The implicit theory of historical change in the work of Alan S. Milward

Alan S. Milward was an economic historian who developed an implicit theory ofhistorical change. His interpretation which was neither liberal nor Marxist positedthat social, political, and economic change, for it to be sustainable, had to be agradual process rather than one resulting from a sudden, cataclysmicrevolutionary event occurring in one sector of the economy or society. Benignchange depended much less on natural resource endowment or technologicaldevelopments than on the ability of state institutions to respond to changingpolitical demands from within each society. State bureaucracies were fundamentalto formulating those political demands and advising politicians of ways to meetthem. Since each society was different there was no single model of developmentto be adopted or which could be imposed successfully by one nation-state onothers, either through force or through foreign aid programs. Nor coulddevelopment be promoted simply by copying the model of a more successfuleconomy. Each nation-state had to find its own response to the political demandsarising from within its society. Integration occurred when a number of nation states shared similar political objectives which they could not meet individuallybut could meet collectively. It was not simply the result of their increasinginterdependence. It was how and whether nation-states responded to thesedomestic demands which determined the nature of historical change.

Value and prices in Russian economic thought (1890-1920)

The subject "Value and prices in Russian economic thought (1890--1920)" should evoke several names and debates in the reader's mind. For a long time, Western scholars have been aware that the Russian economists Tugan-Baranovsky and Bortkiewicz were active participants to the Marxian transformation problem, that the mathematical models of Dmitriev prefigured forthcoming neoricardian based models, and that many Russian economists were either supporting the Marxian labour theory of value or being revisionists. Moreover, these ideas were preparing the ground for Soviet planning. Russian scholars additionally knew that this period was the time of introduction of marginalism in Russia, and that, during this period, economists were active in thinking the relation of ethics with economic theory. All these issues are well covered in the existing literature. But there is a big gap that this dissertation intends to fill. The existing literature handles these pieces separately, although they are part of a single, more general, history. All these issues (the labour theory of value, marginalism, the Marxian transformation problem, planning, ethics, mathematical economics) were part of what this dissertation calls here "The Russian synthesis". The Russian synthesis (in the singular) designates here all the attempts at synthesis between classical political economy and marginalism, between labour theory of value and marginal utility, and between value and prices that occurred in Russian economic thought between 1890 and 1920, and that embraces the whole set of issues evoked above. This dissertation has the ambition of being the first comprehensive history of that Russian synthesis. In this, this contribution is unique. It has always surprised the author of the present dissertation that such a book has not yet been written. Several good reasons, both in terms of scarce availability of sources and of ideological restrictions, may accounted for a reasonable delay of several decades. But it is now urgent to remedy the situation before the protagonists of the Russian synthesis are definitely classified under the wrong labels in the pantheon of economic thought. To accomplish this task, it has seldom be sufficient to gather together the various existing studies on aspects of this story. It as been necessary to return to the primary sources in the Russian language. The most important part of the primary literature has never been translated, and in the last years only some of them have been republished in Russian. Therefore, most translations from the Russian have been made by the author of the present dissertation. The secondary literature has been surveyed in the languages that are familiar (Russian, English and French) or almost familiar (German) to the present author, and which are hopefully the most pertinent to the present investigation. Besides, and in order to increase the acquaintance with the text, which was the objective of all this, some archival sources were used. The analysis consists of careful chronological studies of the authors' writings and their evolution in their historical and intellectual context. As a consequence, the dissertation brings new authors to the foreground - Shaposhnikov and Yurovsky - who were traditionally confined to the substitutes' bench, because they only superficially touched the domains quoted above. In the Russian synthesis however, they played an important part of the story. As a side effect, some authors that used to play in the foreground - Dmitriev and Bortkiewicz - are relegated to the background, but are not forgotten. Besides, the dissertation refreshes the views on authors already known, such as Ziber and, especially, Tugan-Baranovsky. The ultimate objective of this dissertation is to change the opinion that one could have on "value and prices in Russian economic thought", by setting the Russian synthesis at the centre of the debates.

A comment on the Nash program and the theory of implementation

The mechanisms in the Nash program for cooperative games are madecompatible with the framework of the theory of implementation. This is donethrough a reinterpretation of the characteristic function that avoids feasibilityproblems, thereby allowing an analysis that focuses exclusively on the payoff space. In this framework, we show that the core is the only majorcooperative solution that is Maskin monotonic. Thus, implementation of mostcooperative solutions must rely on refinements of the Nash equilibrium concept(like most papers in the Nash program do). Finally, the mechanisms in theNash program are adapted into the model.

Additional utility of insiders with imperfect dynamical information

In this paper we consider an insider with privileged information thatis affected by an independent noise vanishing as the revelation timeapproaches. At this time, information is available to every trader. Ourfinancial markets are based on Wiener space. In probabilistic terms weobtain an infinite dimensional extension of Jacod s theorem to covercases of progressive enlargement of filtrations. The application ofthis result gives the semimartingale decomposition of the originalWiener process under the progressively enlarged filtration. As anapplication we prove that if the rate at which the additional noise inthe insider s information vanishes is slow enough then there is noarbitrage and the additional utility of the insider is finite.

