The Berlin Republic. Evolution of Germany's politics of memory and German patriotism. OSW Point of View, August 2009

Important changes have occurred in recent years in the attitude of a majority of the German elite towards the history of the 20th century and the political identity built on collective memory. Until recently, the sense of guilt for the crimes of the Third Reich and the obligation to remember were prevalent. While these two elements of Germany's memory of World War II are still important, currently the focus increasingly shifts to the German resistance against Nazism and the fate of the Germans who suffered in the war. Positive references to Germany's post-war history also occupy more and more space in the German memory. In 2009, i.e. the year of the 60th anniversary of the Federal Republic of Germany and the 20th anniversary of the fall of Communism, the efforts of German public institutions concentrate on promoting a new canon of history built around the successful democratisation and Germany's post-war economic success. The purpose behind these measures is to build a common historical memory that could be shared by the eastern and western parts of Germany and appeal to Germany's immigrants, who account for a growing proportion of the society.

Eastern Policy of the EU: the Visegrad Countries' Perspective. OSW Point of View, February 2003

1. After its enlargement, scheduled for 2004, the European Union will face a completely new situation at its eastern borders. This new situation calls for a new concept of the EU eastern activities, i.e. for development of the new Eastern Policy of the EU. 2. Due to a number of specific features such as geographical location, closeness of ties, direct risk factors etc., the Visegrad countries will and should be particularly interested in the process of formulating the new EU Eastern Policy. Consequently, they should be the co-makers of this policy. 3. The new EU Eastern Policy should differ fundamentally from the Union's traditional eastern relations. Firstly, its scope should not cover the entire CIS area: instead, the policy should focus on some of the European successor states of the former Soviet Union, namely Belarus, Russia and Ukraine, as well as Moldova, following the accession of Romania. It does not seem advisable to exclude the Russian Federation from this policy and to develop and implement a separate policy towards it. The new Eastern Policy should be an autonomous component and one of the most important elements in the overall foreign policy of the EU. 4. Secondly, the new Eastern Policy should be founded on the following two pillars: a region-oriented strategy, which could be called the Eastern Dimension, and reshaped strategies for individual countries. The Eastern Dimension should set up a universal framework of co-operation, defining its basic mechanisms and objectives. These should include: the adaptation assistance programme, JHA, transborder co-operation, social dialogue and transport infrastructures. The approach, however, should be kept flexible, taking into account the specific situation of each country. This purpose should be served by keeping in place the existing bilateral institutional contacts between the EU and each of its eastern neighbours, and by developing a national strategy for each neighbour.

The Pro-Western Turn in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View, September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 4. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 5. Has it been profitable for Russia? 6. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: 5. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). 6. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. 8. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. 5. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

One country, two societies? Germany twenty years after reunification. OSW Study 35/2011

3 October 2010 marked the twentieth anniversary of the reunification of the two German states. This is an occasion for summing up and evaluating the changes which have taken place in Germany since 1990. Germany became reunited through the incorporation of the East German federal states to the then Federal Republic of Germany. The West German point of view is predominant in public discourse regarding this issue, which is manifested through grading the new federal states for their progress in assimilation to the western part of Germany. However, this way the positive changes which have taken place in the social, political and economic areas in the eastern federal states over the past two decades are often disregarded. This paper is an attempt to show the changes which have taken place in Germany, involving areas in which new federal states have outperformed the western part of the country.

The invisible hand... of the Kremlin. Capitalism 'a la russe'. OSW Point of View, February 2007

This study describes the two main economic processes observed in Russia during President Vladimir Putin's second term; renationalisation, and the concentration of economic assets. As a result of these processes, the share of state-owned property has increased and the position of the state in the economy has strengthened. According to the authorities, the wide-range renationalisation of the assets and the construction of superholdings based on the state enterprises are intended to boost Russia's potential and stimulate the development of the whole economy. However, in practice the current ruling elite are using these superholdings to strengthen Russia's position on the international arena and to promote their vested interests.

