Addressing conflict and tolerance through the curriculum

Political, religious and national divisions in Northern Ireland go back many hundreds of years so it is not surprising that the lack of a common national narrative has made the teaching of history in schools difficult. The fact that schools have largely been organized on a denominational basis has added to the challenge. When political violence broke out in the late 1960s many looked to schools to contribute to the promotion of reconciliation and the way history had been taught received significant critical attention. This chapter will outline the evolving nature of the history curriculum and review evidence on the impact of this curriculum on the historical understanding of students and young people. In addition, the chapter will briefly consider other ways in which students engage with historical issues through the teaching of citizenship, and wider family and community influences. Whereas the teaching of history in the past either was largely absent or often took on a partisan character, the development of a statutory curriculum in the 1990s helped promote a more dispassionate, skills-based approach which emphasized critical engagement with evidence and a multiperspectivity. While this represented a significant improvement on what had gone before, evaluation of the impact of this approach has highlighted the need for a consideration of the emotional impact of historical understanding and the need better to connect the lessons of history to contemporary society.

Peace Building and Conflict Transformation: A Case Study of Northern Ireland

This paper provides an overview of the transition from armed conflict to peace in Northern Ireland between 1994 and 2016. It discusses the main stages of the peace process and the main elements of the peace Agreement in relation to the development of global thinking around peacebuilding as set out in the United Nations 1992 report Agenda for Peace and the 2000 Brahimi Report. The paper argues that while Northern Ireland is often highlighted as a positive example of peacebuilding, it is not without its limitations and overall the experience of the past twenty years emphasises the importance of ensuring a broadly inclusive process and the need for a sustained commitment over a long period of time. 

How to Apply for Scholarships and Grants (2016)

A short guide highlighting federal and state scholarships and grants, including Pell Grant, career-related training grants, opportunities for foster youth and state-funded scholarships.

CIVIL WAR SETTLEMENTS AND COMBATANTS’ BEHAVIORS: STRATEGY, PERCEPTION, AND REPUTATION

Three projects in my dissertation focus on the termination of internal conflicts based on three critical factors: a combatant’s bargaining strategy, perceptions of relative capabilities, and reputation for toughness. My dissertation aims to provide the relevant theoretical framework to understand war termination beyond the simple two-party bargaining context. The first project focuses on the government’s strategic use of peace agreements. The first project suggests that peace can also be designed strategically to create a better bargain in the near future by changing the current power balance, and thus the timing and nature of peace is not solely a function of overcoming current barriers to successful bargaining. As long as the government has no overwhelming capability to defeat all rebel groups simultaneously, it needs to keep multiple rebel groups as divided as possible. This strategic partial peace helps to deter multiple rebel groups from collaborating in the battlefield and increases the chances of victory against non-signatories. The second project deals with combatants’ perceptions of relative capabilities. While bargaining theories of war suggest that war ends when combatants share a similar perception about their relative capabilities, combatants’ perceptions about relative capabilities are not often homogeneous. While focusing on information problems, this paper examines when a rebel group underestimates the government’s supremacy in relative capabilities and how this heterogeneous perception about the power gap influences negotiated settlements. The third project deals with the tension between different types of reputations in the context of civil wars: 1) a reputation for resolve and 2) a reputation for keeping human rights standards. In the context of civil wars, the use of indiscriminate violence by the government is costly, and as such, it signals the government’s toughness (or resolve) to rebel groups. I argue that the rebels are more likely to accept the government’s offer when the government recently engaged in indiscriminate violence against civilians during the conflict. This effect, however, is conditional on the government’s international human rights reputation; suggesting that rebel groups interpret this violence as a signal particularly when the government does not have a penchant for attacking civilians in general.

