Commercial-in-confidence: An obituary to transparency?

This article addresses the issue of accountability and transparency in relation to the use of commercial-in-confidence clauses to withhold information. The issue is contentious. On the one hand some like the Senate Finance and Public Administration Reference Committee (SFPARC) argue that: 'Put simply there can be no accountability if there is no information' (SFPARC 2000). On the other hand, an alternative view is: 'I think that the sanctity of contract... [is] a fundamental pillar of our legal system, and if private businesses enter into contracts with governments that specify confidentiality, then that ought to be respected' (Paterson 1999). This paper is an abridged version of a keynote address to CPA Australia (Queensland Division) Audit Intensive Day 2000, Brisbane Hilton, 10 November 2000.

It's all in the contract: Rethinking feminist critiques of contract

This article examines contemporary feminist arguments about contract. It does not aim to advance new arguments for or against contract but to call into question the dominant feminist position which is that contract has to be cast aside and/or that alternative approaches to contract have to be developed in order to advance the position of women. In a reworking of Elizabeth Kingdom's anti-essentialist approach to rights, Sullivan argues that a feminist but non-essentialist approach to contract is both possible and desirable. Sullivan explores a number of concrete situations in the Australian context where contract approaches have been deployed in law and public policy and demonstrates that contract may be detrimental or advantageous to the position of women. Sullivan argues, therefore, for a strategic and critical feminist approach to the utilisation of the language and practice of contract.

Commonwealth of Australia: July to December 2001

The six-month period from July to December 2001 was an extraordinary phase in Australia’s political history. Until 26 August, when 460 asylum seekers were rescued from their sinking vessel off the Western Australian coast, there was nothing to suggest that politics in Australia would be any different from the usual round of policy pronouncements, routine attacks by the opposition, and the occasional headlinegrabbing scandal. It seemed, as the Australian’s international editor Paul Kelly wrote, that tax would dominate the 2001 federal election campaign (21-22 July 2001). Once the asylum seekers had been rescued by the Norwegian freighter Tampa and refused entry to Australia, however, tax declined in significance. The ramifications of the Tampa incident and its aftermath were still engaging the Australian polity when, on 11 September, terrorists hijacked four passenger jets in the United States and flew two of them into the World Trade Centre in New York, one into the Pentagon, and crashed another in Pennsylvania, killing, it was estimated, more than 6000 people. Both incidents changed Australian politics. The extent and significance of the changes remain to be fully seen, but one short-term effect was to boost significantly the government’s chances of re-election.

The Limits of Rational Choice: New Institutionalism in the Test Bed of Central Banking Politics in Australia

This paper tests the explanatory capacities of different versions of new institutionalism by examining the Australian case of a general transition in central banking practice and monetary politics: namely, the increased emphasis on low inflation and central bank independence. Standard versions of rational choice institutionalism largely dominate the literature on the politics of central banking, but this approach (here termed RC1) fails to account for Australian empirics. RC1 has a tendency to establish actor preferences exogenously to the analysis; actors' motives are also assumed a priori; actor's preferences are depicted in relatively static, ahistorical terms. And there is the tendency, even a methodological requirement, to assume relatively simple motives and preference sets among actors, in part because of the game theoretic nature of RC1 reasoning. It is possible to build a more accurate rational choice model by re-specifying and essentially updating the context, incentives and choice sets that have driven rational choice in this case. Enter RC2. However, this move subtly introduces methodological shifts and new theoretical challenges. By contrast, historical institutionalism uses an inductive methodology. Compared with deduction, it is arguably better able to deal with complexity and nuance. It also utilises a dynamic, historical approach, and specifies (dynamically) endogenous preference formation by interpretive actors. Historical institutionalism is also able to more easily incorporate a wider set of key explanatory variables and incorporate wider social aggregates. Hence, it is argued that historical institutionalism is the preferred explanatory theory and methodology in this case.