Araucaria forest dynamics in relation to fire frequency in southern Brazil based on fossil and modern pollen dataf

To elucidate the relationship between forest dynamics and fire frequency pollen percentages and charcoal amounts from a 120 cm long peat core and from samples of modern pollen rain were collected along a transect. The study site in southern Brazil is characterized by a species-rich mosaic of grassland-Araucaria forest. It is of crucial importance for management strategies for conservation to understand the development and maintenance of these vegetation mosaics including their sharp forest-grassland boundaries. During the late Holocene, considerable changes occurred in the area. From Anno Domini (AD) 1360 to 1410, the area was dominated by Campos (grassland) vegetation and fire was very common. From AD 1410 to 1500, Araucaria forest expanded and fire was less frequent. From AD 1500 to 1580, Campos grassland spread and the Araucaria forest ceased its development, apparently due to the increase of fire. From AD 1580 to 1935, after a decrease in fire frequency, Araucaria forest expanded again. From AD 1935 to the present, the Araucaria forest expanded while the Campos area decreased. Fire was very rare in this period. The results indicate a strong interaction of forest expansion, forming a mosaic of Campos and Araucaria forest, and the frequency of fire during the past 600 years. A possible collapse of the indigenous population following the post-Colombian colonization in southern Brazil after about AD 1550 may have caused a great reduction of fire frequency. The introduction of cattle (probably after AD 1780) and the resulting decrease of fire frequency might be the reason for forest expansion. Fire is probably the most important factor controlling the dynamics of the forest-grassland mosaics and the formation of sharp borders between these two vegetation types. (C) 2010 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

A network of integrate and fire neurons for visual selection

Biological systems have facility to capture salient object(s) in a given scene, but it is still a difficult task to be accomplished by artificial vision systems. In this paper a visual selection mechanism based on the integrate and fire neural network is proposed. The model not only can discriminate objects in a given visual scene, but also can deliver focus of attention to the salient object. Moreover, it processes a combination of relevant features of an input scene, such as intensity, color, orientation, and the contrast of them. In comparison to other visual selection approaches, this model presents several interesting features. It is able to capture attention of objects in complex forms, including those linearly nonseparable. Moreover, computer simulations show that the model produces results similar to those observed in natural vision systems.

Fire Incidences, Water Bodies, and Population in Maine

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FIRE HAZARD IN COCONINO COUNTY, ARIZONA

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Fire Hazard in Coconino County, Arizona

Fire is a major management issue in the southwestern United States. Three spatial models of fire risk for Coconino County, Northern Arizona. These models were generated using thematic data layers depicting vegetation, elevation, wind speed and direction, and precipitation for January (winter), June (summer), and July (start of monsoon season). ArcGIS 9.0 was used to weight attributes in raster layers to reflect their influence on fire risk and to interpolate raster data layers from point data. Final models were generated using the raster calculator in the Spatial Analyst extension of ArcGIS 9.0. Ultimately, the unique combinations of variables resulted in three different models illustrating the change in fire risk during the year.

Non-monotone insurance contracts and their empirical consequences

The goal of this paper is to show the possibility of a non-monotone relation between coverage ans risk which has been considered in the literature of insurance models since the work of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976). We present an insurance model where the insured agents have heterogeneity in risk aversion and in lenience (a prevention cost parameter). Risk aversion is described by a continuous parameter which is correlated with lenience and for the sake of simplicity, we assume perfect correlation. In the case of positive correlation, the more risk averse agent has higher cosr of prevention leading to a higher demand for coverage. Equivalently, the single crossing property (SCP) is valid and iplies a positive correlation between overage and risk in equilibrium. On the other hand, if the correlation between risk aversion and lenience is negative, not only may the SCP be broken, but also the monotonocity of contracts, i.e., the prediction that high (low) risk averse types choose full (partial) insurance. In both cases riskiness is monotonic in risk aversion, but in the last case there are some coverage levels associated with two different risks (low and high), which implies that the ex-ante (with respect to the risk aversion distribution) correlation between coverage and riskiness may have every sign (even though the ex-post correlation is always positive). Moreover, using another instrument (a proxy for riskiness), we give a testable implication to desentangle single crossing ans non single croosing under an ex-post zero correlation result: the monotonicity of coverage as a function os riskiness. Since by controlling for risk aversion (no asymmetric information), coverage is monotone function of riskiness, this also fives a test for asymmetric information. Finally, we relate this theoretical results to empirical tests in the recent literature, specially the Dionne, Gouruéroux and Vanasse (2001) work. In particular, they found an empirical evidence that seems to be compatible with asymmetric information and non single crossing in our framework. More generally, we build a hidden information model showing how omitted variables (asymmetric information) can bias the sign of the correlation of equilibrium variables conditioning on all observable variables. We show that this may be the case when the omitted variables have a non-monotonic relation with the observable ones. Moreover, because this non-dimensional does not capture this deature. Hence, our main results is to point out the importance of the SPC in testing predictions of the hidden information models.