Improving Employment and Income through Development of Egypt’s Aquaculture Sector (IEIDEAS) project

The Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperation (SDC)-funded Improving Employment and Income through Development of Egypt’s Aquaculture Sector (IEIDEAS) project was implemented by WorldFish in partnership with CARE Egypt and the Egyptian Ministry of Agriculture and Land Reclamation from 2011 to 2014 and later extended to November 2015. The project focused on four governorates with significant aquaculture production (Kafr El Sheikh, Behera, Sharkia and Fayoum) and one governorate (El Mineya), where aquaculture was a new activity. The project was based on a value chain analysis conducted by WorldFish in September 2011 that identified the aquaculture value chain as a significant employer, particularly in rural areas. The analysis suggested that there was scope to increase employment of youth and women in the aquaculture sector The main objective was to increase aquaculture production by 10% and create 10,000 jobs. Other objectives included improving profitability for existing producers, securing employment for women fish retailers, expanding aquaculture in El Mineya and improving the policy environment for aquaculture.

Dissonant Belonging and the Making of Community: Native Hawaiian Claims to Selfhood and Home

In 1898 the United States illegally annexed the Hawaiian Islands over the protests of Queen Liliʽuokalani and the Hawaiian people. American hegemony has been deepened in the intervening years through a range of colonizing practices that alienate Kanaka Maoli, the indigenous people of Hawaiʽi, from their land and culture. Dissonant Belonging and the Making of Community is an exploration of contemporary Hawaiian peoplehood that reclaims indigenous conceptions of multiethnicity from colonizing narratives of nation and race. Drawing from archival holdings at the University of Hawaiʽi, Mānoa and in-depth interviews, this project offers an analysis of public and everyday discourses of nation, race, and peoplehood to trace the discursive struggle over Local identity and politics. A context-specific social formation in Hawaiʽi, “Local” is commonly understood as a multiethnic identity that has its roots in working-class, ethnic minority culture of the mid-twentieth century. However, American discourses of race and, later, multiethnicity have functioned to render invisible the indigenous roots of this social formation. Dissonant Belonging and the Making of Community reclaims these roots as an important site of indigenous resistance to American colonialism. It traces, on the one hand, the ways in which Native Hawaiian resistance has been alternately erased and appropriated. On the other hand, it explores the meanings of Local identity to Native Hawaiians and the ways in which indigenous conceptions of multiethnicity enabled a thriving community under conditions of colonialism.

'Yes, the century is an ashen sun': poem and subject in the philosophy of Alain Badiou

This thesis examines the relation between philosophy, the poem and the subject in the mature philosophy of Alain Badiou. It investigates Badiou’s decisive contribution to these questions primarily by means of comparison, especially to Martin Heidegger, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe and Theodor Adorno, as well as by analysing Badiou’s readings of poems and prose by Paul Celan and Samuel Beckett respectively as sites of potential dialogue with his immediate predecessors. The thesis stresses the importance of French philosophy’s German heritage, emphasising not only Badiou’s radical departure from Heidegger and his legacy, but also the former’s wholesale rejection of philosophies that would, in the wake of twentieth-century violence and beyond, proclaim their own end or completion. The thesis argues Badiou’s innovative readings of Celan and Beckett to be crucial to understanding this endeavour: for Badiou, both writers use the poem to affirm novel conceptions of subjectivity capable of transcending the historical conditions of their presentation. The title quotation from Badiou’s The Century, ‘Yes, the century is an ashen sun’, anticipates both the affirmative nature of these subjective figures, and their presience, beyond the bounds of a twentieth-century ‘ashen sun’ pervaded by melancholy, for the ‘new suns’ of the twenty-first. The thesis is in four chapters. The first chapter unfolds the central concepts of Badiou’s departure from Heidegger using Paul Celan’s poems to focus the enquiry. It is guided by two of Badiou’s most condensed declarations about the poem, that, firstly, ‘the modern poem harbours a central silence’, and secondly, that ‘Celan completes Heidegger’. The second chapter exposes the political implications of Heidegger’s writings on Friedrich Hölderlin and the role of the subject therein, offering at its close some thoughts about what Badiou calls, following Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, the poem’s ‘becoming-prose’. It concludes by drawing the poem and politics into relation by way of the philosophical category of the subject. The third chapter reads Badiou’s concept of ‘anabasis’ against Heidegger’s ‘homecoming’ in order to think the possibility of a collective political subject’s formation in the wake of Auschwitz. The final chapter examines the imbrication of the Two of love and the ‘latent poem’ in Badiou’s reading of Samuel Beckett’s late prose, contrasting this ‘affirmative’ reading of Beckett to Theodor Adorno’s earlier emphases on negation. Following its investigations of subjectivity, poem and prose throughout, the thesis concludes by returning to the title quotation in order to unfold the particular relations between subject, affirmation and negation Badiou’s philosophy enacts, and to offer further routes forward for research regarding Badiou’s philosophy and aesthetic figuration.

