Two decades on from the break-up of Czechoslovakia: Departures, diversions and destinations. CEPS Commentary, 7 March 2013

Twenty years after the split of Czechoslovakia, expert analysts from the Czech Republic, Slovakia and the UK shed light on the political geography of this part of Central Europe in an extended three-part Commentary. The end points in the Euro-Atlantic integration processes of the successor states may be similar, argue the authors, but the journeys have been very different. Recent experience would suggest that in terms of EU politics, the Slovaks will be rather passive whilst the Czechs might be a little more troublesome. On the domestic front, the political discourse and competition in both states will largely revolve around the question of competence and corruption.

Monstros : a ciência do mito e a sua utilidade nos videojogos

Since the classic era that monsters have been both the subject of worship and fear. Greeks used to valorize them making up new races which lived in faraway lands, in the East. There were traveler’s reports made up, from a moralist and religious point of view, always with veracity in mind, where anatomical weird beings were described. Saint Augustin tried to prove their existence, classifying them as wonders and focusing on stopping the idea of the corruption of the human soul by denying their relation between monstrous births and divine punishment. Monsters present then two distinct aspects when it comes to their origins: one that pushes back to monstrous births, seen as omens, and other that points to the existence of fantastic races in faraway places. However when it comes to structure these fantastic beings display finite compositions, not looking too different from each other. With the passage of time, besides their fearful role, monsters were being observed as scientific curiosities and at last, as recreation subjects, first in freak shows, now in several industries, being the most well know the cinematographic industry and the videogames one. Two creatures from the world known videogame World of Warcraft from Blizzard Entertainment were selected to be analyzed from a scientific point of view, were based on their features, there will be a comparative analysis with diverse anomalies and diseases (prognathism, acromegaly, cyclopia) existent , as well as comparative anatomy with other animals

Deploying the energy incentive: reinforcing EU integration in South-East Europe. CEPS Policy Brief No. 296, July 2013

This Policy Brief urges the European Union to consider reinforcing the Energy Community by further Europeanising the Energy Community Treaty. It argues that the level of dysfunctionality with respect to the rule of law and corruption will make it very hard to establish a pathway for accession for most Balkan states. However, the demand across the region for a sustainable, competitive and stable energy sector creates an ‘energy incentive’ that the Union can leverage to improve the rule of law and adherence to European rules. Furthermore, a juridical strengthening of the Energy Community Treaty will also strengthen the hand of those parties supporting energy liberalisation rules across the region, such as independent businesses, consumers and NGOs. In addition, there is likely to be significant spill-over effects from decisions of a European Energy Community Court operating in the region on the rule of law in general and the accession process in particular.

Croatia and the EU: the catch-up issue. CEPS Commentary, 28 June 2013

To become a prosperous country devoid of institutional preconditions for corruption, Croatia will have to define its own goals, persevere in reaching them and introduce some sort of internal monitoring. True political will, democratisation, government accountability and appropriate policies are crucial, particularly for the institutions and mechanisms that monitor government accountability and citizen participation. One can only reiterate the European Commission’s hope that membership will prove to be an additional incentive to Croatia’s politicians to change their behaviour and start addressing state capture in the country.

Les pratiques d’intervention policières auprès des personnes en crise ou atteintes de troubles mentaux : le cas des agents de réponse en intervention de crise du Service de police de la Ville de Montréal