The bear watches the dragon. The Russian debate on China. OSW Point of View Number 31, February 2013

Most participants in the Russian public debate seem to agree in their evaluation of the present condition of Russian-Chinese relations. There is awareness of increasing inequality between these two powers and Russia’s weakening position as compared to China.Those who share the optimistic view see co-operation with China as an opportunity for the Russian economy and a key element of Russia’s multi-directional foreign policy, an opportunity for Russia to avoid unilateral dependence on the West. The pessimists view the deepening co-operation with China through the prism of threats resulting from the increasing imbalance in bilateral relations. The greatest source of concern is the model of economic relations, which is often referred to as neo-colonial, where Russia’s role is reduced to that of a supplier of raw materials to China. The possible consequences are evaluated in different ways, ranging from the political subordination of Russian interests the Chinese ones to real loss of control over the Russian Far East. Those who share such views believe that Moscow should slow down its rapprochement with China and search for other partners in Eastern Asia, relations with whom could counterbalance the Chinese influence.

The fragile ‘reset’. The balance sheet and the prospects for changes in Russian-US relations. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), April 2011

The ‘reset’ policy proposed by the USA has brought Russia a number of geopolitical, prestigious and economic benefits. The most important of those are: the resumption of arms control, the USA’s withdrawal from plans to locate elements of its strategic missile defence system in Poland and the Czech Republic, and the entry into force of the so-called 123 Agreement. In response, Russia has assisted the United States in resolving the Iranian crisis, and offered help with the Afghanistan operation, covering the transit of supplies and supporting the Afghan government. Moscow has also eased up on its anti-American rhetoric. The changes which have taken place in Russian-US relations are not durable. The two parties have not resolved their major disputes (for example, regarding missile defence), and any differences are hushed up for tactical reasons.

Jihad vs The New Great Game: Paradoxes of militant Islamic threats in Central Asia. OSW Point of View (Policy Brief), January 2010

Threats linked to Islamic fundamentalism have been hanging over Central Asia for almost two decades. Many believe that militant Islam has played a significant part in each major political crisis in the region, and Central Asia is perceived as an almost perfect environment for its further development. Such a picture of this region is a result of serious abuses and manipulations. The real threat posed by militant Islam seems to be rather limited, and its roots lie outside Central Asia. This region is unlikely to become a key front of global jihad. Nevertheless, this does not guarantee peace and safety in Central Asia, as the Islamic threat remains an element of the geopolitical rivalry in the region – the ‘New Great Game’.

Belarus-Russia: Whither Integration? OSW Point of View (unspecified), May 2003

Of the re-integration processes currently taking place in the former Soviet Union, the formation of a Russian-Belarusian so-called 'Union State' is one of the most advanced. A customs union was formally announced between the two countries as early as 1995 and the process of constructing the Union State itself was launched in December 1999. However, both events were largely driven by the perceived need to match societal demands, without much concrete action and the Union State remained largely 'virtual'. Only in the last few years has the Russian initiative allowed for moving from symbolic gestures to political action and since late 2002 debate and policy have intensified on specific issues of economic and political co-operation. However, despite such advances in the integration process, its objectives remain vague and there is little or no agreement on the principles that should govern the process. Furthermore, current bilateral relations questions still dominate the dialogue. The project seems at present to be driven mainly by the political interests of both countries' presidents and also, to a lesser extent, by the interests of business, political, military and security elites, each apparently motivated by self- and group-interest in the emerging dialogue of integration. In contrast to EU integration, the societies of the two countries involved appear to have had little or no say in the process. Thus, several questions naturally arise. What is the real nature of such integration? What motivates the parties involved? What stage has the process reached? What likely future course will it take? What might be the consequences of it for Belarusian independence? Answers to these questions should ultimately determine the stance and policies of the enlarged EU in this area.

