Biomasa desovante de la anchoveta del stock norte centro en el invierno 2004

El crucero BIC Olaya y SNP2 0408-09 tuvo el objetivo de estimar la biomasa desovante de la anchoveta (Engraulis ringens) del stock norte centro (4 a 15°S) durante el invierno 2004. Se utilizó el método de producción de huevos (MPH). El total estimado fue de 4,2 millones de toneladas.

Is bank debt special for the transmission of monetary policy? Evidence from the stock market

We combine existing balance sheet and stock market data with two new datasets to studywhether, how much, and why bank lending to firms matters for the transmission of monetarypolicy. The first new dataset enables us to quantify the bank dependence of firms precisely,as the ratio of bank debt to total assets. We show that a two standard deviation increase inthe bank dependence of a firm makes its stock price about 25% more responsive to monetarypolicy shocks. We explore the channels through which this effect occurs, and find that thestock prices of bank-dependent firms that borrow from financially weaker banks display astronger sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with the banklending channel, a theory according to which the strength of bank balance sheets mattersfor monetary policy transmission. We construct a new database of hedging activities andshow that the stock prices of bank-dependent firms that hedge against interest rate riskdisplay a lower sensitivity to monetary policy shocks. This finding is consistent with aninterest rate pass-through channel that operates via the direct transmission of policy ratesto lending rates associated with the widespread use of floating-rates in bank loans and creditline agreements.

Modelo de control viable para el manejo sostenible del stock de anchoveta peruana (Engraulis ringens)

El manejo sostenible de pesquerías es todavía un problema abierto y la teoría de viabilidad ofrece una alternativa para determinar políticas de manejo de los recursos que garanticen la sostenibilidad, una vez definidas las restricciones que determinan los estados sostenibles del sistema. La dinámica poblacional de la anchoveta peruana se modeló usando un modelo estructurado por edades tipo Thomson–Bell con capturas discretas acoplado con el modelo de reclutamiento de Ricker, con pasos semestrales entre los años 1963–1984. Se definió además un conjunto deseable de estados sostenibles, asociado a los niveles del stock y capturas que satisfacen restricciones ecológicas, económicas y sociales previamente definidas. En base a esto se calculó el conjunto de los estados del stock para los que existe un sucesión de capturas que permiten mantenerlo en un estado sostenible (conjunto denominado núcleo de viabilidad) y una familia de conjuntos de capturas viables, que corresponden a todos los niveles de captura que se puedan aplicar sobre cada estado del stock de manera tal que éste se mantenga dentro del núcleo de viabilidad, es decir, permanezca en un estado sostenible. Se encontró una condición suficiente para la existencia de un núcleo de viabilidad no vacío: que la cuota social (captura mínima para mantener en funcionamiento la pesquería) sea menor a un desembarque de 915 800 t semestrales. Se comparó la serie histórica de capturas con las obtenidas a partir de la teoría de viabilidad para el periodo 1963 - 1984, encontrándose que hubo sobrepesca desde finales de 1968, lo que conllevó al colapso de la pesquería durante El Niño de 1972-1973. A partir de los resultados de viabilidad, se definieron 5 estrategias de manejo pesquero (E1–E5) para la anchoveta peruana, concluyéndose que la estrategia precautoria viable media (E5) hubiera podido evitar el colapso de la pesquería de anchoveta, manteniendo además niveles aceptables de pesca. Además, la estrategia precautoria del ICES (E2) no aseguró la sostenibilidad del stock durante los periodos El Niño. Además, se concluye que hubiera sido necesaria una veda de un año después del colapso de la pesquería para que el stock regresara al núcleo de viabilidad, posibilitando un manejo sostenible en adelante. La teoría de la viabilidad, con el núcleo de viabilidad y las capturas viables asociadas, resultaron ser herramientas útiles para el diseño de estrategias de manejo que aseguran la sostenibilidad de los recursos pesqueros.

Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the Euro periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and lowspreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising theirdeficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and,surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocatedfrom the private to the public sectors, reducing investment and deepening the recessions evenfurther. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debtcan be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discriminationand crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereigndebt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This providesincentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowingis limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productiveinvestment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead toself-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countriesin the Eurozone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.

