Completing the picture: the effects of video game practice on verbal and performance I.Q. scores in high functioning children

The strength and nature of the video game practice effect on tests of visual and perceptual skills were examined using high functioning Grades Four and Five students who had been tested with the WISC-R .for the purpose of gifted identification and placement. The control group, who did not own and .play video games on a sustained basis, and the experimental group, who did own a video game system and had some mastery of video games, including the -Nintendo game, "Tetris", were each composed of 18 juniorg:r;-ade students and were chosen from pre-existing conditions. The experimental group corresponded to the control group in terms of age, sex, and community. Data on the Verbal and Performance I.Q. Scores were· collected for both groups and the author was interested in the difference between the Verbal and Performance Scores within each group, anticipating a P > V outcome for the experimental group. The results showed a significant P > V difference in the experimental, video game playing group, as expected, but no significant difference between the Performance $cores of the control and experimental groups. The results, thus, indicated lower Verbal I.Q. Scores in the experimental group relat'ive to 'the control group.' The study conclu~ed that information about a sUbject's video game experience and "learhing style pref~rence is important for a clear interpretation of the Verbal and Performance I.Q. Scores of the WISC-R. Although the time spent on video game play may, 'indeed, increase P~rformance Scores relative to Verbal Scores for an individual, the possibilities exist that the time borrowed and spent away from language based activities may retard verbal growth and/or that the cognitive style associated with some Performance I.Q.subtests may have a negative effect on the approach to the tasks on the Verbal I.Q. Scale. The study also discussed the possibility that exposure to ,the video game experience, in pre-puberty, can provide spatial instruction which will result in improved spatial skills. strong spatial skills have been linked to improved performance and preference in mathematics, science, and engineering and it was suggested that appropriate video game play might be a way to involve girls more in the fields of mathematics and science.

