996 resultados para Military doctrine


Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This article critically evaluates a course that was conceived and run at the LSE by Sir Halford Mackinder for officers of the Britsh Army between 1907 and 1932.There is an examination of the nature of the syllabus,the aims and objectives of this course.An explanation is also given as to why the army cut it seven years before the outbreak of the Second World War.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This article draws on Warsaw Treaty Organisation and East German military archives to demonstrate that the WTO's military exercises until the mid-1990s always envisaged an offensive strategy with the aim of reaching the Channel in a few days. Only gradually did this change under Gorbachev and to include also defensive strategies, very much against the opposition of East Germany.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Writers on military matters from the 14th century until the late 18th century either regretted the decadence of their times compared with Antiquity, or they saw no great change in military affairs since Antiquity. Few saw a revolutionary change ushered in by gunpowder, although this number increased since the great "querelle" about the Ancients and the Moderns under Louis XIV. In the early 19th century, the balance tipped, and few would have denied that technology had profoundly changed warfare. All this is a far cry, however, from any contemporary perception of a "Military Revolution" in the 16th and 17th centuries.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

The assumption that the most important aim of war is to create a better peace than existed before the war, i.e. a peace with justice, was self-evident for writers prior to Clausewitz. This does not mean that princes saw this as their priority, but theoreticians did. This changed dramatically with the Napoleonic Wars: Clausewitz initiated an era where writers on strategy paid no heed to what would come after military victory, now seen as the be-all and end-all of war. Terrible consequences flowed from this, and a series of ephemeral victories leading to new wars. It was only around the Second World War, to some in itself the consequence of this obsession with victory and not with peace, that it began to dawn on writers that peace, not military victory must be the ultimate aim to be kept in sight.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This essay aims to make a contribution to the conversation between IR and nationalism literatures by considering a particular question: What is the relationship between interstate military competition and the emergence of nationalism as a potent force in world politics? The conventional wisdom among international security scholars, especially neorealists, holds that nationalism can be more or less treated like a “technology” that allowed states to extract significant resources as well as manpower from their respective populations. This paper underlines some of the problems involved with this perspective and pushes forward an interpretation that is based on the logic of political survival. I argue that nationalism’s emergence as a powerful force in world politics followed from the “mutation” and absorption of the universalistic/cosmopolitan republican ideas that gained temporary primacy in Europe during the eighteenth century into particularistic nationalist ideologies. This transformation, in turn, can be best explained by the French Revolution’s dramatic impacts on rulers’ political survival calculi vis-à-vis both interstate and domestic political challenges. The analysis offered in this essay contributes to our understanding of the relationship between IR and nationalism while also highlighting the potential value of the political survival framework for exploring macrohistorical puzzles.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

Why are some states more willing to adopt military innovations than others? Why, for example, were the great powers of Europe able to successfully reform their military practices to better adapt to and participate in the so-called military revolution of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries while their most important extra-European competitor, the Ottoman Empire, failed to do so? This puzzle is best explained by two factors: civil-military relations and historical timing. In the Ottoman Empire, the emergence of an institutionally strong and internally cohesive army during the early stages of state formation—in the late fourteenth century—equipped the military with substantial bargaining powers. In contrast, the great powers of Europe drew heavily on private providers of military power during the military revolution and developed similar armies only by the second half of the seventeenth century, limiting the bargaining leverage of European militaries over their rulers. In essence, the Ottoman standing army was able to block reform efforts that it believed challenged its parochial interests. Absent a similar institutional challenge, European rulers initiated military reforms and motivated officers and military entrepreneurs to participate in the ongoing military revolution.

Relevância:

20.00% 20.00%

Publicador:

Resumo:

This paper explores the spatiality of (post)military identities, demonstrating the continuing impact of having been part of the military community despite the passage of time. Our tri-service respondents highlighted the challenges faced even by those deemed to have ‘successfully’ transitioned to ‘Civvy Street’, articulating discourses of loss and separation. While some had achieved closure with their past military selves, others struggled and became stuck in a liminal space between civilian and military lives that perpetuated feelings of isolation. Our work contributes to understandings of military geographies and highlights the importance of conceptualising post-institutional transitions as a process in order to understand how individuals negotiate their identities in changing spatial circumstances.