Empresa na favela: políticas públicas e desafios

Desde o seu surgimento, as favelas no Rio de Janeiro foram, ao longo dos anos, foco de diferentes políticas públicas desenvolvidas pelos governantes. Primeiramente a ênfase dessas políticas foi pautada na questão da remoção das favelas, pois eram consideradas verdadeiras aberrações que necessitavam ser erradicadas. Com o passar dos anos nota-se uma grande mudança. O discurso de valorização da urbanização das favelas ganha força e o remocionismo parece ficar um pouco esquecido. Entretanto, a partir do ano de 2009, vemos que a agenda pública passa a dar grande ênfase ao fomento do empreendedorismo nas favelas, já que este é visto como um importante fator de geração de riquezas e combate da pobreza. Para isso, foram criados diferentes projetos por parte do poder público e da iniciativa privada que visam fomentar a iniciativa empreendedora nas favelas. Entretanto, como será exposto através de algumas entrevistas que foram realizadas com empreendedoras da favela do Cantagalo, estes projetos apresentam algumas barreiras e desafios que precisam ser vencidos para que possam servir à finalidade para a qual foram criados e para que sejam mais efetivos.

Desafios para a regulação de um mercado competitivo de gás natural no estado de São Paulo

O trabalho tem o objetivo de apresentar os principais desafios e algumas propostas para a formação e regulação de um mercado de gás natural mais competitivo no Estado de São Paulo. São descritos, caracterizados e analisados os principais pontos do estudo: a estrutura da indústria, aspectos econômicos, a regulação do setor, e aprendizados de algumas experiências internacionais. Posteriormente, são oferecidas alternativas que poderiam servir como possibilidades para o desenvolvimento de um mercado de livre concorrência mais amplo.

A monthly indicator of Brazilian GDP. The Brazilian business cycle and growth cycle

This paper constructs an indicator of Brazilian GDP at the monthly ftequency. The peculiar instability and abrupt changes of regimes in the dynamic behavior of the Brazilian business cycle were explicitly modeled within nonlinear ftameworks. In particular, a Markov switching dynarnic factor model was used to combine several macroeconomic variables that display simultaneous comovements with aggregate economic activity. The model generates as output a monthly indicator of the Brazilian GDP and real time probabilities of the current phase of the Brazilian business cycle. The monthly indicator shows a remarkable historical conformity with cyclical movements of GDP. In addition, the estimated filtered probabilities predict ali recessions in sample and out-of-sample. The ability of the indicator in linear forecasting growth rates of GDP is also examined. The estimated indicator displays a better in-sample and out-of-sample predictive performance in forecasting growth rates of real GDP, compared to a linear autoregressive model for GDP. These results suggest that the estimated monthly indicator can be used to forecast GDP and to monitor the state of the Brazilian economy in real time.

Effects of trade policy on technology adoption and investment

This paper studies the consequences of trade policy for the adoption of new technologies. It develops a dynamic international trade model with two sectors. Workers in manufacturing decide if new technologies are used, capital owners then choose investment. We analyze three different arrangements: free trade, tariffs, and quotas. In the model economy, free trade as well as tariffs guarantee that the most productive technology available will be used. In contrasL under a quota the most productive technology available will not be used at all times. Further, in the latter case investment and the capital stock are smaller than in the former one. Finally, there exists parameter values for which the computed difference in GDP is a factor of thirty.

Formation and destruction of coalition groups under economic growth

This paper introduces a model economy in which formation of coalition groups under technological progress is generated endogenously. The coalition formation depends crucially on the rate of arrival of new technologies. In the model, an agent working in the saroe technology for more than one period acquires skills, part of which is specific to this technology. These skills increase the agent productivity. In this case, if he has worked more than one period with the same technology he has incentives to construct a coalition to block the adoption of new technologies. Therefore, in every sector the workers have incentives to construct a coalition and to block the adoption of new technologies. They will block every time that a technology stay in use for more than one period.