Husserl's approach to transcendental intersubjectivity

It is our intention in the course of the development of this thesis to give an account of how intersubjectivity is "eidetically" constituted by means of the application of the phenomenological reduction to our experience in the context of the thought of Edmund Husserl; contrasted with various representative thinkers in what H. Spiegelberg refers to as "the wider scene" of phenomenology. That is to say, we intend to show those structures of both consciousness and the relation which man has to the world which present themselves as the generic conditions for the possibility of overcoming our "radical sol itude" in order that we may gain access to the mental 1 ife of an Other as other human subject. It is clear that in order for us to give expression to these accounts in a coherent manner, along with their relative merits, it will be necessary to develop the common features of any phenomenological theory of consdousness whatever. Therefore, our preliminary inquiry, subordinate to the larger theme, shall be into some of the epistemological results of the application of the phenomenological method used to develop a transcendental theory of consciousness. Inherent in this will be the deliniation of the exigency for making this an lIintentional ll theory. We will then be able to see how itis possible to overcome transcendentally the Other as an object merely given among other merely given objects, and further, how this other is constituted specifically as other ego. The problem of transcendental intersubjectivity and its constitution in experience can be viewed as one of the most compelling, if not the most polemical of issues in phenomenology. To be sure, right from the beginning we are forced to ask a number of questions regarding Husserl's responses to the problem within the context of the methodological genesis of the Cartesian Meditations, and The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology. This we do in order to set the stage for amplification. First, we ask, has Husserl lived up to his goal, in this connexion, of an apodictic result? We recall that in his Logos article of 1911 he adminished that previous philosophy does not have at its disposal a merely incomplete and, in particular instances, imperfect doctrinal system; it simply has none whatever. Each and every question is herein controverted, each position is a matter of individual conviction, of the interpretation given byaschool, of a "point of view". 1. Moreover in the same article he writes that his goal is a philosophical system of doctrine that, after the gigantic preparatory work. of generations, really be- . gins from the ground up with a foundation free from doubt and rises up like any skilful construction, wherein stone is set upon store, each as solid as the other, in accord with directive insights. 2. Reflecting upon the fact that he foresaw "preparatory work of generations", we perhaps should not expect that he would claim that his was the last word on the matter of intersubjectivity. Indeed, with 2. 'Edmund Husserl, lIPhilosophy as a Rigorous Science" in Phenomenology and theCrisis6fPhilosophy, trans". with an introduction by Quentin Lauer (New York.: Harper & Row, 1965) pp. 74 .. 5. 2Ibid . pp. 75 .. 6. 3. the relatively small amount of published material by Husserl on the subject we can assume that he himself was not entirely satisfied with his solution. The second question we have is that if the transcendental reduction is to yield the generic and apodictic structures of the relationship of consciousness to its various possible objects, how far can we extend this particular constitutive synthetic function to intersubjectivity where the objects must of necessity always remain delitescent? To be sure, the type of 'object' here to be considered is unlike any other which might appear in the perceptual field. What kind of indubitable evidence will convince us that the characteristic which we label "alter-ego" and which we attribute to an object which appears to resemble another body which we have never, and can never see the whole of (namely, our own bodies), is nothing more than a cleverly contrived automaton? What;s the nature of this peculiar intentional function which enables us to say "you think just as I do"? If phenomenology is to take such great pains to reduce the takenfor- granted, lived, everyday world to an immanent world of pure presentation, we must ask the mode of presentation for transcendent sub .. jectivities. And in the end, we must ask if Husserl's argument is not reducible to a case (however special) of reasoning by analogy, and if so, tf this type of reasoning is not so removed from that from whtch the analogy is made that it would render all transcendental intersubjective understandtng impos'sible? 2. HistoticalandEidetic Priority: The Necessity of Abstraction 4. The problem is not a simple one. What is being sought are the conditions for the poss ibili:ty of experi encing other subjects. More precisely, the question of the possibility of intersubjectivity is the question of the essence of intersubjectivity. What we are seeking is the absolute route from one solitude to another. Inherent in this programme is the ultimate discovery of the meaning of community. That this route needs be lIabstract" requires some explanation. It requires little explanation that we agree with Husserl in the aim of fixing the goal of philosophy on apodictic, unquestionable results. This means that we seek a philosophical approach which is, though, not necessarily free from assumptions, one which examines and makes explicit all assumptions in a thorough manner. It would be helpful at this point to distinguish between lIeidetic ll priority, and JlhistoricallJpriority in order to shed some light on the value, in this context, of an abstraction.3 It is true that intersubjectivity is mundanely an accomplished fact, there havi.ng been so many mi.llions of years for humans to beIt eve in the exi s tence of one another I s abili ty to think as they do. But what we seek is not to study how this proceeded historically, but 3Cf• Maurice Natanson;·TheJburne in 'Self, a Stud in Philoso h and Social Role (Santa Cruz, U. of California Press, 1970 . rather the logical, nay, "psychological" conditions under which this is possible at all. It is therefore irrelevant to the exigesis of this monograph whether or not anyone should shrug his shoulders and mumble IIwhy worry about it, it is always already engaged". By way of an explanation of the value of logical priority, we can find an analogy in the case of language. Certainly the language 5. in a spoken or written form predates the formulation of the appropriate grammar. However, this grammar has a logical priority insofar as it lays out the conditions from which that language exhibits coherence. The act of formulating the grammar is a case of abstraction. The abstraction towards the discovery of the conditions for the poss; bi 1 ity of any experiencing whatever, for which intersubjective experience is a definite case, manifests itself as a sort of "grammar". This "grammar" is like the basic grammar of a language in the sense that these "rulesil are the ~ priori conditions for the possibility of that experience. There is, we shall say, an "eidetic priority", or a generic condition which is the logical antecedent to the taken-forgranted object of experience. In the case of intersubjectivity we readily grant that one may mundanely be aware of fellow-men as fellowmen, but in order to discover how that awareness is possible it is necessary to abstract from the mundane, believed-in experience. This process of abstraction is the paramount issue; the first step, in the search for an apodictic basis for social relations. How then is this abstraction to be accomplished? What is the nature of an abstraction which would permit us an Archimedean point, absolutely grounded, from which we may proceed? The answer can be discovered in an examination of Descartes in the light of Husserl's criticism. 