Business cycle measurement with some theory

A method to evaluate cyclical models not requiring knowledge of the DGP and the exact specificationof the aggregate decision rules is proposed. We derive robust restrictions in a class of models; use someto identify structural shocks in the data and others to evaluate the class or contrast sub-models. Theapproach has good properties, even in small samples, and when the class of models is misspecified. Themethod is used to sort out the relevance of a certain friction (the presence of rule-of-thumb consumers)in a standard class of models.

Audit of the Utility System Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology (Iowa State University) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2007

Audit of the Utility System Revenue Bond Funds of Iowa State University of Science and Technology (Iowa State University) as of and for the year ended June 30, 2007

Bringing game theory to hypothesis testing: Establishing finite sample bounds on inference

Small sample properties are of fundamental interest when only limited data is avail-able. Exact inference is limited by constraints imposed by speci.c nonrandomizedtests and of course also by lack of more data. These e¤ects can be separated as we propose to evaluate a test by comparing its type II error to the minimal type II error among all tests for the given sample. Game theory is used to establish this minimal type II error, the associated randomized test is characterized as part of a Nash equilibrium of a .ctitious game against nature.We use this method to investigate sequential tests for the di¤erence between twomeans when outcomes are constrained to belong to a given bounded set. Tests ofinequality and of noninferiority are included. We .nd that inference in terms oftype II error based on a balanced sample cannot be improved by sequential sampling or even by observing counter factual evidence providing there is a reasonable gap between the hypotheses.

The optimum quantity of money: Theory and evidence

In this paper we propose a simple and general model for computing the Ramsey optimal inflation tax, which includes several models from the previous literature as special cases. We show that it cannot be claimed that the Friedman rule is always optimal (or always non--optimal) on theoretical grounds. The Friedman rule is optimal or not, depending on conditions related to the shape of various relevant functions. One contribution of this paper is to relate these conditions to {\it measurable} variables such as the interest rate or the consumption elasticity of money demand. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money when there are economies of scale in the demand for money (the scale elasticity is smaller than one) and/or when money is required for the payment of consumption or wage taxes. We find that it tends to be optimal to tax money more heavily when the interest elasticity of money demand is small. We present empirical evidence on the parameters that determine the optimal inflation tax. Calibrating the model to a variety of empirical studies yields a optimal nominal interest rate of less than 1\%/year, although that finding is sensitive to the calibration.

Relative price riddles in international business cycle theory: Are transport costs the explanation?

We study relative price behavior in an international business cyclemodel with specialization in production, in which a goods marketfriction is introduced through transport costs. The transporttechnology allows for flexible transport costs. We analyze whetherthis extension can account for the striking differences betweentheory and data as far as the moments of terms of trade and realexchange rates are concerned. We find that transport costs increaseboth the volatility of the terms of trade and the volatility of thereal exchange rate. However, unless the transport technology isspecified by a Leontief technology, transport costs do not resolvethe quantitative discrepancies between theory and data. Asurprising result is that transport costs may actually lower thepersistence of the real exchange rate, a finding that is in contrastto much of the emphasis of the empirical literature.

Consumer Advisory Bulletin, Storm Warning: Be Wary of Impostors Posing as Utility Workers, March 2007

The Attorney General’s Consumer Protection Division receives hundreds of calls and consumer complaints every year. Follow these tips to avoid unexpected expense and disappointments. This record is about: Storm Warning: Be Wary of Impostors Posing as Utility Workers

Social security in theory and practice (II): Efficiency theories, narrative theories and implications for reform

166 countries have some kind of public old age pension. What economic forcescreate and sustain old age Social Security as a public program? Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999b) document several of the internationally and historically common features of social security programs, and explore "political" theories of Social Security. This paper discusses the "efficiency theories", which view creation of the SS program as a full of partial solution to some market failure. Efficiency explanations of social security include the "SS as welfare for the elderly" the "retirement increases productivity to optimally manage human capital externalities", "optimal retirement insurance", the "prodigal father problem", the "misguided Keynesian", the "optimal longevity insurance", the "governmenteconomizing transaction costs", and the "return on human capital investment". We also analyze four "narrative" theories of social security: the "chain letter theory", the "lump of labor theory", the "monopoly capitalism theory", and the "Sub-but-Nearly-Optimal policy response to private pensions theory".The political and efficiency explanations are compared with the international and historical facts and used to derive implications for replacing the typical pay-as-you-go system with a forced savings plan. Most of the explanations suggest that forced savings does not increase welfare, and may decrease it.

A dynamic choice model of hybrid behavior in the attribute-space

This paper presents a dynamic choice model in the attributespace considering rational consumers that discount the future. In lightof the evidence of several state-dependence patterns, the model isfurther extended by considering a utility function that allows for thedifferent types of behavior described in the literature: pure inertia,pure variety seeking and hybrid. The model presents a stationaryconsumption pattern that can be inertial, where the consumer only buysone product, or a variety-seeking one, where the consumer buys severalproducts simultane-ously. Under the inverted-U marginal utilityassumption, the consumer behaves inertial among the existing brands forseveral periods, and eventually, once the stationary levels areapproached, the consumer turns to a variety-seeking behavior. An empiricalanalysis is run using a scanner database for fabric softener andsignificant evidence of hybrid behavior for most attributes is found,which supports the functional form considered in the theory.