Using Quantitative Methods to Explore Political Leverage, Trade Policy, and Food Security: A Case Study of the Middle East

This dissertation explores why some states consistently secure food imports at prices higher than the world market price, thereby exacerbating food insecurity domestically. I challenge the idea that free market economics alone can explain these trade behaviors, and instead argue that states take into account political considerations when engaging in food trade that results in inefficient trade. In particular, states that are dependent on imports of staple food products, like cereals, are wary of the potential strategic value of these goods to exporters. I argue that this consideration, combined with the importing state’s ability to mitigate that risk through its own forms of political or economic leverage, will shape the behavior of the importing state and contribute to its potential for food security. In addition to cross-national analyses, I use case studies of the Gulf Cooperation Council states and Jordan to demonstrate how the political tools available to these importers affect their food security. The results of my analyses suggest that when import dependent states have access to forms of political leverage, they are more likely to trade efficiently, thereby increasing their potential for food security.

Credible Commitments and Post-Conflict Refugee Return: A Statistical and Network Analysis

I examine determinants of refugee return after conflicts. I argue that institutional constraints placed on the executive provide a credible commitment that signals to refugees that the conditions required for durable return will be created. This results in increased return flows for refugees. Further, when credible commitments are stronger in the country of origin than in the country of asylum, the level of return increases. Finally, I find that specific commitments made to refugees in the peace agreement do not lead to increased return because they are not credible without institutional constraints. Using data on returnees that has only recently been made available, along with network analysis and an original coding of the provisions in refugee agreements, statistical results are found to support this theory. An examination of cases in Djibouti, Sierra Leone, and Liberia provides additional support for this argument.

Reconciling History and International Law: Territorial and Maritime Claims in the South China Sea and East China Sea

High-ranking Chinese military officials are often quoted in international media as stating that China cannot afford to lose even an inch of Chinese territory, as this territory has been passed down from Chinese ancestors. Such statements are not new in Chinese politics, but recently this narrative has made an important transition. While previously limited to disputes over land borders, such rhetoric is now routinely applied to disputes involving islands and maritime borders. China is increasingly oriented toward its maritime borders and seems unwilling to compromise on delimitation disputes, a transition mirrored by many states across the globe. In a similar vein, scholarship has found that territorial disputes are particularly intractable and volatile when compared with other types of disputes, and a large body of research has grappled with producing systematic knowledge of territorial conflict. Yet in this wide body of literature, an important question has remained largely unanswered - how do states determine which geographical areas will be included in their territorial and maritime claims? In other words, if nations are willing to fight and die for an inch of national territory, how do governments draw the boundaries of the nation? This dissertation uses in-depth case studies of some of the most prominent territorial and maritime disputes in East Asia to argue that domestic political processes play a dominant and previously under-explored role in both shaping claims and determining the nature of territorial and maritime disputes. China and Taiwan are particularly well suited for this type of investigation, as they are separate claimants in multiple disputes, yet they both draw upon the same historical record when establishing and justifying their claims. Leveraging fieldwork in Taiwan, China, and the US, this dissertation includes in-depth case studies of China’s and Taiwan’s respective claims in both the South China Sea and East China Sea disputes. Evidence from this dissertation indicates that officials in both China and Taiwan have struggled with how to reconcile history and international law when establishing their claims, and that this struggle has introduced ambiguity into China's and Taiwan's claims. Amid this process, domestic political dynamics have played a dominant role in shaping the options available and the potential for claims to change in the future. In Taiwan’s democratic system, where national identity is highly contested through party politics, opinions vary along a broad spectrum as to the proper borders of the nation, and there is considerable evidence that Taiwan’s claims may change in the near future. In contrast, within China’s single-party authoritarian political system, where nationalism is source of regime legitimacy, views on the proper interpretation of China’s boundaries do vary, but along a much more narrow range. In the dissertation’s final chapter, additional cases, such as South Korea’s position on Dokdo and Indonesia’s approach to the defense of Natuna are used as points of comparison to further clarify theoretical findings.