3. The Impulse for Scientific Philosophy. The Method to which it Gives Rise. 6. Foremost in our inquiry is the discovery of a method appropriate to the discovery of our grounding point. For the purposes of our investigations, i.e., that of attempting to give a phenomenological view of the problem of intersubjectivity, it would appear to be of cardinal importance to trace the attempt of philosophy predating Husserl, particularly in the philosophy of Descartes, at founding a truly IIscientific ll philosophy. Paramount in this connexion would be the impulse in the Modern period, as the result of more or less recent discoveries in the natural sciences, to found philosophy upon scientific and mathematical principles. This impulse was intended to culminate in an all-encompassing knowledge which might extend to every realm of possible thought, viz., the universal science ot IIMathexis Universalis ll •4 This was a central issue for Descartes, whose conception of a universal science would include all the possible sciences of man. This inclination towards a science upon which all other sciences might be based waS not to be belittled by Husserl, who would appropriate 4This term, according to Jacab Klein, was first used by Barocius, the translator of Proclus into Latin, to designate the highest mathematical discipline. . 7. it himself in hopes of establishing, for the very first time, philosophy as a "rigorous science". It bears emphasizing that this in fact was the drive for the hardening of the foundations of philosophy, the link between the philosophical projects of Husserl and those of the philosophers of the modern period. Indeed, Husserl owes Descartes quite a debt for indicating the starting place from which to attempt a radical, presupositionless, and therefore scientific philosophy, in order not to begin philosophy anew, but rather for the first time.5 The aim of philosophy for Husserl is the search for apodictic, radical certitude. However while he attempted to locate in experience the type of necessity which is found in mathematics, he wished this necessity to be a function of our life in the world, as opposed to the definition and postulation of an axiomatic method as might be found in the unexpurgated attempts to found philosophy in Descartes. Beyond the necessity which is involved in experiencing the world, Husserl was searching for the certainty of roots, of the conditi'ons which underl ie experience and render it pOssible. Descartes believed that hi~ MeditatiOns had uncovered an absolute ground for knowledge, one founded upon the ineluctable givenness of thinking which is present even when one doubts thinking. Husserl, in acknowledging this procedure is certainly Cartesian, but moves, despite this debt to Descartes, far beyond Cartesian philosophy i.n his phenomenology (and in many respects, closer to home). 5Cf. Husserl, Philosophy as a Rigorous Science, pp. 74ff. 8 But wherein lies this Cartesian jumping off point by which we may vivify our theme? Descartes, through inner reflection, saw that all of his convictions and beliefs about the world were coloured in one way or another by prejudice: ... at the end I feel constrained to reply that there is nothing in a all that I formerly believed to be true, of which I cannot in some measure doubt, and that not merely through want of thought or through levity, but for reasons which are very powerful and maturely considered; so that henceforth I ought not the less carefully to refrain from giving credence to these opinions than to that which is manifestly false, if I desire to arrive at any certainty (in the sciences). 6 Doubts arise regardless of the nature of belief - one can never completely believe what one believes. Therefore, in order to establish absolutely grounded knowledge, which may serve as the basis fora "universal Science", one must use a method by which one may purge oneself of all doubts and thereby gain some radically indubitable insight into knowledge. Such a method, gescartes found, was that, as indicated above by hi,s own words, of II radical doubt" which "forbids in advance any judgemental use of (previous convictions and) which forbids taking any position with regard to their val idi'ty. ,,7 This is the method of the "sceptical epoche ll , the method of doubting all which had heretofor 6Descartes,Meditations on First Philosophy, first Med., (Libera 1 Arts Press, New York, 1954) trans. by L. LaFl eur. pp. 10. 7Husserl ,CrisiS of Eliroeari SCiences and Trariscendental Phenomenology, (Northwestern U. Press, Evanston, 1 7 ,p. 76. 9. been considered as belonging to the world, including the world itself. What then is left over? Via the process of a thorough and all-inclusive doubting, Descartes discovers that the ego which performs the epoche, or "reduction", is excluded from these things which can be doubted, and, in principle provides something which is beyond doubt. Consequently this ego provides an absolute and apodictic starting point for founding scientific philosophy. By way of this abstention. of bel ief, Desca'rtes managed to reduce the worl d of everyday 1 ife as bel ieved in, to mere 'phenomena', components of the rescogitans:. Thus:, having discovered his Archimedean point, the existence of the ego without question, he proceeds to deduce the 'rest' of the world with the aid of innate ideas and the veracity of God. In both Husserl and Descartes the compelling problem is that of establ ishing a scientific, apodictic phi'losophy based upon presuppos itionless groundwork .. Husserl, in thi.s regard, levels the charge at Descartes that the engagement of his method was not complete, such that hi.S: starting place was not indeed presupositionless, and that the validity of both causality and deductive methods were not called into question i.'n the performance of theepoche. In this way it is easy for an absolute evidence to make sure of the ego as: a first, "absolute, indubitablyexisting tag~end of the worldll , and it is then only a matter of inferring the absolute subs.tance and the other substances which belon.g to the world, along with my own mental substance, using a logically val i d deductive procedure. 8 8Husserl, E.;' Cartesian 'Meditation;, trans. Dorion Cairns (Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1970), p. 24 ff.

