Ecologia trófica das assembléias de peixes do reservatório de Chavantes (Medio rio Paranapanema. SP/PR)

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Comunidades de aves em um mosaico de Eucalyptus em Rio Claro, São Paulo

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Distribuição e alimentação de peixes em riachos costeiros de Mata Atlântica, sudeste do estado de São Paulo

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Morcegos frugívoros no uso do hábitat fragmentado e seu potencial para recuperação de áreas degradadas: subsídios para uma nova ferramenta voltada à conservação

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Ecologia e comportamento do bicudinho-do-brejo (Stymphalornis acutirostris Bornschein, Reinert & Teixeira, 1995 - aves, Thamnophilidae)

Pós-graduação em Ciências Biológicas (Zoologia) - IBRC

Condição corpórea e hormônios de estresse como indicadores do status fisiológicos de três espécies de morcegos em resposta à fragmentação

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Atividade de morcegos em cinco hábitats de uma paisagem fragmentada de Floresta Atlântica do sul do Brasil

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Serological investigation of rabies virus neutralizing antibodies in bats captured in the eastern Brazilian Amazon

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Dretske e o problema dos qualia

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss Fred Dretske's (1995) suggestion for analysis of the problem of qualia. Such a problem was acknowledged following Thomas Nagel's discussion in his classical paper What is it like to be a bat. In the paper, Nagel (1974) postulates the impossibility of knowing aspects of human experience from a third-person perspective. He considers that qualitative aspects of a subject's experience, fundamental for characterization of qualia, would be lost during the course of objective descriptions of it. Based on his Representational Thesis of Mind, Dretske argues that if we were to consider mind to be the representational aspect of the brain, the nature of qualia would thus be representational. In this context, mental facts related to experiences would be representational facts: if we were to know the nature of these representational facts, we would also know the experience the system represents. Given this understanding, we discuss to what extent the Dretskean proposal constitutes (or not) an alternative for the problem of qualia.

Overexpression of UCP1 in tobacco induces mitochondrial biogenesis and amplifies a broad stress response

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Frugivory and the effects of ingestion by bats on the seed germination of three pioneering plants

Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES)

Patterns of rDNA and telomeric sequences diversification: contribution to repetitive DNA organization in Phyllostomidae bats

Fundação de Amparo à Pesquisa do Estado de São Paulo (FAPESP)

Decay of interspecific avian flock networks along a disturbance gradient in Amazonia

Our understanding of how anthropogenic habitat change shapes species interactions is in its infancy. This is in large part because analytical approaches such as network theory have only recently been applied to characterize complex community dynamics. Network models are a powerful tool for quantifying how ecological interactions are affected by habitat modification because they provide metrics that quantify community structure and function. Here, we examine how large-scale habitat alteration has affected ecological interactions among mixed-species flocking birds in Amazonian rainforest. These flocks provide a model system for investigating how habitat heterogeneity influences non-trophic interactions and the subsequent social structure of forest-dependent mixed-species bird flocks. We analyse 21 flock interaction networks throughout a mosaic of primary forest, fragments of varying sizes and secondary forest (SF) at the Biological Dynamics of Forest Fragments Project in central Amazonian Brazil. Habitat type had a strong effect on network structure at the levels of both species and flock. Frequency of associations among species, as summarized by weighted degree, declined with increasing levels of forest fragmentation and SF. At the flock level, clustering coefficients and overall attendance positively correlated with mean vegetation height, indicating a strong effect of habitat structure on flock cohesion and stability. Prior research has shown that trophic interactions are often resilient to large-scale changes in habitat structure because species are ecologically redundant. By contrast, our results suggest that behavioural interactions and the structure of non-trophic networks are highly sensitive to environmental change. Thus, a more nuanced, system-by-system approach may be needed when thinking about the resiliency of ecological networks.

Eficácia terapêutica de RNAs de interferência (siRNAS) e avaliação da resposta imune em camundongos infectados com vírus da raiva de origem de cão e de morcego

Pós-graduação em Cirurgia Veterinária - FCAV

Dretske e o problema dos qualia

The aim of this paper is to present and discuss Fred Dretske’s (1995) suggestion for analysis of the problem of qualia. Such a problem was acknowledged following Thomas Nagel’s discussion in his classical paper “What is it like to be a bat”. In the paper, Nagel (1974) postulates the impossibility of knowing aspects of human experience from a third-person perspective. He considers that qualitative aspects of a subject’s experience, fundamental for characterization of qualia, would be lost during the course of objective descriptions of it. Based on his Representational Thesis of Mind, Dretske argues that if we were to consider mind to be the representational aspect of the brain, the nature of qualia would thus be representational. In this context, mental facts related to experiences would be representational facts: if we were to know the nature of these representational facts, we would also know the experience the system represents. Given this understanding, we discuss to what extent the Dretskean proposal constitutes (or not) an alternative for the problem of qualia.