Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Little Spirit Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Project Overview, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Silver Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Center Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-West Okoboji Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Lower Gar Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Lake Minnewashta, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Upper Gar Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-East Okoboji Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Cooperative Lakes Area Monitoring Project-Big Spirit Lake, 2007

Water fact sheet for Iowa Department of Natural Resources and the Geological Bureau.

Estimating the effect of transitory economic shocks on civil conflict

This note tries to clarify some remaining issues in the debate on the effect of income shocks oncivil conflict. Section 1 discusses the discrepant findings on the effect of rainfall shocks oncivil conflict in Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011) and Ciccone (2011). Section 2 develops aninstrumental variables approach to estimate the effect of transitory (rainfall-driven) incomeshocks on civil conflict and contrasts the conclusions with those of Miguel, Satyanath, andSergenti (2004) and Miguel and Satyanath (2010, 2011). Throughout, the note uses the data ofMiguel, Satyanath, and Sergenti to focus on the methodological issues at the core of the debate(for results using the latest data see Ciccone, 2011).

State capacity and military conflict

In 1500, Europe was composed of hundreds of statelets and principalities, with weak central authority,no monopoly over the legitimate use of violence, and overlapping jurisdictions. By 1800, only ahandful of powerful, centralized nation states remained. We build a model that explains both the emergenceof capable states and growing divergence between European powers. We argue that the impactof war was crucial for state building, and depended on: i) the financial cost of war, and ii) a country sinitial level of domestic political fragmentation. We emphasize the role of the "Military Revolution",which raised the cost of war. Initially, this caused more cohesive states to invest in state capacity, whilemore divided states rationally dropped out of the competition, causing divergence between Europeanstates. As the cost of war escalated further, all states engaged in a "race to the top" towards greater statebuilding.

Why ethnic fractionalization? Polarization, ethnic conflict and growth

This paper ia an attempt to clarify the relationship between fractionalization,polarization and conflict. The literature on the measurement of ethnic diversityhas taken as given that the proper measure for heterogeneity can be calculatedby using the fractionalization index. This index is widely used in industrialeconomics and, for empirical purposes, the ethnolinguistic fragmentation isready available for regression exercises. Nevertheless the adequacy of asynthetic index of hetergeneity depends on the intrinsic characteristicsof the heterogeneous dimension to be measured. In the case of ethnicdiversity there is a very strong conflictive dimension. For this reasonwe argue that the measure of heterogeneity should be one of the class ofpolarization measures. In fact the intuition of the relationship betweenconflict and fractionalization do not hold for more than two groups. Incontrast with the usual problem of polarization indices, which are ofdifficult empirical implementation without making some arbitrary choiceof parameters, we show that the RQ index, proposed by Reynal-Querol (2002),is the only discrete polarization measure that satisfies the basic propertiesof polarization. Additionally we present a derivation of the RQ index froma simple rent seeking model. In the empirical section we show that whileethnic polarization has a positive effect on civil wars and, indirectly ongrowth, this effect is not present when we use ethnic fractionalization.

Shallow Lakes in Iowa: Water Quality and Biological Assessments, 2008

This monthly report from the Iowa Department of Natural Resources is about the water quality management of Iowa's rivers, streams and lakes.