The insurance function of contracts

One of the central problems in contract law is to define the frontier between legal and illegal breaches of promises. The distinction between good and bad faith is perhaps the conceptual tool most commonly used to tell one from the other. Lawyers spend a lot of energy trying to frame better definitions of the concepts of good and bad faith based on principles of ethics or justice, but often pay much less attention to theories dealing with the incentives that can engender good faith behavior in contractual relationships. By describing the economics of what Stiglitz defined as “explicit” and “implicit” insurance, I highlight the “insurance function” hidden in any promise with basically no mathematical notation. My aim is to render the subject intelligible and useful to lawyers with little familiarity with economics.

On insurance markets with endogenous information acquisition: A robust mechanism design approach

Neste trabalho propomos a aplicação das noções de equilíbrio da recente literatura de desenho de mecanismo robusto com aquisição de informação endógena a um problema de divisão de risco entre dois agentes. Através deste exemplo somos capazes de motivar o uso desta noção de equilíbrio, assim como discutir os efeitos da introdu ção de uma restrição de participação que seja dependente da informação. A simplicidade do modelo nos permite caracterizar a possibilidade de implementar a alocação Pareto efiente em termos do custo de aquisição da informação. Além disso, mostramos que a precisão da informação pode ter um efeito negativo sobre a implementação da alocação efi ciente. Ao final, sao dados dois exemplos específicos de situações nas quais este modelo se aplica.

Unemployment insurance an analysis of optimal mechanisms under aggregate shocks

The purpose of this work is to provide a brief overview of the literature on the optimal design of unemployment insurance systems by analyzing some of the most influential articles published over the last three decades on the subject and extend the main results to a multiple aggregate shocks environment. The properties of optimal contracts are discussed in light of the key assumptions commonly made in theoretical publications on the area. Moreover, the implications of relaxing each of these hypothesis is reckoned as well. The analysis of models of only one unemployment spell starts from the seminal work of Shavell and Weiss (1979). In a simple and common setting, unemployment benefits policies, wage taxes and search effort assignments are covered. Further, the idea that the UI distortion of the relative price of leisure and consumption is the only explanation for the marginal incentives to search for a job is discussed, putting into question the reduction in labor supply caused by social insurance, usually interpreted as solely an evidence of a dynamic moral hazard caused by a substitution effect. In addition, the paper presents one characterization of optimal unemployment insurance contracts in environments in which workers experience multiple unemployment spells. Finally, an extension to multiple aggregate shocks environment is considered. The paper ends with a numerical analysis of the implications of i.i.d. shocks to the optimal unemployment insurance mechanism.

Determinants for political risk insurance of direct investments in emerging markets

Esta dissertação analisa os principais determinantes para investidores contratarem seguro de proteção de riscos políticos (PRI) para seus investimentos diretos, assim com o racional de sair de um PRI não renovando suas políticas. Esta dissertação contribui para a literatura existente sobre PRI, investigando os principais motivadores para PRI, tais como, riscos políticos, riscos econômicos, capacidade do patrocinador, instrumento utilizado para realizar o investimento (horizonte do investimento) determina combinações de PRI utilizando um modelo binário de resposta não linear. Um banco de dados único da Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) no período de 1990 até 2010, contendo informações sobre 693 investimentos incluindo sua cobertura para: seguro de risco de conversibilidade, seguro para risco de expropriação, riscos de guerras e distúrbios civis e riscos de quebra de contrato. Entretanto, percebemos que 47% destes seguros não permanecem ativos até o prazo originalmente contratado. Adicionalmente, instituições financeiras como garantidoras utilizam proporcionalmente mais dívida do que capital como instrumento de investimento e são largamente seguradas dentro da União Européia (EU). Por outro lado, investidores nos BRICs tendem a cobrir primariamente seus investimentos em infraestrutura. Resultados empíricos incluem que um aumento nos riscos de quebra de contrato e guerra civil estão totalmente correlacionados com a renovação de contratos de seguro, assim como um aumento da percepção de risco do pais que está recebendo o investimento.

Commodity Taxation and Social Insurance

We investigate optimal commodity taxation in a social insurance framework based on Varian (1980). We show that the tax prescriptions in this moral hazard framework are notably similar to those derive

On the cost of sympathy : a alternative model of insurance markets

The paper provides an alternative model for insurance market with three types of agents: households, providers of a service and insurance companies. Households have uncertainty about future leveIs of income. Providers, if hired by a household, perform a diagnoses and privately learn a signal. For each signal there is a procedure that maximizes the likelihood of the household obtaining the good state of nature. The paper assumes that providers care about their income and also about the likelihood households will obtain the good state of nature (sympathy assumption). This assumption is satisfied if, for example, they care about their reputation or if there are possible litigation costs in case they do not use the appropriate procedure. Finally, insurance companies offer contracts to both providers and households. The paper provides sufficient conditions for the existence of equilibrium and shows that the sympathy assumption 1eads to a 10ss of welfare for the households due to the need to incentive providers to choose the least expensive treatment.