RAGBRAI Learn about the Land; Day 1, July 2009

Want to know what conditions to expect over the next stage of RAGBRAI? How hilly will it be, what towns and parks are between here and there, or what services are coming up in the next town?

RAGBRAI Learn about the Land; Day 2, July 2009

Want to know what conditions to expect over the next stage of RAGBRAI? How hilly will it be, what towns and parks are between here and there, or what services are coming up in the next town?

RAGBRAI Learn about the Land; Day 3, July 2009

Want to know what conditions to expect over the next stage of RAGBRAI? How hilly will it be, what towns and parks are between here and there, or what services are coming up in the next town?

RAGBRAI Learn about the Land; Day 4, July 2009

Want to know what conditions to expect over the next stage of RAGBRAI? How hilly will it be, what towns and parks are between here and there, or what services are coming up in the next town?

RAGBRAI Learn about the Land; Day 5, July 2009

Want to know what conditions to expect over the next stage of RAGBRAI? How hilly will it be, what towns and parks are between here and there, or what services are coming up in the next town?

RAGBRAI Learn about the Land; Day 6, July 2009

Want to know what conditions to expect over the next stage of RAGBRAI? How hilly will it be, what towns and parks are between here and there, or what services are coming up in the next town?

RAGBRAI Learn about the Land; Day 7, July 2009

Want to know what conditions to expect over the next stage of RAGBRAI? How hilly will it be, what towns and parks are between here and there, or what services are coming up in the next town?

RAGBRAI Learn about the Land; Day 1 thru Day 7, July 2009

Want to know what conditions to expect over the next stage of RAGBRAI? How hilly will it be, what towns and parks are between here and there, or what services are coming up in the next town?

Report on a review of the Fuel Inspection Program administered by the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship for the period July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2009

Report on a review of the Fuel Inspection Program administered by the Iowa Department of Agriculture and Land Stewardship for the period July 1, 2005 through June 30, 2009

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Lobbying, political competition, and local land supply: recent evidence from Spain

We analyze whether local land supply is influenced by the degree of political competition, and interpret the findings as being indicative of the influence wielded by land development lobbies. We use a new database including both political and land supply data for more than 2,000 Spanish municipalities for the period 2003-2007. In Spain, land use policies are largely a local responsibility with municipalities having periodically to pass compre- hensive land use plans. The main policy variable in these plans, and the one analyzed here, is the amount of land classified for potential development. We measure local political competition as the margin of victory of the incumbent government. We instrument this variable using the number of votes obtained by parties represented in local government when standing at the first national legislative elections following the re-establishment of democracy, and the number of votes they actually obtained regionally at the national legislative elections. The results indicate that stiffer political competition does indeed reduce the amount of new land designated for development. This effect is found to be most marked in suburbs, in towns with a high percent of commuters and homeowners, and in municipalities governed by the left.

Heterogeneous discounting in consumption-investment problems. Time consistent solutions

[cat] En aquest treball s'analitza un model estocàstic en temps continu en el que l'agent decisor descompta les utilitats instantànies i la funció final amb taxes de preferència temporal constants però diferents. En aquest context es poden modelitzar problemes en els quals, quan el temps s'acosta al moment final, la valoració de la funció final incrementa en comparació amb les utilitats instantànies. Aquest tipus d'asimetria no es pot descriure ni amb un descompte estàndard ni amb un variable. Per tal d'obtenir solucions consistents temporalment es deriva l'equació de programació dinàmica estocàstica, les solucions de la qual són equilibris Markovians. Per a aquest tipus de preferències temporals, s'estudia el model clàssic de consum i inversió (Merton, 1971) per a les funcions d'utilitat del tipus CRRA i CARA, comparant els equilibris Markovians amb les solucions inconsistents temporalment. Finalment es discuteix la introducció del temps final aleatori.