Fighting corruption with pyramids: A Law and Economics approach to combating corruption in post-socialist countries

Corruption is, in the last two decades, considered as one of the biggest problems within the international community, which harms not only a particular state or society but the whole world. The discussion on corruption in law and economics approach is mainly run under the veil of Public choice theory and principal-agent model. Based on this approach the strong international initiatives taken by the UN, the OECD and the Council of Europe, provided various measures and tools in order to support and guide countries in their combat against corruption. These anti-corruption policies created a repression -prevention-transparency model for corruption combat. Applying this model, countries around the world adopted anti-corruption strategies as part of their legal rules. Nevertheless, the recent researches on the effects of this move show non impressive results. Critics argue that “one size does not fit all” because the institutional setting of countries around the world varies. Among the countries which experience problems of corruption, even though they follow the dominant anti-corruption trends, are transitional, post-socialist countries. To this group belong the countries which are emerging from centrally planned to an open market economy. The socialist past left traces on institutional setting, mentality of the individuals and their interrelation, particularly in the domain of public administration. If the idiosyncrasy of these countries is taken into account the suggestion in this thesis is that in public administration in post-socialist countries, instead of dominant anti-corruption scheme repression-prevention-transparency, corruption combat should be improved through the implementation of a new one, structure-conduct-performance. The implementation of this model is based on three regulatory pyramids: anti-corruption, disciplinary anti-corruption and criminal anti-corruption pyramid. This approach asks public administration itself to engage in corruption combat, leaving criminal justice system as the ultimate weapon, used only for the very harmful misdeeds.

Essays in Health Economics

In the first chapter we develop a theoretical model investigating food consumption and body weight with a novel assumption regarding human caloric expenditure (i.e. metabolism), in order to investigate why individuals can be rationally trapped in an excessive weight equilibrium and why they struggle to lose weight even when offered incentives for weight-loss. This assumption allows the theoretical model to have multiple equilibria and to provide an explanation for why losing weight is so difficult even in the presence of incentives, without relying on rational addiction, time-inconsistency preferences or bounded rationality. In addition to this result we are able to characterize under which circumstances a temporary incentive can create a persistent weight loss. In the second chapter we investigate the possible contributions that social norms and peer effects had on the spread of obesity. In recent literature peer effects and social norms have been characterized as important pathways for the biological and behavioral spread of body weight, along with decreased food prices and physical activity. We add to this literature by proposing a novel concept of social norm related to what we define as social distortion in weight perception. The theoretical model shows that, in equilibrium, the effect of an increase in peers' weight on i's weight is unrelated to health concerns while it is mainly associated with social concerns. Using regional data from England we prove that such social component is significant in influencing individual weight. In the last chapter we investigate the relationship between body weight and employment probability. Using a semi-parametric regression we show that men and women employment probability do not follow a linear relationship with body mass index (BMI) but rather an inverted U-shaped one, peaking at a BMI way over the clinical threshold for overweight.

Essays in the Economics of Ageing

In the first paper, I assess if financial incentives may be used as an effective device to induce workers to postpone retirement by evaluating the Italian so called “super bonus” reform. The bonus consisted in economic incentives given for a limited period to private sector workers who had reached the requirements for seniority pension. Crucially for this study, public workers were not entitled to the bonus. Using data from the Bank of Italy Survey on Household Income andWealth, and exploiting the DID-Probit strategy proposed by Blundell et al. (JEEA, 2004), I assess the effect of the bonus on the decision to postpone retirement, by comparing private and public workers before and after the reform. Results suggest a reduction of 12ppt in the proportion of private workers who decided to retire among those qualifying for retirement. Results also suggest, not trivially, that most of the effect of the reform is driven by low-income workers. Finally, I propose an estimate of the extensive margin elasticity of Italian older workers. The second study estimates a structural reduced form of the “option value” model developed by Stock and Wise (1990) using Italian data from the Survey of Health, Ageing and Retirement in Europe (SHARE).Exploiting exogenous changes in social security wealth (SSW) results show a significant effect in the expected direction of SSW and of marginal incentives to retire. Results are robust even after controlling for individual heterogeneity and its correlation with financial incentives. Using detailed information on individuals, the results also highlights the importance of individual and job characteristics, which have been very little explored by this literature, as determinants of retirement. This suggests the potential of “tagging” in the design of social security incentives in order to reduce choice distortions and improve the overall efficiency of the system.