Technology adoption and effects of transfers across locations

This paper develops a two-period model with heterogeneous agents to analyze the e¤ects of transfers across locations on convergence, growth and welfare. The model has two important features. First, locations are asymmetric as it is assumed that there are more specialized occupations in the more developed one. Second, the returns on the investment to acquire new technology depend positively on the level of each region’s knowledge and on the level of the world knowledge assumed to be available to all. In one hand, the poor region has a disadvantage as it has a lower stock of knowledge. On the other hand, it has the advantage of not having yet exploited a greater stock of useable knowledge available in the world. Hence, there are two possible cases. When the returns are greater in the poor region, we obtain the following results: (i) the rich location grows slower; (ii) the transfers to the poor location enhances the country’s growth rate; and (iii) there is a positive amount of transfers to the poor region that is welfare improving. When the returns are greater in the rich region, the …rst two results are reversed and transfers to the rich region are welfare improving. In both cases, the optimal amount of transfer increases with the level of income disparity across regions and is not dependent on the level of the country’s economic development (measured by its income per capita). Barriers to the adoption of new technology available in the world can constrain the convergence process as it harms in greater length the poor region. The results do not change whether migration is allowed or not.

Generalists versus specialists in organizations

In this paper, we discuss the trade-o¤ between specialization and coordination in an organizational design problem. Most papers on the assignment of heterogeneous managers to di¤erent hierarchic levels emphasize the role of talent: better managers should be on top of hierarchies. However, this requires talent to be measured on an one-dimensional scale. In this paper, we explore the implications of allowing talent to have two dimensions: breadth and depth. Specialists have deep knowledge of few areas while generalists have narrow knowledge of many areas. When perfect communication is impossible, hierarchies arise in which generalists are at the top and specialists are at the bottom. We propose a model of imperfect communication and discuss its implications for organizational design, the optimal degree of centralization and the depth of hierarchies. We show that our model also implies plausible organizational structures, like balanced hierarchies and pyramidal structures.

Technical change and factor shares

The implications of technical change that directly alters factor shares are examined. Such change can lower the income of some factors of production even when it raises total output, thus offering a possible explanation for episodes of social conflict such as the Luddite uprisings in 19th century England and the recent divergence in the U. S. between wages for skilled and unskilled labor. An explanation also why underdeveloped countries do not adopt the latest technology but continue to use outmoded production methods. Total factor productivity is shown to be a misleading measure of technical progress. Share-altering technical change brings into question the plausibility of a wide class of endogenous growth models.

Monopoly rights can reduce income big time

We study a two–sector version of the neoclassical growth model with coalitions of factor suppliers in the capital producing sectors. We show that if the coalitions have monopoly rights, then they block the adoption of the efficient technology. We also show that blocking leads to a decrease in the productivity of each capital producing sector and to an increase in the relative price of capital; as a result the capital stock and the production fall in each sector. We finally show that the implied fall in the level of per–capita income can be large quantitatively.

Environmental policy and growth when inputs are differentiated in pollution intensity

Environmental policy affects the distribution of market shares if intermediate goods are differentiated in their pollution intensity. When innovations are environment-friendly, a tax on emissions skews demand towards new goods which are the most productive. In this case, the tax has to increase along a balanced growth path to keep the market shares of goods of different vintages constant. Comparing balanced growth paths, we find that an increase in the burden of environmental taxation spurs innovation because it increases the market share of recent vintages. As a result the cost of environmental policy in terms of slower growth is weaker and may even be absent.

Robustness and stabilization properties of monetary policy rules in Brazil

Based on three versions of a small macroeconomic model for Brazil, this paper presents empirical evidence on the effects of parameter uncertainty on monetary policy rules and on the robustness of optimal and simple rules over different model specifications. By comparing the optimal policy rule under parameter uncertainty with the rule calculated under purely additive uncertainty, we find that parameter uncertainty should make policymakers react less aggressively to the economy's state variables, as suggested by Brainard's "conservatism principIe", although this effect seems to be relatively small. We then informally investigate each rule's robustness by analyzing the performance of policy rules derived from each model under each one of the alternative models. We find that optimal rules derived from each model perform very poorly under alternative models, whereas a simple Taylor rule is relatively robusto We also fmd that even within a specific model, the Taylor rule may perform better than the optimal rule under particularly unfavorable realizations from the policymaker' s loss distribution function.

The long-run economic impact of AIDS

This paper studies the long-run impact of HIV / AIDS on per capita income and education. We introduce a channel from HIV / AIDS to long-run income that has been overlooked by the literature, the reduction of the incentives to study due to shorter expected longevity. We work with a continuous time overlapping generations mo deI in which life cycle features of savings and education decision play key roles. The simulations predict that the most affected countries in Sub-Saharan Africa will be in the future, on average, a quarter poorer than they would be without AIDS, due only to the direct (human capital reduction) and indirect (decline in savings and investment) effects of life-expectancy reductions. Schooling will decline on average by half. These findings are well above previous results in the literature and indicate that, as pessimistic as they may be, at least in economic terms the worst could be yet to come.