Redistributive taxation, public expenditure, and size of governent

We introduce a model of redistributive income taxation and public expenditure. This joint treatment permits analyzing the interdependencies between the two policies: one cannot be chosen independently of the other. Empirical evidence reveals that partisan confrontation essentially falls on expenditure policies rather than on income taxation. We examine the case in which the expenditure policy (or the size of government) is chosen by majority voting and income taxation is consistently adjusted. This adjustment consists of designing the income tax schedule that, given the expenditure policy, achieves consensus among the population. The model determines the consensus in- come tax schedule, the composition of public expenditure and the size of government. The main results are that inequality is negatively related to the size of government and to the pro-rich bias in public expenditure, and positively or negatively related to the marginal income tax, depending on substitutability between government supplied and market goods. These implications are validated using OECD data.

Knowledge of Catalan, public/private sector choice and earnings: Evidence from a double sample selection model

This paper explores the earnings return to Catalan knowledge for public and private workers in Catalonia. In doing so, we allow for a double simultaneous selection process. We consider, on the one hand, the non-random allocation of workers into one sector or another, and on the other, the potential self-selection into Catalan proficiency. In addition, when correcting the earnings equations, we take into account the correlation between the two selectivity rules. Our findings suggest that the apparent higher language return for public sector workers is entirely accounted for by selection effects, whereas knowledge of Catalan has a significant positive return in the private sector, which is somewhat higher when the selection processes are taken into account.

Clustering or scattering: the underlying reason for regulating distance among retail outlets

Concerns on the clustering of retail industries and professional services in main streets had traditionally been the public interest rationale for supporting distance regulations. Although many geographic restrictions have been suppressed, deregulation has hinged mostly upon the theory results on the natural tendency of outlets to differentiate spatially. Empirical evidence has so far offered mixed results. Using the case of deregulation of pharmacy establishment in a region of Spain, we empirically show how pharmacy locations scatter, and that there is not rationale for distance regulation apart from the underlying private interest of very few incumbents.

Is it redistribution or centralization? On the determinants of government investment in infrastructure

The dilemma efficiency versus equity, together with political partisan interests, has received increasing attention to explain the territorial allocation of investments. However, centralization intended to introduce or reinforce hierarchization in the political system has not been object as of now of empirical analysis. Our main contribution to the literature is providing evidence that meta-political objectives related to the ordering of political power and administration influence regional investment. In this way, we find evidence that network mode’s (roads and railways) investment programs are influenced by the centralization strategy of investing near to the political capital, while investment effort in no-network modes (airports and ports) appears to be positively related to distance. Since investment in surface transportation infrastructures is much higher than that in airports and ports, and taken into account that regions surrounding the political capital are poorer than the average, we suggest that centralization rather than redistribution has been the driver for the concentration of public investment on these regions.

Programa d'introducció al dret espanyol per a estudiants d'intercanvi

El projecte "Programa d'introducció al dret espanyol per a estudiants d'intercanvi" s'ha dut a terme a la Facultat de dret de la Universitat de Barcelona des del mes de juny de 2007 al mes de setembre de 2008. Ha consistit en iniciar l’esmentat programa que suposava, pels estudiants d’intercanvi sol·licitants, la consecució d’un Diploma d’Introducció al Dret espanyol, expedit per la Facultat de Dret de la UB, a banda del reconeixement dels crèdits cursats a Barcelona. L’objectiu va ser proposar canvis en el plantejament curricular, en concret la posada en marxa de les assignatures del Diploma: Introducció al Dret Privat, Introducció al Dret públic, Introducció al sistema processal espanyol, i Bases del sistema legal espanyol. Com a tasca prèvia que havia de garnatir l’èxit es va fer una difusió del programa a les universitats d’origen i es va articular un sistema d’acollida als estudiants que es va demostrar molt útil al principi de curs per a informacions diverses, però que després va ser infrautilitzat. Pel que fa a les assignatures, es van plantejar com un anàlisi dels trets fonamentals i diferencials del nostre dret, utilitzant elements de comparació amb els ordenaments dels països dels alumnes, però sense fer un exercici estricte de dret comparat. La taxa de rediment va ser alta – 75% - però es va detectar un problema, la insuficient preparació idomàtica, que depassa l’organització del programa. També es va considerar un repte pedagògic important: la heterogeneïtat dels estudiants tant en la seva formació jurídica prèvia –assignatures cursades en la seva Universitat-, com en relació al sistema legal del país del qual provenien, en relació al sistema espanyol. Per aquest motiu, el plantejament del curs i els materials a utilitzar va dependre en bona mesura del conjunt del grup al qual es va dirigr cada assignatura en concret.

Public and private learning from prices, strategic substitutability and complementarity, and equilibrium multiplicity

We study a general static noisy rational expectations model where investors have private information about asset payoffs, with common and private components, and about their own exposure to an aggregate risk factor, and derive conditions for existence and uniqueness (or multiplicity) of equilibria. We find that a main driver of the characterization of equilibria is whether the actions of investors are strategic substitutes or complements. This latter property in turn is driven by the strength of a private learning channel from prices, arising from the multidimensional sources of asymmetric information, in relation to the usual public learning channel. When the private learning channel is strong (weak) in relation to the public we have strong (weak) strategic complementarity in actions and potentially multiple (unique) equilibria. The results enable a precise characterization of whether information acquisition decisions are strategic substitutes or complements. We find that the strategic substitutability in information acquisition result obtained in Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) is robust. JEL Classification: D82, D83, G14 Keywords: Rational expectations equilibrium, asymmetric information, risk exposure, hedging, supply information, information acquisition.