Essays in Applied and Labor Economics

This thesis consists of three self-contained papers. In the first paper I analyze the labor supply behavior of Bologna Pizza Delivery Vendors. Recent influential papers analyze labor supply behavior of taxi drivers (Camerer et al., 1997; and Crawford and Meng, 2011) and suggest that reference-dependence preferences have an important influence on drivers’ labor-supply decisions. Unlike previous papers, I am able to identify an exogenous and transitory change in labor demand. Using high frequency data on orders and rainfall as an exogenous demand shifter, I invariably find that reference-dependent preferences play no role in their labor’ supply decisions and the behavior of pizza vendors is perfectly consistent with the predictions of the standard model of labor’ supply. In the second paper, I investigate how the voting behavior of Members of Parliament is influenced by the Members seating nearby. By exploiting the random seating arrangements in the Icelandic Parliament, I show that being seated next to Members of a different party increases the probability of not being aligned with one’s own party. Using the exact spatial orientation of the peers, I provide evidence that supports the hypothesis that interaction is the main channel that explain these results. In the third paper, I provide an estimate of the trade flows that there would have been between the UK and Europe if the UK had joined the Euro. As an alternative approach to the standard log-linear gravity equation I employ the synthetic control method. I show that the aggregate trade flows between Britain and Europe would have been 13% higher if the UK had adopted the Euro.

The Intersection of Economics and Politics in a Small OPEC Country: the Case of Ecuador, 1990 - March 2014

Today, crude oil remains a vital resource all around the world. This non-renewable resource powers countries worldwide. Besides serving as an energy source, crude oil is also the most important component for different world economies, especially in developing countries. Ecuador, a small member of the OPEC oil cartel, presents a case where its economy is oil dependent. A great percentage of the country¿s GDP and government¿s budget comes from oil revenues. Ecuador has always been a primary exporter of raw materials. In the last centuries, the country experienced three important economic booms: cacao, bananas, and, ultimately, crude oil. In this sense, the country has not been able to fully industrialize and begin to export manufactured goods, i.e., Ecuador suffers from the Dutch disease. The latter has deterred Ecuador from achieving broad-based economic development. Given crude oil¿s importance for the Ecuadorian economy, the government has always tried to influence the oil industry in search of profits and benefits. Therefore, this thesis, explores the question: how and to what extent have political interventions affected the oil industry in Ecuador from 1990 until March 2014? In general, this thesis establishes an economic history context during the last twenty-four years, attempting to research how political interventions have shaped Ecuador¿s oil industry and economy. In the analysis, it covers a period where political instability prevailed, until Rafael Correa became president. The thesis examines Ecuador¿s participation in OPEC, trying to find explanations as to why the country voluntarily left the organization in 1992, only to rejoin in 2007 when Correa rose to power. During the ¿Revolución Ciudadana¿ period, the thesis researches reforms to the Law of Hydrocarbons, variations in the relations with other nations, the controversy surrounding the Yasuní-ITT oil block, and the ¿Refinería del Pacífico¿ construction. The thesis is an Industrial Organization detailed case study that analyzes, updates, and evaluates the intersection of economics and politics in Ecuador¿s crude oil industry during the last 24 years. In this sense I have consulted past theses, newspaper articles, books, and other published data about the petroleum industry, both from a global and Ecuadorian perspective. In addition to published sources, I was able to interview sociologists, public figures, history and economics academics, and other experts, accessing unique unpublished data about Ecuador¿s oil industry. I made an effort to collect information that shows the private and public side of the industry, i.e., from government-related and independent sources. I attempted to remain as objective as possible to make conclusions about the appropriate Industrial Organization policy for Ecuador¿s oil industry, addressing the issue from an economic, social, political, and environmental point of view. I found how Ecuador¿s political instability caused public policy to fail, molding the conduct and market structure of the crude oil industry. Throughout history, developed nations have benefited from low oil prices, but things shifted since oil prices began to rise, which is more beneficial for the developing nations that actually possess and produce the raw material. Nevertheless, Ecuador, a victim of the Dutch disease due to its heavy reliance on crude oil as a primary product, has not achieved broad-based development.

From Elitism through Corporatism to Pluralism? The Role of Elites in the Political Transition of Ukraine

The group set out to analyse the dynamics of elite groups in Ukraine today, both internal and inter-group, and their ideas on major socio-economic, political and foreign policies, in order to identify the degree of competitiveness between groups, methods of elite recruitment and the degree of elite response, which influence both the political agenda and the results of political activity. Having observed the contemporary debate and identified the pre-eminence of various elite groups in the decision-making process at the regional and state levels, they also sought to determine the type and degree of elite consensus which might be achieved in contemporary Ukraine. They also considered the extent of concealed power, in terms of covert interaction more characteristic of corporate societies, which might allow for the abuse of authority within a technically democratic system. The group then went on to consider the stages of counter-elite transformation and the continuing importance of the communist elite, as well as the issue of rivalry versus consensus. They see their findings as relevant not only to the Central and Eastern European context but also to the situation in Latin America today.

Can OBAMA win Re-election? Demographics vs. Economics in the 2012 Election

Lincoln famously spoke of government “of the people, by the p eople, and for the people.” But who, exactly, are “the people”? Which demographic characteristics are the most politically significant? And who will actually turn out to vote? Dr. Ruy Teixeira, Senior Fellow at The Century Foundation and the Center for American Progress, will consider these questions against the backdrop of this year’s presidential campaign.

Paying with karma in the Buddha’s Flower Shop: Spiritual Economics in Early Indian Buddhism

Shen Weirong