Protection of Urban Lands: Advances in Medellin’s Public Policy

The problem of land ownership protection in this country is an issue that must be faced by those who have as part of their responsibilities the recognition, the restitution and the reparation of victims of forced displacement. One of the points that must be analyzed is the protection of ownership of urban lands, a subject falling under municipal responsibility. The development of a public policy by the City of Medellín for the protection of such lands is a significant advance for the creation of protocols and for the return of rights to those who have adandoned their lands because of violence or who have been divested of their homes in urban areas.

Maternal Mortality in Colombia: Some Thoughs on the Situation and Public Policy During Last Decade

In this article we make a critical analysis about the situation of maternal mortality in Colombia, considering some of the most current rates of this problem and the public policy rules adopted in the last years to decrease its prevalence. We think that the rate of maternal mortality in Colombia is too hight because the State does not guarantee the right health care to Colombian women. In this way, the structure and resources distribution established by the policies on sexual and reproductive health have not reflected the population necessities, specially in the case of young mothers left aside by the social security system.

KNOWLEDGE MANAGEMENT PROCESS AS DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN PUBLIC SECTOR.

The competitive approach to the theory of knowledge management has allowed the first decade of the twenty-first century government institutions will focus on human resources as feedstock to generate knowledge in the organization that benefits users of various government, Solving the most common conflicts and supporting the continuity of the common processes without falling into routines that lead to low utilization of resources.This work aims to show how it has improved the performance of some public agencies in the city of Guadalajara through a knowledge management model

Resources for an Intersectorial Management of Public Policies: Mobility and Access

The objective of this paper is to integrate mobility as across component of the management of specific public actions. The case of study concerns the public health services in Argentina, and mother’s mobility conditions in the suburban of the Buenos Aires Metropolitan Area. In terms of methodology, the paper working on the concept of access trying to identify, measure and evaluate the relationship between mobility conditions and maternal health care. Access is weighted according to the realization of health services, and not according to the arrival at the places where they are offers. The result is innovative empirical evidence, useful as an indicator to make more relevant the role of mobility within the public agenda of transport and others specific sectors, asa basic social right behind the access that requires coordinated actions and cross-sectoral approaches.

What kind of European Banking Union? Bruegel Policy Contribution [2012/12?]June 25, 2012

This paper discusses the creation of a European Banking Union. First, we discuss questions of design. We highlight seven fundamental choices that decision makers will need to make: Which EU countries should participate in the banking union? To which categories of banks should it apply? Which institution should be tasked with supervision? Which one should deal with resolution? How centralised should the deposit insurance system be? What kind of fiscal backing would be required? What governance framework and political institutions would be needed? In terms of geographical scope, we see the coverage of the banking union of the euro area as necessary and of additional countries as desirable, even though this would entail important additional economic difficulties. The system should ideally cover all banks within the countries included, in order to prevent major competitive and distributional distortions. Supervisory authority should be granted either to both the ECB and a new agency, or to a new agency alone. National supervisors, acting under the authority of the European supervisor, would be tasked with the supervision of smaller banks in accordance with the subsidiarity principle. A European resolution authority should be established, with the possibility of drawing on ESM resources. A fully centralized deposit insurance system would eventually be desirable, but a system of partial reinsurance may also be envisaged at least in a first phase. A banking union would require at least implicit European fiscal backing, with significant political authority and legitimacy. Thus, banking union cannot be considered entirely separately from fiscal union and political union. The most difficult challenge of creating a European banking union lies with the short-term steps towards its eventual implementation. Many banks in the euro area, and especially in the crisis countries, are currently under stress and the move towards banking union almost certainly has significant distributional implications. Yet it is precisely because banks are under such stress that early and concrete action is needed. An overarching principle for such action is to minimize the cost to the tax payers. The first step should be to create a European supervisor that will anchor the development of the future banking union. In parallel, a capability to quickly assess the true capital position of the system’s most important banks should be created, for which we suggest establishing a temporary European Banking Sector Task Force working together with the European supervisor and other authorities. Ideally, problems identified by this process should be resolved by national authorities; in case fiscal capacities would prove insufficient, the European level would take over in the country concerned with some national financial participation, or in an even less likely adverse scenario, in all participating countries at once. This approach would require the passing of emergency legislation in the concerned countries that would give the Task Force the required access to information and, if necessary, further intervention rights. Thus, the principle of fiscal responsibility of respective member states for legacy costs would be preserved to the maximum extent possible, and at the same time, market participants and the public would be reassured that adequate tools are in place to address any eventuality.