Buddhism and the earth : environmental thought in early Buddhist philosophy

Introduction Fundamental to the philosophy of Buddhism, is the insight that there is "unsatisfactohness" (dukkha) in the world and that it can be eliminated through the practice of the Noble Eight Fold Path. Buddhism also maintains that the world as we experience and entities that exist are bereft of any substantiality. Instead existence is manifest through dependent origination. All things are conditional; nothing is permanent. However, inherent in this dependent existence is the interconnectedness of all beings and their subjection to the cosmic law of karma. Part of cultivating the Eight Fold path includes a deep compassion for all other living things, 'trapped' within this cycle of dependent origination. This compassion or empathy (karuna) is crucial to the Buddhist path to enlightenment. It is this emphasis on karuna that shows itself in Mahayana Buddhism with respect to the theory of the boddhisatva (or Buddha-to-be) since the boddhisatva willingly postpones his/her own enlightenment to help others on the same path. One of the ramifications of the theory of dependent origination is that there is no anthropocentric bias placed on humans over the natural world. Paradoxically the doctrine of non-self becomes an ontology within Buddhism, culminating in the Mayahana realization that a common boundary exists between samsara and nirvana. Essential to this ontology is the life of dharma or a moral life. Ethics is not separated from ontology. As my thesis will show, this basic outlook of Buddhism has implications toward our understanding of the Buddhist world-view with respect to the current human predicament concerning the environment. While humans are the only ones who can 4 attain "Buddhahood", it is because of our ability to understand what it means to follow the Eight fold path and act accordingly. Because of the interconnectedness of all entities {dharmas), there is an ontological necessity to eliminate suffering and 'save the earth' because if we allow the earth to suffer, we ALL suffer. This can be understood as an ethical outlook which can be applied to our interaction with and treatment of the natural environment or environment in the broadest sense, not just trees plants rocks etc. It is an approach to samsara and all within it. It has been argued that there is no ontology in Buddhism due to its doctrine of "non-self". However, it is a goal of this thesis to argue that there does exist an original ontology in Buddhism; that according to it, the nature of Being is essentially neither "Being nor non-being nor not non-being" as illustrated by Nagarjuna. Within this ontology is engrained an ethic or 'right path' (samma marga) that is fundamental to our being and this includes a compassionate relationship to our environment. In this dissertation I endeavour to trace the implications that the Buddhist worldview has for the environmental issues that assail us in our age of technology. I will explore questions such as: can the Buddhist way of thinking help us comprehend and possibly resolve the environmental problems of our day and age? Are there any current environmental theories which are comparable to or share common ground with the classical Buddhist doctrines? I will elucidate some fundamental doctrines of early Buddhism from an environmental perspective as well as identify some comparable modern environmental theories such as deep ecology and general systems theory, that seem to share in the wisdom of classical Buddhism and have much to gain from a deeper appreciation of Buddhism.

