Financial fragility, trade credit and contagion effects during the crisis: a spatial econometric approach to firm-level data

The number of distressed manufacturing firms increased sharply during recessionary phase 2009-13. Financial indebtness traditionally plays a key role in assessing firm solvency but contagion effects that originate from the supply chain are usually neglected in literature. Firm interconnections, captured via the trade credit channel, represent a primary vehicle of individual shocks’ propagation, especially during an economic downturn, when liquidity tensions arise. A representative sample of 11,920 Italian manufacturing firms is considered to model a two-step econometric design, where chain reactions in terms of trade credit accumulation (i.e. default of payments to suppliers) are primarily analyzed by resorting to a spatial autoregressive approach (SAR). Spatial interactions are modeled based on a unique dataset of firm-to-firm transactions registered before the outbreak of the crisis. The second step in instead a binary outcome model where trade credit chains are considered together with data on the bank-firm relationship to assess determinants of distress likelihoods in 2009-13. Results show that outstanding trade debt is affected by the liquidity position of a firm and by positive spatial effects. Trade credit chain reactions are found to exert, in turn, a positive impact on distress likelihoods during the crisis. The latter effect is comparable in magnitude to the one exerted by individual financial rigidity, and stresses the importance to include complex interactions between firms in the analysis of the solvency behavior.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of the risk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in a particular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on the corporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

Three Dichotomies in Lawyers’ Ethics (With Particular Attention to the Corporation as Client)

Three usually unexpressed, and too often unnoticed, conceptual dichotomies underlie our perception and understanding of lawyers’ ethics. First, the existence of a special body of professional ethics and professional regulation presupposes some special need or risk. Criminal and civil law are apparently insufficient. Ordinary day-to-day morality and ordinary ethics, likewise, are not considered to be enough. What is the risk entailed by the notion of a profession that is special; who needs protection, and from what? Two quite different possible answers to this question provide the first of the three dichotomies examined in this article: one can understand the risk as primarily to a vulnerable client from a powerful professional; or, to the contrary, from a powerful client-lawyer combination toward vulnerable others. Second, what is the foundational orientation of lawyers? Are lawyers serving primarily their particular clients, and those clients’ preferences, choices and autonomy? Or is the primary allegiance of lawyers to some community or collective goal or interest distinct from the particular goals or interests of the client? The third dichotomy concerns not the substance of therisk, or the primary orientation, but the appropriate means of responding to that risk or that fundamental obligation. Should professional ethics be implemented primarily through rules? Or, should we rely on character and the discretion of lawyers to make a thought out, all things considered, decision? Each of these three presents a fundamental difference in how we perceive and address issues of lawyers’ ethics. Each affects our understanding and analysis on multiple levels, from (1) determining the appropriate or requisite conduct in aparticular situation, to (2) framing a specific rule or approach for a particular category of situations, to (3) more general or abstract theory or policy. A person’s inclinations in regard to the dichotomies affects the conclusions that person will reach on each of those levels of analysis, yet those inclinations and assumptions are frequently unexamined and unarticulated. One’s position on each of the dichotomies tends to structure the approach and outcome without the issues and choice having been explicitly addressed or possibly even noticed. This article is an effort to ameliorate that problem. Part I addresses the question of what is the risk in the work of lawyers, or the function of lawyers, for which professional ethics is the answer. The concluding section focuses on the particular problem of the corporation as client. Part II then asks the related and possibly consequent question of what is the foundational orientation or allegiance of the lawyer? Is it to the individual client? Or is it to some larger community interest? Again, the concluding section focuses on thecorporation. Part III turns to the means or method for addressing the obligations and possible problems of the professional ethics of lawyers. Should lawyers’ ethics guide and confine the conduct of lawyers primarily through rules? Or should it function primarily through reliance on the knowledge, judgment and character of lawyers? If the latter were the guide, ethical decisions would be made on a situation by situation basis under the discretion of each lawyer. Toward the end of each discussion possibilities for bridging the dichotomy are considered (and with such bridges each dichotomy may come to look more like a spectrum or continuum.). At several points after its introduction in Parts I and II, the special problem of the corporation as client is revisited and possible solutions suggested. Illustrating the usefulness of keeping the dichotomies in view, Part IV applies them to several exemplary situations of ethical difficulty in actual lawyer practice. For readers finding it difficult to envision the consequences of these distinctions, turning ahead to Part IV may be useful in making the discussion more concrete. Some commonalities across the dichotomies and connections among them are then developed in the concluding section, Part V.

The assignment of credit through bills of exchange and transmission documents in Andalusi Law

The exchange traffic was a practice that suited the modus vivendi of caravanners and traders in the Islamic world. The inclusion of the Iberian.Peninsula into the most important commercial routes of Muslims – such as the silk route through the North Africa – provides a very solid reason to deepen in the study of the sources that have been preserved about the role that certain credit instruments, which represented an alternative to the coin, might have played in trade centres.

A quantitative assessment of students’ experiences of studying music: a Spanish perspective on the European credit transfer system (ECTS)

The purpose of this investigation is to evaluate whether or not the allocation of time proposed in the Music Study Guide, adapted from the European Higher Education Area (EHEA) guidelines, is consistent and adequate for students with minimal musical knowledge. The report takes into account the importance of students’ previous knowledge and the relation this has to the time and effort expended by students in acquiring appropriate knowledge and skills. This is related also to the adequacy of the course specification to meet the demands of university study and the labour market. Results show that those students who enrolled at university without any previous musical knowledge are likely to experience significant difficulty in the acquisition of certain musical and professional competences. This highlights a need to reinforce the music curriculum, or establish zero-level courses, in order to enable such students to succeed in the subject.

Note from William Croswell to President Kirkland and the Corporation of Harvard College, 1817-1821

This folder contains six documents: three drafts of a brief March 10, 1817, note to Harvard President John Kirkland, with two of the drafts followed by an October 25, 1819, note to the Harvard College Corporation concerning Croswell's work on Harvard's Library Catalogue.

Letters to the Corporation of Harvard College, 1819-1829

Paper notebook containing copies of letters sent by Croswell to the Harvard Corporation in relation to his work on the Harvard Library Catalogue.