Brexit will deepen the fault lines within the EU over mobility. CEPS Commentary, 12 July 2016

Much has been made of the divide that opened up in 2015 between eastern and western member states as a result of acrimonious discussions on how to handle the refugee crisis and distribute asylum applicants across the EU. Against the prevailing political sentiment in certain member state capitals, Germany and France pushed through a plan devised by the European Commission to relocate 120,000 refugees, by a qualified majority vote in the Council. Rather than creating an east/west divide, however, the vote split the group of (relatively) new Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) of the EU into two factions: Romania, Czechia, Slovakia and Hungary voted against the plan, whereas several other CEECs, namely Poland, Bulgaria and the Baltic states, joined the controversial motion on the side of the other (northern, southern and western) member states. Finland abstained. Few member states have shifted their positions in the meantime. If anything, in fact, they have coalesced among the Visegrad 4, following a change of government in Poland; and they have hardened, as a result of new proposals by the Commission to fine member states that refuse to accept refugees. With Hungary’s referendum on the Commission’s relocation scheme scheduled for October 2nd, tensions are set to intensify even further.

Demographics and Brexit: A deeper problem for the EU? CEPS Commentary, 8 July 2016

There has been much debate about the demographic factors that contributed to the outcome of the UK’s referendum on its membership of the EU. Two aspects command special attention. First, there are marked differences between young and old generations in the preferences shown for remaining in the EU. While the former predominantly voted to remain, a great majority of the latter voted to leave. On the other hand, voter turnout revealed the opposite trend: about 83% of UK citizens aged 65 and older voted, whereas only 36% of those aged 18-24 cast their vote (Figure 1).

Soft or hard Brexit? EPC Commentary, 15 July 2016

The EU is in uncharted waters when it comes to negotiating the UK’s exit from the Union. Creative and flexible thinking will be required from all parties if an orderly departure is to be managed. The alternative is a fractious, mutually damaging and disorderly Brexit. This commentary argues for a short-term, time-limited agreement to stabilise the EU-UK relationship and to allow breathing space to develop the terms of a long-term strategic partnership.

Scotland and the European Union. EPC Policy Brief, 14 July 2016

Britain’s referendum on EU membership revealed a country divided; while the United Kingdom voted to leave by 52%, Scotland voted by 62% to remain in the EU, putting the question of Scottish independence back on the table. The Scottish government says that Scotland should not be taken out of the EU against the will of its people, and that a second referendum on independence is “highly likely”. Although the Scottish people voted against independence in a referendum in 2014, opinion polls currently suggest that a majority in Scotland wants another referendum, and would vote for independence. In this Policy Brief, Graham Avery looks at how the Scottish question relates to the UK’s withdrawal from the EU; what factors have changed since the Scottish people voted against independence in 2014 and what Scotland‘s chances are of remaining in the EU.

Institutionen und Volksrechte

Mit der Wahl von Simonetta Sommaruga zur Bundespräsidentin sowie Claude Hêche zum Ständerats- und Stéphane Rossini zum Nationalratspräsidenten, werden 2015 die drei höchsten Ämter von der SP besetzt. - Verschiedene Skandale bei IT-Beschaffungen in der Bundesverwaltung führten zu Strafuntersuchungen und zahlreichen politischen Vorstössen. - 2014 wurden nicht weniger als elf neue Bundesparlamentarier vereidigt. - Verschiedene Geschäfte und der Rücktritt Christoph Blochers lösten eine Debatte über Miliz- vs. Berufsparlament aus. - Mit dem revidierten Bundesgesetz über die politischen Rechte werden die Sammelfristen bei Referenden nicht verlängert. - Angestossen von der SVP wird im Parlament über das Verhältnis von Völkerrecht und Landesrecht diskutiert; die Vorstösse der Volkspartei stossen auf Ablehnung. - Gegen E-Voting beginnt sich auch auf politischer Ebene leise Kritik zu regen.

