitors, this paper considers the extent to which the Agreement could also discipline subsidies that cause harm to the environment as a global common. Beyond the existing legal framework, this paper surveys a number of alternatives for improving the ability of subsidies disciplines to internalize climate change costs of energy production and consumption. One option is a new multilateral agreement on subsidies or trade remedies (with an appropriate carve-out in the WTO regime to allow for it if such an agreement is concluded outside it). Alternatively, climate change-related subsidies could be included as part of another multilateral regime or as part of regional agreements. A third approach would be to incorporate rules on energy subsidies in sectorial agreements, including a Sustainable Energy Trade Agreement such as has been proposed in other ICTSD studies.