Cette recherche porte sur les pratiques d’intervention des agents de réponse en intervention de crise (RIC), de leur partenaire fixe et des agents en attente de la formation du Service de police de la Ville de Montréal (SPVM) auprès des personnes en crise ou atteintes de troubles mentaux. Les agents RIC sont des patrouilleurs de première ligne qui ont reçu une formation complète sur les principes d’intervention en contexte de crise ou de santé mentale. Ce modèle de réponse spécialisée est une solution proactive qui a pour but d’améliorer l’action policière en situation de crise et de veiller à une meilleure prise en charge de ces personnes par les ressources institutionnelles. La désinstitutionnalisation des soins et des services psychiatriques a eu pour effet une augmentation du nombre de personnes atteintes de troubles mentaux dans la communauté. Par conséquent, cet accroissement a engendré des rapports plus fréquents entre les services policiers et cette clientèle. Les interventions en contexte de crise ou de santé mentale sont particulières et complexes, de même qu’elles requièrent un niveau supérieur de compréhension des crises humaines. Les autorités policières ont admis que ces interventions représentent une part significative de leur travail et que la formation policière traditionnelle ne les prépare pas suffisamment pour intervenir adéquatement auprès de cette population. En réponse à ces considérations et dans l’objectif d’améliorer leur capacité d’agir, les forces policières se sont dotées de modèles de réponse policière spécialisée en intervention de crise. L’approche la plus répandue est l’équipe d’intervention de crise (« crisis intervention team » ou « CIT »), aussi appelée le modèle de Memphis. Il existe plusieurs variantes de ce modèle, mais les composantes principales, c’est-à-dire la formation avancée et la consolidation d’un partenariat avec le système de santé demeurent dans l’ensemble de ces structures. L’objectif de cette recherche consiste à sonder les perceptions des agents RIC, de leur partenaire fixe et des agents en attente de la formation afin de comprendre et de contraster leurs visions et leurs pratiques d’intervention en contexte de crise ou de santé mentale. Chaque groupe a apporté des précisions intéressantes. Nous avons conduit 12 entrevues qualitatives avec des policiers du SPVM. De façon générale, les participants rapportent que leurs pratiques d’intervention auprès des personnes en crise ou atteintes de troubles mentaux sont davantage ancrées dans une perspective de relation d’aide. Ils mentionnent également que la communication, l’écoute et la confiance doivent être privilégiées avant tout autre stratégie dans les situations qui les permettent et que la force doit être employée seulement lorsqu’elle est nécessaire, c’est-à-dire lorsque leur sécurité ou celle d’autrui est en péril ou lorsque la communication n’est pas possible. Puis, ils admettent que le recours à l’expertise des intervenants en santé mentale permet une analyse plus approfondie de la situation et de l’état mental de la personne visée par l’intervention. D’autre part, en ce qui concerne les limites de la formation policière traditionnelle, les candidats ont soulevé qu’il y a un manque de connaissances en matière de santé mentale ainsi qu’une difficulté associée à l’évaluation de l’état de la personne et du besoin de transport ont été soulevés. Sur le plan des apprentissages, les agents RIC disent avoir une compréhension plus globale de la problématique de santé mentale, de meilleures habiletés communicationnelles, une analyse plus approfondie de la situation, de plus grandes connaissances juridiques, une compréhension du fonctionnement des services hospitaliers ainsi qu’une appréciation particulière pour le partage de savoirs et les principes d’endiguement. Ils font part également de l’importance des rapports pour documenter l’évolution de l’état mental d’une personne et ils ajoutent que la dimension temporelle joue un rôle clé dans la résolution définitive de la problématique. Au sujet des partenaires, ils évoquent des retombées similaires. Toutefois, à la suite de la formation, ils reconnaissent davantage l’importance de leur rôle dans la sécurité de leur partenaire et ils y accordent dorénavant une attention marquée lors de ces interventions. Enfin, les agents non formés formulent des attentes relatives au développement d’outils et de compétences, ce qui leur sera rendu dans la formation RIC. Globalement, les agents RIC et les partenaires interviewés ont modifié leurs pratiques pour les arrimer avec la philosophie des interventions en contexte de crise ou de santé mentale. Ils ont également davantage confiance en leurs capacités et habiletés d’intervention auprès des personnes en crise ou atteintes de troubles mentaux grâce aux connaissances acquises dans la formation.

Les variations spatiales du comportement policier: l'exemple de la Sûreté du Québec

Travail dirigé présenté en vue de l’obtention du grade de maîtrise en criminologie option sécurité intérieure

Towards a new constitutional blueprint for Bosnia and Herzegovina. CEPS Commentary, 20 June 2014

Bosnia-Herzegovina's provisional constitutional system, as created by the Dayton Agreement, has outlived its purpose by more than ten years. Economic and political governance are now even more deadlocked by corruption, political recriminations and institutional failure. Fouéré and Blockmans argue the need for more robust engagement by both the EU and the US and for a constitutional convention to spur reform. This should facilitate the transition from the country’s current status as international protectorate to sustainable self-government, guided by the EU pre-accession process.

The parliamentary elections in Ukraine: new hope? EPC Policy Brief, 21 October 2014

Ukraine’s parliamentary elections on 26 October 2014 seem set to be the most important and most challenging the country has ever held. For the first time in Ukraine’s history, the presidential election of Petro Poroshenko in May gave many Ukrainians new hope. His victory seemed to unite the country, being the first president to have won in most of the regions despite the ongoing conflict in the East. However, with many corrupt elites still in power, reforms have become hostage to vested interests and in-fighting which has raised fears of ‘business as usual’. This has made this election campaign set against a backdrop of serious challenges dominating the agenda for the foreseeable future. In this policy brief, Amanda Paul and Svitlana Kobzar explore the status of the reform agenda needed for a stable and democratic Ukraine as well as the challenges in the run up to the election including corruption, energy and EU relations.