Incomplete information games of conflict and collective action

My thesis consists of three essays that investigate strategic interactions between individuals engaging in risky collective action in uncertain environments. The first essay analyzes a broad class of incomplete information coordination games with a wide range of applications in economics and politics. The second essay draws from the general model developed in the first essay to study decisions by individuals of whether to engage in protest/revolution/coup/strike. The final essay explicitly integrates state response to the analysis. The first essay, Coordination Games with Strategic Delegation of Pivotality, exhaustively analyzes a class of binary action, two-player coordination games in which players receive stochastic payoffs only if both players take a ``stochastic-coordination action''. Players receive conditionally-independent noisy private signals about the normally distributed stochastic payoffs. With this structure, each player can exploit the information contained in the other player's action only when he takes the “pivotalizing action”. This feature has two consequences: (1) When the fear of miscoordination is not too large, in order to utilize the other player's information, each player takes the “pivotalizing action” more often than he would based solely on his private information, and (2) best responses feature both strategic complementarities and strategic substitutes, implying that the game is not supermodular nor a typical global game. This class of games has applications in a wide range of economic and political phenomena, including war and peace, protest/revolution/coup/ strike, interest groups lobbying, international trade, and adoption of a new technology. My second essay, Collective Action with Uncertain Payoffs, studies the decision problem of citizens who must decide whether to submit to the status quo or mount a revolution. If they coordinate, they can overthrow the status quo. Otherwise, the status quo is preserved and participants in a failed revolution are punished. Citizens face two types of uncertainty. (a) non-strategic: they are uncertain about the relative payoffs of the status quo and revolution, (b) strategic: they are uncertain about each other's assessments of the relative payoff. I draw on the existing literature and historical evidence to argue that the uncertainty in the payoffs of status quo and revolution is intrinsic in politics. Several counter-intuitive findings emerge: (1) Better communication between citizens can lower the likelihood of revolution. In fact, when the punishment for failed protest is not too harsh and citizens' private knowledge is accurate, then further communication reduces incentives to revolt. (2) Increasing strategic uncertainty can increase the likelihood of revolution attempts, and even the likelihood of successful revolution. In particular, revolt may be more likely when citizens privately obtain information than when they receive information from a common media source. (3) Two dilemmas arise concerning the intensity and frequency of punishment (repression), and the frequency of protest. Punishment Dilemma 1: harsher punishments may increase the probability that punishment is materialized. That is, as the state increases the punishment for dissent, it might also have to punish more dissidents. It is only when the punishment is sufficiently harsh, that harsher punishment reduces the frequency of its application. Punishment Dilemma 1 leads to Punishment Dilemma 2: the frequencies of repression and protest can be positively or negatively correlated depending on the intensity of repression. My third essay, The Repression Puzzle, investigates the relationship between the intensity of grievances and the likelihood of repression. First, I make the observation that the occurrence of state repression is a puzzle. If repression is to succeed, dissidents should not rebel. If it is to fail, the state should concede in order to save the costs of unsuccessful repression. I then propose an explanation for the “repression puzzle” that hinges on information asymmetries between the state and dissidents about the costs of repression to the state, and hence the likelihood of its application by the state. I present a formal model that combines the insights of grievance-based and political process theories to investigate the consequences of this information asymmetry for the dissidents' contentious actions and for the relationship between the magnitude of grievances (formulated here as the extent of inequality) and the likelihood of repression. The main contribution of the paper is to show that this relationship is non-monotone. That is, as the magnitude of grievances increases, the likelihood of repression might decrease. I investigate the relationship between inequality and the likelihood of repression in all country-years from 1981 to 1999. To mitigate specification problem, I estimate the probability of repression using a generalized additive model with thin-plate splines (GAM-TPS). This technique allows for flexible relationship between inequality, the proxy for the costs of repression and revolutions (income per capita), and the likelihood of repression. The empirical evidence support my prediction that the relationship between the magnitude of grievances and the likelihood of repression is non-monotone.