The formation of conscience : pedagogy of the sacred

This qualitative study explores Thomas Green's (1999) treatise, Voices: The Educational Formation of Conscience; for the purpose of reconstruing the transformative usefulness of conscience in moral education. Conscience is "reflexive judgment about things that matter" (Green, 1999, p. 21). Paul Lehmann (1963) suggested that we must "do the conscience over or do the conscience in" (p. 327). Thomas Green "does the conscience over", arguing that a philosophy of moral education, and not a moral philosophy, provides the only framework from which governance of moral behaviour can be understood. Narratives from four one-to-one interviews and a focus group are analysed and interpreted in search of: (a) awareness and understanding of conscience, (b) voices of conscience, (c) normation, (d) reflexive emotions, and (e) the idea of the sacred. Participants in this study (ages 16-21) demonstrated an active awareness of their conscience and a willingness to engage in a reflective process of their moral behaviour. They understood their conscience to be a process of self-judgment about what is right and wrong, and that its authority comes from within themselves. Narrative accounts from childhood indicated that conscience is there "from the beginning" with evidence of selfcorrecting behaviour. A maturing conscience is accompanied by an increased cognitive capacity, more complicated life experiences, and individualization. Moral motivation was grounded in " a desire to connect with things that are most important." A model for conscience formation is proposed, which visualizes a critical path of reflexive emotions. It is argued that schools, striving to shape good citizens, can promote conscience formation through a "curriculum of moral skills"; a curriculum that embraces complexity, diversity, social criticism, and selfhood.

The von Neumann Minimax Theorem and its relatives and a study of externality in on-line auctions

This work consists of a theoretical part and an experimental one. The first part provides a simple treatment of the celebrated von Neumann minimax theorem as formulated by Nikaid6 and Sion. It also discusses its relationships with fundamental theorems of convex analysis. The second part is about externality in sponsored search auctions. It shows that in these auctions, advertisers have externality effects on each other which influence their bidding behavior. It proposes Hal R.Varian model and shows how adding externality to this model will affect its properties. In order to have a better understanding of the interaction among advertisers in on-line auctions, it studies the structure of the Google advertisements networ.k and shows that it is a small-world scale-free network.

Response curves of deterministic and probabilistic cellular automata in one and two dimensions

One of the most important problems in the theory of cellular automata (CA) is determining the proportion of cells in a specific state after a given number of time iterations. We approach this problem using patterns in preimage sets - that is, the set of blocks which iterate to the desired output. This allows us to construct a response curve - a relationship between the proportion of cells in state 1 after niterations as a function of the initial proportion. We derive response curve formulae for many two-dimensional deterministic CA rules with L-neighbourhood. For all remaining rules, we find experimental response curves. We also use preimage sets to classify surjective rules. In the last part of the thesis, we consider a special class of one-dimensional probabilistic CA rules. We find response surface formula for these rules and experimental response surfaces for all remaining rules.