It has only just begun: EU and anticorruption institutions in Moldova. EPC Policy Brief, 1 August 2014

The Republic of Moldova recently signed the Association Agreement with the EU, closely followed by a detailed Association Agenda, which comes with concrete steps and conditionalities in the future dialogue between Chisinau and Brussels. The current paper discusses the most recent evolutions of the anticorruption institutions in Moldova, which owe a lot to EU`s influence. We pay specific attention to the justice reforms chapters in the Agenda and we conclude with recommendations for the EU to continue to pay attention to corruption in Moldova, but address it in a more coherent manner.

Turkey votes: Part I - The storm before the election. EPC Commentary, 26 March 2014

At an election rally on 20 March 2014, Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, declared he wanted to “root out Twitter, no matter what the international community thought”. A few hours later Twitter was shut down. The decision backfired. Turkey’s some 12 million Twitter users immediately found ways to circumnavigate the ban; it highlighted the increasingly authoritarian trend of Erdoğan; and it brought immediate condemnation from numerous foreign leaders. The move has been viewed by many Turks as part of an operation to cover up a corruption probe that has consumed Turkey since 17 December, before key local elections on 30 March. The elections, which will be followed by Presidential election in August and political ones expected in 2015, have become a referendum on Erdoğan’s popularity, and are set to shape Turkey’s political landscape. A lot is at stake as a big win for the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) may not only be used by Erdoğan to justify his response to the corruption scandal but also risks consolidating his increasingly authoritarian style of governance.

Turkey votes: Part II - Erdoğan reloaded. EPC Commentary, 3 April 2014

On 30 March, Turkey’s ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) scooped a significant victory in local elections, taking almost 44 percent of the vote despite accusations of corruption, undermining the rule of law, fundamental rights and freedoms. While there have been claims of election fraud and the main opposition party, the Republican People’s Party (CHP), has demanded recounts in several cities including Istanbul and Ankara, it is clear that even allowing for some level of fraud the win was substantial and more than most people expected. Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan has reached a juncture. He has two choices: return to the path of democracy after a period of democratic back-sliding which included passing several controversial reforms such as a new internet law which led to the recent banning of Twitter and Youtube; or alternatively he can forge ahead with his much talked of revenge campaign against those he has accused of creating a “parallel state” and conspiring to remove him from power. Given that Erdoğan viewed this election as a referendum on his popularity and leadership there is a serious risk that he will do the latter; using the significant mandate given to him to do whatever he wants, including further cracking down on democracy.

The Kremlin plays the immigration card. OSW Commentary No. 112, 2013-08-19

Russia is currently the world’s second most popular destination country for international migrants (second only to the United States). In recent years, Russia’s relatively high economic growth has attracted foreign workers from poorer neighbouring republics in Central Asia, as well as from Ukraine and Belarus. In the absence of a consistent immigration policy, the largescale influx of immigrants has become a major issue affecting social relations in Russia. The majority of Russians oppose the arrival of both foreign workers and internal migrants from Russia’s North Caucasus republics, claiming that their presence in Russia contributes to the escalation of ethnic and religious tensions, fuels organised crime and corruption, and increases competition on the labour market. As many as 70% of Russians are in favour of restricting the number of immigrants allowed into the country, calling on the government for a more stringent policy on immigration. Since the end of July the authorities have responded to these calls by carrying out a series of raids on markets and construction sites across Moscow, where most immigrants tend to find employment. The raids have led to arrests and deportations. However, these measures should not be seen as a serious attempt to deal with the problem of economic migrants in the capital, mainly because of the highly selective and staged nature of the crackdown. This, coupled with the timing of the initiative, might indicate that the raids are a part of an ongoing election campaign, particularly in the run-up to the Moscow mayoral elections scheduled for 8 September. By adopting anti-immigration rhetoric, the Kremlin is seeking both to garner support among Russian voters, who tend to be easily swayed by nationalist sentiments, and to steal the anti-immigration card from the opposition and its leader Alexei Navalny. The opposition has been calling for a clearer policy on this issue and has blamed the government for the current lack of control over migrant numbers, accusing the authorities of benefiting from the widespread corruption linked to immigration. In a broader context, the actions taken by the government are a response to the declining legitimacy of the current ruling elite. By attempting to address the immigration issue, the Kremlin is trying to restore its image as a government attentive to social problems and capable of solving them effectively.