Comrades or Culprits? Donor Engagement and Budget Transparency in Aid Dependent Countries

Budget transparency has come to be considered a key aspect of governance. Over the past decade, donors have invested increasing resources in strengthening processes through which budget transparency in developing countries can be enhanced. According to the 2008 Open Budget Index (OBI) Report, however, aid dependency and budget transparency appear to be inversely correlated. This article looks at the role of donor agencies in promoting or preventing budget transparency in aid dependent countries. It analyzes data for a sample of 16 aid-dependent countries included in the OBI, to test some preliminary hypotheses and select six countries for which more detailed findings are then presented. All of these countries have implemented reforms aimed at enhancing budget transparency, with substantial donor support. These, however, often had only limited success, partly because they were not well adapted to the local context, and partly because donors put limited emphasis on improving public access to budget information. Donor efforts were also often offset by other characteristics of donor interventions, namely their fragmentation, lack of transparency, and limited use of program aid modalities such as budget support and pooled sector funding.

IPH response to the DSD consultation on regulations to prohibit or restrict irresponsible promotions of alcohol in Northern Ireland

IPH responded to the Department for Social Development consultation on the banning of certain promotions that may encourage irresponsible and excessive drinking. The consultation relates to regulations Article 57A(2)(d) of the 1996 Licensing Order “involving the supply of unlimited amounts of intoxicating liquor for a fixed charge (including any charge for entry to the premises)” and Article 31A(2)(d) of the Registration of Clubs Order “restricting the price at which the holder of a licence or the licence holder’s servant or agent may sell on licensed premises a package containing two or more intoxicating liquor products”. IPH welcomes this consultation and supports the Department’s proposals to restrict promotions that involve the supply of unlimited amounts of intoxicating liquor for a fixed charge. IPH welcomes this tangible action linked to the renewed commitment to tackling alcohol-related harms on the island of Ireland set out in the Steering Group Report on a National Substance Strategy (Dept of Health, 2012) and in the New Strategic Direction on Alcohol and Drugs (DHSSPS, 2011). IPH considers that irresponsible alcohol promotions can contribute to this burden of physical and mental ill-health, accidental and non-accidental injury and other harms associated with excessive alcohol consumption in Northern Ireland. As previously stated in the IPH submissions on the introduction of powers to prohibit or restrict irresponsible alcohol promotions (Dec, 2010), IPH considers that the issues of promotion and price are inter-related. The effectiveness of the proposed restrictions could be reinforced by the expeditious introduction of minimum unit pricing of alcohol on an all-island basis.

IPH response to a Draft Policy Framework for supporting people in Northern Ireland living with long term (or chronic) conditions

The Department of Health, Social Services and Public Safety recently consulted on a draft Policy Framework for supporting people in Northern Ireland living with long term (or chronic) conditions

IPH response to Department for Social Development: introduction of powers to prohibit or restrict irresponsible alcohol promotions

Alcohol–related harm is an increasing public health concern and contributor to health inequalities on this island. IPH considered this consultation on powers to restrict alcohol promotions as a significant development towards harmonised all island regulations to tackle excessive alcohol consumption.

Extra healthy years or just extra years? What can we know from the data we have on the island of Ireland?

As life expectancy continues to rise, the prevalence of chronic conditions is increasing in our society. However, we do not know if the extra years of life gained are being spent with disability and illness, or in good health. Furthermore, it is unclear if all groups in society experience their extra years of life in the same way. This report examines patterns of health expectancies across the island of Ireland, examining any North-South and socio-economic differences as well looking at differences in data sources. The older population (aged 65 or over) on the island of Ireland is growing and becoming a larger percentage of the total  population. Republic of Ireland Census 2011 revealed that 12% of the RoI population was aged 65 or over (CSO, 2012), and Northern Ireland Census 2011 revealed that 13% of the NI population was aged 65 or over (NISRA, 2012). By 2041 the population aged 65 or over is projected to reach 22% in RoI and 24% in NI (McGill, 2010). It is unclear, however, if this increasing longevity will be enjoyed equally by all strata of society.

Notification of a disability or long term health condition (Guidance notes and form) (PDF 133KB)

Provides guidance and advice on notifying a disability/long-term health condition to PMB and on requesting a reasonable adjustment, if you have previously declared a disability/long-term health condition.

Uncovering hidden duplicated content in public transcriptomics data.

As part of the development of the database Bgee (a dataBase for Gene Expression Evolution), we annotate and analyse expression data from different types and different sources, notably Affymetrix data from GEO and ArrayExpress, and RNA-Seq data from SRA. During our quality control procedure, we have identified duplicated content in GEO and ArrayExpress, affecting ∼14% of our data: fully or partially duplicated experiments from independent data submissions, Affymetrix chips reused in several experiments, or reused within an experiment. We present here the procedure that we have established to filter such duplicates from Affymetrix data, and our procedure to identify future potential duplicates in RNA-Seq data. Database URL: http://bgee.unil.ch/

Public Monitoring with Uncertainty in the Time Repetitions

This paper study repeated games where the time repetitions of the stage game are not known or controlled by the players. We call this feature random monitoring. Kawamori's (2004) shows that perfect random monitoring is always better than the canonical case. Surprisingly, when the monitoring is public, the result is less clear-cut and does not generalize in a straightforward way. Unless the public signals are sufficiently informative about player's actions and/or players are patient enough. In addition to a discount effect, that tends to consistently favor the provision of incentives, we found an information effect, associated with the time uncertainty on the distribution of public signals. Whether payoff improvements are or not possible, depends crucially on the direction and strength of these effects. JEL: C73, D82, D86. KEYWORDS: Repeated Games, Frequent Monitoring, Random Public Monitoring, Moral Hazard, Stochastic Processes.