'To do justice and judgement' : the place of passion in public life

Please consult the paper edition of this thesis to read. It is available on the 5th Floor of the Library at Call Number: Z 9999 P65 F47 2003

The Effectiveness of Learning Portfolios: A Study of Quality Assurance Programs of Selected Health Regulatory Colleges in Ontario

Health regulatory colleges promote quality practice and continued competence through Quality Assurance (QA) programs. For many colleges, a QA program includes the use of portfolios that incorporate self-directed learning. The purpose of this study was to determine some of the issues surrounding the effectiveness of QA portfolio programs. The literature review revealed that portfolios are valuable tools, but gaps in knowledge include a comparative analysis of QA programs and the perspective of regulatory college administrators. Data were collected through interviews with 6 administrators and a review of 14 portfolio models described on college websites. The results from the two data sources were applied to Robert Stake's responsive evaluation framework to identify issues related to the portfolio's effectiveness (Stake, 1967). The learning components of portfolios were analyzed through the humanist and constructivist lenses. All 14 portfolio models were found to have 3 main components: self-diagnosis, learning plan and activities, and self-evaluation. However, differences were uncovered in learners' autonomy in selecting learning activities, methods of portfolio evaluation, and the relationship between the portfolio and other QA components. The results revealed a dual philosophy of learning in portfolio models and an apparent contradiction between the needs of the individual learner and the organization. Paths for future research include the tenuous relationship between competence and learning, and the impact of technical approaches on selfdirected learning initiatives. A key recommendation is to acknowledge the unique identity of each profession so that health regulatory colleges can address legislative demands and learner needs.

Acyclic 5-Choosability of Planar Graphs Without Adjacent Short Cycles

The conjecture claiming that every planar graph is acyclic 5-choosable[Borodin et al., 2002] has been verified for several restricted classes of planargraphs. Recently, O. V. Borodin and A. O. Ivanova, [Journal of Graph Theory,68(2), October 2011, 169-176], have shown that a planar graph is acyclically 5-choosable if it does not contain an i-cycle adjacent to a j-cycle, where 3<=j<=5 if i=3 and 4<=j<=6 if i=4. We improve the above mentioned result and prove that every planar graph without an i-cycle adjacent to a j-cycle with3<=j<=5 if i=3 and 4<=j<=5 if i=4 is acyclically 5-choosable.

Edge-choosability of Planar Graphs

According to the List Colouring Conjecture, if G is a multigraph then χ' (G)=χl' (G) . In this thesis, we discuss a relaxed version of this conjecture that every simple graph G is edge-(∆ + 1)-choosable as by Vizing’s Theorem ∆(G) ≤χ' (G)≤∆(G) + 1. We prove that if G is a planar graph without 7-cycles with ∆(G)≠5,6 , or without adjacent 4-cycles with ∆(G)≠5, or with no 3-cycles adjacent to 5-cycles, then G is edge-(∆ + 1)-choosable.

Backbone Colouring of Graphs

Consider an undirected graph G and a subgraph of G, H. A q-backbone k-colouring of (G,H) is a mapping f: V(G) {1, 2, ..., k} such that G is properly coloured and for each edge of H, the colours of its endpoints differ by at least q. The minimum number k for which there is a backbone k-colouring of (G,H) is the backbone chromatic number, BBCq(G,H). It has been proved that backbone k-colouring of (G,T) is at most 4 if G is a connected C4-free planar graph or non-bipartite C5-free planar graph or Cj-free, j∈{6,7,8} planar graph without adjacent triangles. In this thesis we improve the results mentioned above and prove that 2-backbone k-colouring of any connected planar graphs without adjacent triangles is at most 4 by using a discharging method. In the second part of this thesis we further improve these results by proving that for any graph G with χ(G) ≥ 4, BBC(G,T) = χ(G). In fact, we prove the stronger result that a backbone tree T in G exists, such that ∀ uv ∈ T, |f(u)-f(v)|=2 or |f(u)-f(v)| ≥ k-2, k = χ(G). For the case that G is a planar graph, according to Four Colour Theorem, χ(G) = 4; so, BBC(G,T) = 4.