Macroeconomics, economic crisis and electoral outcomes: A national European pool

An abundance of comparative survey research argues the presence of economic voting as an individual force in European elections, thereby refuting a possible ecological fallacy. But the hypothesis of economic voting at the aggregate level, with macroeconomics influencing overall electoral outcomes, seems less sure. Indeed, there might be a micrological fallacy at work, with the supposed individual economic vote effect not adding up to a national electoral effect after all. Certainly that would account for the spotty evidence linking macroeconomics and national election outcomes. We examine the possibility of a micrological fallacy through rigorous analysis of a large time-series cross-sectional dataset of European nations. From these results, it becomes clear that the macroeconomy strongly moves national election outcomes, with hard times punishing governing parties, and good times rewarding them. Further, this economy-election connection appears asymmetric, altering under economic crisis. Indeed, we show that economic crisis, defined as negative growth, has much greater electoral effects than positive economic growth. Hard times clearly make governments more accountable to their electorates.

The economic voter and economic crisis

Theories of economic voting have a long tradition in political science and continue to inspire a large group of scholars. Classical economic voting theory assumes a reward-and-punishment mechanism (Key, 1966). This mechanism implies that incumbents are more likely to stay in power under a good economy, but are cast out under a bad economy (Lewis-Beck and Stegmaier, 2000). The economy has repeatedly been shown to be a major determinant of electoral behavior (see especially the recent book by Duch and Stevenson, 2008), but the current economic crisis seems to provide a marked illustration of how the economy affects voting. In recent elections across the Western industrialized world, most ruling coalitions lost their majority. Opposition parties, on the other hand, whether right wing or left wing, have appeared to benefit from the economic downturn.

Election Forecasting under Opaque Conditions

Election forecasting models assume retrospective economic voting and clear mechanisms of accountability. Previous research indeed indicates that incumbent political parties are being held accountable for the state of the economy. In this article we develop a ‘hard case’ for the assumptions of election forecasting models. Belgium is a multiparty system with perennial coalition governments. Furthermore, Belgium has two completely segregated party systems (Dutch and French language). Since the prime minister during the period 1974-2011 has always been a Dutch language politician, French language voters could not even vote for the prime minister, so this cognitive shortcut to establish political accountability is not available. Results of an analysis for the French speaking parties (1981-2010) show that even in these conditions of opaque accountability, retrospective economic voting occurs as election results respond to indicators with regard to GDP and unemployment levels. Party membership figures can be used to model the popularity function in election forecasting.

Punishing Local Incumbents for the Local Economy

After decennia of research on economic voting, it is now established that the state of the economy affects voting behaviour. Nevertheless, this conclusion is the result of a focus on predominantly national-level economies and national-level elections. In this paper, we show that at a local level as well, mechanisms of accountability linked to the economy are at work. The local economic context affected voting behaviour in the 2012 Belgian municipal elections, with a stronger increase of unemployment rates in their municipality significantly decreasing the probability that voters choose an incumbent party. Additionally, we observe that voters are not opportunistically voting for incumbents who lower tax rates. Instead, voters seem to be holding local incumbents accountable for local economic conditions. We hence conclude that voters care about economic outcomes, not about what specific policies are implemented to reach these outcomes.

1961 Commission on Civil Rights report.

Spine and cover title: 1961 United States Commission on Civil Rights report.

Thoughts on the ballot.

Mode of access: Internet.

The rise of professional proxy solicitors: Georgeson & Co. of Wall Street, et al.

Includes bibliography.

The influence of recent proxy contests on social and economic trends.

Mode of access: Internet.

Hinds' precedents of the House of representatives of the United States, including references to provisions of the Constitution, the laws, and decisions of the United States Senate.

v. 1. Organization, apportionment, qualifications, prima facie title, elections.--v. 2. Elections, members, speaker, prerogatives, contempts.--v. 3. Investigations, inquiries, electoral count, impeachments, privilege.-- v. 4. Quorurm, order of business, appropriation bills, committees, committee of the whole.--v. 5. Debate, motions, amendments, voting, conference.--v. 6-8. Index-digest ( A to G; H to P; Q-Z)

Absentee ballot legislation : hearing before the Subcommittee on Postal Operations and Services of the Committee on Post Office and Civil Service, House of Representatives, Ninety-sixth Congress, second session ... March 13, 1980.

"Serial no. 96-77."