Reforms in Moldova: Moderate progress and an uncertain outlook for the future. OSW Commentary No. 100, 2013-01-22

After coming to power in September 2009, the Alliance for European Integration (AIE)1 coalition began implementing a wide-ranging programme of reforms, with a view to bringing Moldova closer to the European Union, and ultimately to ensure the country’s full membership of the EU. Today, Moldova is considered a clear leader in European integration among the members of the EU’s Eastern Partnership programme. This, however, has less to do with the concrete reforms introduced by the Moldovan government, and more to do with, on the one hand, Chișinău’s excellent public relations with Brussels, achieved through effective diplomacy; and on the other hand, the growing disillusionment with the lack of progress in other Eastern Partnership countries, particularly in Ukraine. Attempts to evaluate Moldova’s reforms have proven rather problematic. On the one hand, the ruling coalition has managed to make significant progress in the areas of civil liberties, human rights and electoral reform. The government has also successfully implemented regulations which have brought Moldova closer to signing a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (DCFTA) with the EU, and it has made headway in talks on visa liberalisation with Brussels. On the other hand, Chișinău has still not carried out the structural and economic reforms without which real change in the country will be impossible. No reforms have been introduced in the Ministry of the Interior, the Moldovan police force, or the judiciary. The AIE has also failed to decentralise governance and has had no real success in reducing corruption; its attempts to rebuild the country’s financial institutions have proved equally unsuccessful. The main reasons for this poor performance include mutual mistrust and conflicting interests among the coalition members, a shortage of financial resources, strong resistance to change by public administration staff, and significant pressure from those political and business groups whose interests could suffer as a result of the proposed reforms. It should also be noted that since the AIE took power, the international context of the reform efforts has undergone significant changes. On the one hand, the EU has been facing an economic crisis, which has had a negative impact on Moldovan exports and contributed to the worsening of the economic situation in the country; and on the other hand, Moldova has been offered membership of the Customs Union as a viable alternative to EU membership.

Preventing collapse in Ukraine: The EU should finance the grass roots directly. CEPS Commentary, 10 December 2014

With the aim of averting the total collapse of the Ukrainian economy, Daniel Gros and Steven Blockmans urge the EU to ​offer a minimum of macro-financial assistance to improve governance, fight corruption and harmonise laws with the EU acquis, while beefing up financing channelled directly to the grass roots.

The EU-Ukraine Action Plan on Visa Liberalisation: an assessment of Ukraine's readiness. OSW Commentary No. 45, 2011-01-17

The Action Plan on visas adopted during the recent EU-Ukraine summit is a success for Ukraine. It is the first time that Kyiv has succeeded in obtaining a definition of the conditions and criteria whose fulfilment will enable Ukraine to apply for the lifting of EU visas for its citizens. Ukraine's strong point has been its political will; the lifting of this visa regime has been a priority for all Ukrainian governments since 2005. Since Viktor Yanukovych became president, Ukraine has adopted or prepared key legal acts that brought it nearer to European standards in the area of border and migration management. One of Kyiv's strengths is also its relatively well reformed and efficiently managed border service. Moreover, illegal transit migration via Ukraine is decreasing, and fewer Ukrainians are trying to enter or stay in the EU illegally. Also, Kyiv has efficiently implemented the EU-Ukraine readmission agreement. The hardest task for Ukraine will be to meet the EU’s expectations concerning values, the condition of Ukrainian democracy, and the rule of law. Corruption remains the main barrier to Ukraine's development and modernisation; the courts are weak and the judicial system inefficient. The main undertaking of the new migration service that is being formed at the moment will be to create a civil system of registration, monitoring and regulating the stays of foreign nationals. This may prove difficult, as the supervisory authority (the Ministry of the Interior) remains an unreformed, police-type bureaucratic institution. Ukraine is lagging behind countries such as Russia, Belarus and Moldova when it comes to the introduction of biometric documents. Another problem is the lack of an electronic information system on foreign nationals, visas and border crossings which would be accessible to all the relevant services and institutions. For these reasons, the complete abolition of visas seems to be a longterm perspective, especially considering that many EU countries, which themselves are faced with the problem of migrants’ integration, are rather sceptical about the further liberalisation of movement of people with their eastern neighbours. In the immediate future, if Ukraine meets some of the requirements set by the EU, it will be able to seek the extension of the visa facilitations that have been in operation since 2008.