The Demobilized Body: Transgressions of Personal Space and Political Participation

Grounded in the intersection between gender politics and electoral studies, this dissertation examines the demobilizing effects of violations of personal space (in the form of domestic violence, control over mobility, emotional abuse, and sexual harassment) on the propensity to vote. Using quantitative methods across four survey datasets concerning Lebanon, the United States, Morocco, and Yemen, this research concludes that cross-regionally, familial control over mobility reduces the propensity to vote among women. Conversely, mechanisms of empowerment such as education and employment increase the propensity to vote.

States' Responding Behavior in Conflict: Asymmetric Response and Strategic Conflict Avoidance

State responses to external threats and aggression are studied with focus on two different rationales: (1) to make credible deterrent threats to avoid being exploited, and (2) to minimize the risk of escalation to unwanted war. Given external aggression, the target state's responding behavior has three possibilities: concession (under-response), reciprocation, and escalation. This study focuses on the first two possibilities and investigates how the strategic nature of crisis interaction can explain the intentional choice of concession or avoidance of retaliation. I build a two-level bargaining model that accounts for the domestic bargaining situation between the leader and the challenger for each state. The model's equilibrium shows that the responding behavior is determined not only by inter-state level variables (e.g. balance of power between two states, or cost of war that each state is supposed to pay), but also the domestic variables of both states. Next, the strategic interaction is rationally explained by the model: as the responding state believes that the initiating state has strong domestic challenges and, hence, the aggression is believed to be initiated for domestic political purposes (a rally-around-the-flag effect), the response tends to decrease. The concession is also predicted if the target state leader has strong bargaining power against her domestic challengers \emph{and} she believes that the initiating leader suffers from weak domestic standing. To test the model's prediction, I conduct a lab experiment and case studies. The experimental result shows that under an incentivized bargaining situation, individual actors are observed to react to hostile action as the model predicts: if the opponent is believed to suffer from internally driven difficulties, the subject will not punish hostile behavior of the other player as severely as she would without such a belief. The experiment also provides supporting evidence for the choice of concession: when the player finds herself in a favorable situation while the other has disadvantages, the player is more likely to make concessions in the controlled dictator game. Two cases are examined to discuss how the model can explain the choice of either reciprocation or concession. From personal interviews and fieldwork in South Korea, I find that South Korea's reciprocating behavior during the 2010 Yeonpyeong Island incident is explained by a combination of `low domestic power of initiating leader (Kim Jong-il)' and `low domestic power of responding leader (Lee Myung-bak).' On the other hand, the case of EC-121 is understood as a non-response or concession outcome. Declassified documents show that Nixon and his key advisors interpreted the attack as a result of North Korea's domestic political instabilities (low domestic power of initiating leader) and that Nixon did not have difficulties at domestic politics during the first few months of his presidency (high domestic power of responding leader).