The "Pro-Western Turn" in Russia's Foreign Policy: Causes, Consequences and Prospects. OSW Point of View (unspecified), September 2002

From Europe and Poland's point of view, one of the most important recent developments in international politics was the re-orientation of Russia's foreign policy. This paper aims to answer three important questions relating to this issue: 1. When and why did the "pro-Western turn" in the Russian Federation's policy take place? 2. Has it been profitable for Russia? 3. What goals will the Russian policy pursue in the future? An analysis of the last two years in Russia's foreign policy leads to the several conclusions, including those: a. Clearly, the Russian leaders realise that in the longer term, Russia - in its desire for more influence in the world - will not be able to survive as an independent pole of power in international politics and it will have to join forces with the West (most likely, the European Union). b. September 11 was not the cause of Russia's pro-Western turn, but rather a catalyst that put the process which started when Vladimir Putin took his office in sharp focus. 7. In the nearest future, this new direction of Russia's foreign policy seems not be challenged by internal opposition in Russia. c. The "pro-Western turn" proved to be beneficial for Russia, although: d. Russia has not become a strategic ally of the US e. There has been no breakthrough in the relations between Russia and the European Union, and Moscow has not gained any real influence on NATO's important decisions. f. Russia has not become a major decision-maker of international politics. g. Russia's closing to the West is in Poland's and Europe's interest.

The turn to the East. The flawed diversification of Russian foreign policy. OSW Point of View Number 44, November 2014

The ‘turn to the East’ proclaimed by Russia in 2010 has failed to bring about a fundamental breakthrough in her relations with Asian countries, nor has it produced impulses for the economic modernization of Russia’s Far Eastern territories. Although the energisation of Russian policy towards Asia which has taken place under this slogan has diversified Russian foreign policy somewhat, this diversification has two weak points: Firstly, it has occurred only in the political sphere. The share of Asian countries in Russia’s foreign economic relations has not risen significantly in comparison with the share of European and North American countries. Secondly, the ‘turn to the East’ has turned out primarily to be a turn towards China. In all spheres – diplomatic, economic, energy and military – it is Beijing that has become the most important Asian partner for Moscow. The result is that the policy that aimed to limit the excessive – in the Kremlin’s view – dependence of Russia on the West is likely to turn Russia into a ‘junior partner’ of the People’s Republic of China.

The devil is in the details. Information warfare in the light of Russia's military doctrine. OSW Point of View 50, May 2015

By highlighting informational threats and giving them a military dimension, the authors of the Russian Federation's military doctrine have outlined the concept of information warfare. It is a kind of combat conducted by both conventional and indirect methods, open and concealed, using military and civilian structures. It has two dimensions: broader ("non-nuclear containment", i.e. combat waged on various levels - political, economic, diplomatic, humanitarian, military) and narrower (as an element supporting of action). An analysis of these issues enables us to identify several rising trends over the period 2000-2014 in Russian security policy. These boil down to a blurring of the boundaries between internal and external threats, introducing non-military methods and organisational structures to armed combat, and conferring an ideological character on this combat. This leads to a blurring of the contours of inter-state conflicts, which allows Russia to take part in armed conflicts in which it is not officially a party.

The Southern Gas Corridor. The Azerbaijani-Turkish project becomes part of the game between Russia and the EU. OSW POINT OF VIEW 53, 2015-08-20

The Southern Gas Corridor is a system of three complementary gas pipeline projects controlled by Azerbaijan and Turkey, each at a different stage of implementation. The crisis in EU-Russia relations over Ukraine has made the two players interested in the Southern Gas Corridor once again. Brussels views it as an opportunity for a genuine diversification of gas supplies and a way to reinforce its position against Russia. In turn, Moscow’s proposal for Turkey and Greece to join the Turkish Stream gas pipeline project changes the energy map of the regional projects, which indirectly affects the Southern Gas Corridor. This has raised concern in Azerbaijan, which has been making efforts to manoeuvre between the interests of Moscow and Brussels.

Late Putin. The end of growth, the end of stability. OSW POINT OF VIEW #55, 2015-10-05

Since Vladimir Putin returned to the Kremlin as President in May 2012, the Russian system of power has become increasingly authoritarian, and has evolved towards a model of extremely personalised rule that derives its legitimacy from aggressive decisions in internal and foreign policy, escalates the use of force, and interferes increasingly assertively in the spheres of politics, history, ideology or even public morals. Putin’s power now rests on charismatic legitimacy to a much greater extent than it did during his first two presidential terms; currently the President is presented not only as an effective leader, but also as the sole guarantor of Russia’s stability and integrity. After 15 years of Putin’s rule, Russia’s economic model based on revenue from energy resources has exhausted its potential, and the country has no new model that could ensure continued growth for the economy. The Putinist system of power is starting to show symptoms of agony – it has been unable to generate new development projects, and has been compensating for its ongoing degradation by escalating repression and the use of force. However, this is not equivalent to its imminent collapse.