Strategic behaviours in healthcare : evidence from primary care and pharmaceutical markets

We analyse the strategic behaviours of agents in a market through the appropriate¬ness of their skills to the market. If agents' skills are well adapted to market and they can reach their target, they will not need to adopt strategic behaviours. The agents will behave as selfish individuals. However, if their skills are not well adapted and they cannot attain their target alone, they will adopt strategic behaviours to reach their objectives. These behaviours will have a different impact on the utilities of other agents, depending on the skills and the objectives of the agent. If these agents need other agents to reach their objectives, they will behave as altruistic individuals who internalise the utilities of other agents in reaching their objectives and will adopt cooperative behaviours. However, if these agents fear that other agents could prevent them from reaching their target because they can foresee that the skills of other agents are better adapted than their own skills, the agents will then behave as predator individuals and will adopt destructive behaviours to attain their objective. It is in the interests of these agents to manipulate information to increase disorder and dissimulate their lack of skills. They will reproduce the strategies of animals that modify their appearance to escape predators or simulate being bait to attract their prey. These agents will seek to induce chaos into the behaviours of other agents to amplify the impact of their strategies. The appropriateness of skills to the market allows an understanding of the emer-gence of networks and associated strategies. The members of a networks are inputs who are excluded when their costs are higher than their benefits. A network simul-taneously allows cooperation and selfish, predatory behaviours among its members. A network may adopt informational strategies when seeking to become the leader in a market or when it cannot survive. The creation of networks and the manipulation of information are two overlapping evolutionary strategies, with the first strategy favouring the second. In our model, an agent does not behave like a firm that aims only to maximise the profits of the firm but rather as a member of a network who adopts strategic behaviours as a function of the interests of this network. If his skills are well adapted to the market and he can innovate, he will not invest in erroneous input; in contrast, if his skills are not adapted, the agent will invest in the erroneous input of information into the market in order to survive. Therefore, when any informational asymmetries between the agents and their principals characterise the market, the price cannot be the main element that allows equilibrium to be reached in the market; instead, the appropriateness of skills to the market enables equilibrium. We will now apply these hypotheses to explain the strategic behaviours of physicians and pharmaceutical companies.

Consistency and population sensitivity properties in marriage and Rrommate markets

We consider one-to-one matching markets in which agents can either be matched as pairs or remain single. In these so-called roommate markets agents are consumers and resources at the same time. Klaus (Games Econ Behav 72:172-186, 2011) introduced two new "population sensitivity" properties that capture the effect newcomers have on incumbent agents: competition sensitivity and resource sensitivity. On various roommate market domains (marriage markets, no-odd-rings roommate markets, solvable roommate markets),we characterize the core using either of the population sensitivity properties in addition to weak unanimity and consistency. On the domain of all roommate markets, we obtain two associated impossibility results.

Essays in general equilibrium asset pricing

ABSTRACT : Research in empirical asset pricing has pointed out several anomalies both in the cross section and time series of asset prices, as well as in investors' portfolio choice. This dissertation aims to discover the forces driving some of these "puzzling" asset pricing dynamics and portfolio decisions observed in the financial market. Through the dissertation I construct and study dynamic general equilibrium models of heterogeneous investors in the presence of frictions and evaluate quantitatively their implications for financial-market asset prices and portfolio choice. I also explore the potential roots of puzzles in international finance. Chapter 1 shows that, by introducing jointly endogenous no-default type of borrowing constraints and heterogeneous beliefs in a dynamic general-equilibrium economy, many empirical features of stock return volatility can be reproduced. While most of the research on stock return volatility is empirical, this paper provides a theoretical framework that is able to reproduce simultaneously the cross section and time series stylized facts concerning stock returns and their volatility. In contrast to the existing theoretical literature related to stock return volatility, I don't impose persistence or regimes in any of the exogenous state variables or in preferences. Volatility clustering, asymmetry in the stock return-volatility relationship, and pricing of multi-factor volatility components in the cross section all arise endogenously as a consequence of the feedback between the binding of no-default constraints and heterogeneous beliefs. Chapters 2 and 3 explore the implications of differences of opinion across investors in different countries for international asset pricing anomalies. Chapter 2 demonstrates that several international finance "puzzles" can be reproduced by a single risk factor which captures heterogeneous beliefs across international investors. These puzzles include: (i) home equity preference; (ii) the dependence of firm returns on local and foreign factors; (iii) the co-movement of returns and international capital flows; and (iv) abnormal returns around foreign firm cross-listing events in the local market. These are reproduced in a setup with symmetric information and in a perfectly integrated world with multiple countries and independent processes producing the same good. Chapter 3 shows that by extending this framework to multiple goods and correlated production processes; the "forward premium puzzle" arises naturally as a compensation for the heterogeneous expectations about the depreciation of the exchange rate held by international investors. Chapters 2 and 3 propose differences of opinion across international investors as the potential resolution of several international finance `puzzles'. In a globalized world where both capital and information flow freely across countries, this explanation seems more appealing than existing asymmetric information or segmented markets theories aiming to explain international finance puzzles.

Multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment markets: the nucleolus and the core-center

En aquest treball mostrem que, a diferència del cas bilateral, per als mercats multilaterals d'assignació coneguts amb el nom de Böhm-Bawerk assignment games, el nucleolus i el core-center, i. e. el centre de masses del core, no coincideixen en general. Per demostrar-ho provem que donant un m-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game les dues solucions anteriors poden obtenir-se respectivament del nucleolus i el core-center d'un joc convex definit en el conjunt format pels m sectors. Encara més, provem que per calcular el nucleolus d'aquest últim joc només les coalicions formades per un jugador o m-1 jugadors són importants. Aquests resultats simplifiquen el càlcul del nucleolus d'un multi-sided ¿¿ohm-Bawerk assignment market amb un número molt elevat d'agents.

Vertical Syndication-Proof Competitive Prices in Multilateral Markets

[eng] A multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment game (Tejada, to appear) is a model for a multilateral market with a finite number of perfectly complementary indivisible commodities owned by different sellers, and inflexible demand and support functions. We show that for each such market game there is a unique vector of competitive prices for the commodities that is vertical syndication-proof, in the sense that, at those prices, syndication of sellers each owning a different commodity is neither beneficial nor detrimental for the buyers. Since, moreover, the benefits obtained by the agents at those prices correspond to the nucleolus of the market game, we provide a syndication-based foundation for the nucleolus as an appropriate solution concept for market games. For different solution concepts a syndicate can be disadvantageous and there is no escape to Aumman’s paradox (Aumann, 1973). We further show that vertical syndicationproofness and horizontal syndication-proofness – in which sellers of the same commodity collude – are incompatible requirements under some mild assumptions. Our results build on a self-interesting link between multi-sided Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and bankruptcy games (O’Neill, 1982). We identify a particular subset of Böhm-Bawerk assignment games and we show that it is isomorphic to the whole class of bankruptcy games. This isomorphism enables us to show the uniqueness of the vector of vertical syndication-proof prices for the whole class of Böhm-Bawerk assignment market using well-known results of bankruptcy problems.

Symmetrically multilateral-bargained allocations in multi-sided assignment markets

[cat] Aquest treball tracta d’extendre la noció d’equilibri simètric de negociació bilateral introduït per Rochford (1983) a jocs d’assignació multilateral. Un pagament corresponent a un equilibri simètric de negociación multilateral (SMB) és una imputación del core que garanteix que qualsevol agent es troba en equilibri respecte a un procés de negociación entre tots els agents basat en allò que cadascun d’ells podria rebre -i fer servir com a amenaça- en un ’matching’ òptim diferent al que s’ha format. Es prova que, en el cas de jocs d’assignació multilaterals, el conjunt de SMB és sempre no buit i que, a diferència del cas bilateral, no sempre coincideix amb el kernel (Davis and Maschler, 1965). Finalment, responem una pregunta oberta per Rochford (1982) tot introduïnt un conjunt basat en la idea de kernel, que, conjuntament amb el core, ens permet caracteritzar el conjunt de SMB.

Complements and substitutes in multilateral assignment markets

[cat] En aquest treball provo que, en mercats d’assignació amb més de dos costats, agents de diferents sectors poden no ser complementaris mentre que agents del mateix sector poden no ser substituts. Shapley (1962) va provar que això mai pot succeïr quan el mercat d’assignació només té dos costats. No obstant, demostro que existeixen condicions suficients que garanteixen la substitutabilitat i la complementarietat entre agents en aquests tipus de mercats. A més, provo que, quan els béns al mercat son homogenis, el resultat de Shapley (1962) es manté.

Testing the bivariate distribution of daily equity returns using copulas: an application to the Spanish stock market

In this paper we deal with the identification of dependencies between time series of equity returns. Marginal distribution functions are assumed to be known, and a bivariate chi-square test of fit is applied in a fully parametric copula approach. Several families of copulas are fitted and compared with Spanish stock market data. The results show that the t-copula generally outperforms other dependence structures, and highlight the difficulty in adjusting a significant number of bivariate data series