The Conceptualization and Exploration of Place Allegiance: Towards a Unified Model of Person-Place Relationships within Outdoor Recreation

The academic study of place has been generally defined by two distinct and highly refined discourses within outdoor recreation research: place attachment and sense of place. Place attachment generally describes the intensity of the place relationship, whereas sense of place approaches place from a more holistic and intimate orientation. This study bridges these two methodological and theoretical separate areas of place research together by re-conceptualizing the way in which place relationships are viewed within outdoor recreation research. The Psychological Continuum Model is used to extend the language of place attachment to incorporate more of the philosophy of sense of place while attending to the empirical strength and utility of place attachment. This extension results in the term place allegiance being coined to depict the strong and profound relationships outdoor recreationists build with their places of outdoor recreation. Using a concurrent mixed methods research design, this study explored place allegiance via an online survey (n = 437) and thirteen in-depth qualitative interviews with outdoor recreationists. Results indicate that place allegiance can be measured through a multi-dimensional model of place allegiance that incorporates behaviours, importance, resistance, knowledge and symbolic value. In addition, place allegiance was found to be related to an individual's influence on life course and his/her willingness to exhibit preservation and protection tendencies. Place allegiance plays an important role in acknowledging the importance of authentic place relationships in an effort to confront placelessness. Wilderness recreation is an important avenue for outdoor recreationists to build strong place relationships.

Optimal and Robust Designs of Step-stress Accelerated Life Testing Experiments for Proportional Hazards Models

Accelerated life testing (ALT) is widely used to obtain reliability information about a product within a limited time frame. The Cox s proportional hazards (PH) model is often utilized for reliability prediction. My master thesis research focuses on designing accelerated life testing experiments for reliability estimation. We consider multiple step-stress ALT plans with censoring. The optimal stress levels and times of changing the stress levels are investigated. We discuss the optimal designs under three optimality criteria. They are D-, A- and Q-optimal designs. We note that the classical designs are optimal only if the model assumed is correct. Due to the nature of prediction made from ALT experimental data, attained under the stress levels higher than the normal condition, extrapolation is encountered. In such case, the assumed model cannot be tested. Therefore, for possible imprecision in the assumed PH model, the method of construction for robust designs is also explored.

Community and the Recognition of the Other: A Levinasian Examination of The City, Inc. 1987-1992

This case study examines how The City, Inc.’s work within North and South Minneapolis, Minnesota neighborhoods from 1987 and 1992 was framed within a compilation of articles drawn from prominent Twin Cities’ daily newspapers. Positioned within a conceptual framework based on the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas, this study explores how the idea of community, as constructed and reinforced through organizational initiatives and local print media, impacts the everyday relationships of those within and between communities. Framed within a discourse analysis, Levinasian ethics considers what aspects of community discourse restrict and oppress the relation with the other. The study concludes by suggesting how the identified aspects of conditional belonging, finding the trace, and building community can be valuable in offering an alternative to assessment-style research by considering the relationship and responsibility of the one for the other.

Methodology in Economics: the Logic of Appraisal

This Paper Intends to Develop a Coherent Methodological Framework Concerned with the Appraisal of Scientific Theories in Economics, and Which Is Based on a Postulated Aim of Science. We First Define the Scope of a Methodological Inquiry (Precise Definition of What Is Meant by the Logic of Appraisal of Scientific Theories) and Review the Work of Popper and Lakatos in the Philosophy of Science. We Then Use Their Results to Develop a Rational Structure of Scientific Activity. We Identify and Analyse Both a Micro and Macro Framework for the Process of Appraisal and Single Out the Importance of So-Called 'Fundamental Assumptions' in Creating Externalities in the Appraisal Process Which Forces Us to Adop a Multi-Level Analysis. Special Attention Is Given to the Role and Significance of the Abstraction Process and the Use of Assumptions in General. the Proposed Structure of Scientific Activity Is Illustrated with Examples From Economics.