Detrital zircon geochronology data, petrographic point count data and paleocurrent indicator data of Triassic turbidites in the Nanpanjiang Basin, South China

Triassic turbidites of the Nanpanjiang basin of south China represent the most expansive and voluminous siliciclastic turbidite accumulation in south China. The Nanpanjiang basin occurs at a critical junction between the southern margin of the south China plate and the Indochina, Siamo and Sibumasu plates to the south and southwest. The Triassic Yangtze carbonate shelf and isolated carbonated platforms in the basin have been extensively studied, but silicilastic turbidites in the basin have received relatively little attention. Deciphering the facies, paleocurrent indicators and provenance of the Triassic turbidites is important for several reasons: it promises to help resolve the timing of plate collisions along suture zones bordering the basin to the south and southwest, it will enable evaluation of which suture zones and Precambrian massifs were source areas, and it will allow an evaluation of the impact of the siliciclastic flux on carbonate platform evolution within the basin. Turbidites in the basin include the Early Triassic Shipao Formation and the Middle-Late Triassic Baifeng, Xinyuan, Lanmu Bianyang and Laishike formations. Each ranges upward of 700 m and the thickest is nearly 3 km. The turbidites contain very-fine sand in the northern part of the basin whereas the central and southern parts of the basin also commonly contain fine and rarely medium sand size. Coarser sand sizes occur where paleocurrents are from the south, and in this area some turbidites exhibit complete bouma sequences with graded A divisions. Successions contain numerous alternations between mud-rich and sand-rich intervals with thickness trends corresponding to proximal/ distal fan components. Spectacularly preserved sedimentary structures enable robust evaluation of turbidite systems and paleocurrent analyses. Analysis of paleocurrent measurements indicates two major directions of sediment fill. The northern part of the basin was sourced primarily by the Jiangnan massif in the northeast, and the central and southern parts of the basin were sourced primarily from suture zones and the Yunkai massif to the south and southeast respectively. Sandstones of the Lower Triassic Shipao Fm. have volcaniclastic composition including embayed quartz and glass shards. Middle Triassic sandstones are moderately mature, matrix-rich, lithic wackes. The average QFL ratio from all point count samples is 54.1/18.1/27.8% and the QmFLt ratio is 37.8/ 18.1/ 44.1%. Lithic fragments are dominantly claystone and siltstone clasts and metasedimentary clasts such as quartz mica tectonite. Volcanic lithics are rare. Most samples fall in the recycled orogen field of QmFLt plots, indicating a relatively quartz and lithic rich composition consistent with derivation from Precambrian massifs such as the Jiangnan, and Yunkai. A few samples from the southwest part of the basin fall into the dissected arc field, indicating a somewhat more lithic and feldspar-rich composition consistent with derivation from a suture zone Analysis of detrial zircon populations from 17 samples collected across the basin indicate: (1) Several samples contain zircons with concordant ages greater than 3000 Ma, (2) there are widespread peaks across the basin at 1800 Ma and 2500, (3) a widespread 900 Ma population, (3) a widespread population of zircons at 440 Ma, and (5) a larger population of younger zircons about 250 Ma in the southwestern part which is replaced to the north and northwest by a somewhat older population around 260-290 Ma. The 900 Ma provenance fits derivation from the Jiangnan Massif, the 2500, 1800, and 440 Ma provenance fits the Yunkai massif, and the 250 Ma is consistent with convergence and arc development in suture zones bordering the basin on the south or southwest. Early siliciclastic turbidite flux, proximal to source areas impacted carbonate platform evolution by infilling the basin, reducing accommodation space, stabilizing carbonate platform margins and promoting margin progradation. Late arrival, in areas far from source areas caused margin aggradation over a starved basin, development of high relief aggradational escarpments and unstable scalloped margins.