The Boston Marathon and the Visa Negotiations between the EU and Russia: Time to get real and positive. CEPS Commentary, 8 May 2013

Against the background of the Boston Marathon bombing as a violent reminder of the lawlessness throughout much of the Northern Caucasus, Michael Emerson calls in this commentary for a fresh direction in the EU’s negotiations with Russia over visa-free travel. While finding that a ‘visa liberalisation’ regime has a very slim prospect of materialising any time soon, on the other hand, he sees realistic possibilities for fast delivery of a ‘virtual visa free regime’ of the multi-year, multi-entry visa, which would be a real and important achievement for EU-Russian relations.

The Euro Crisis, the Other Crisis and the Need for Global Thinking

In addition to the euro crisis the EU faces a second, more existential crisis, in the form of an ill-defined notion of the Union’s global role. This contribution argues that the euro crisis should not redefine perceptions of the EU on the global stage, which it is in danger of doing. Instead, the EU and its members should embark upon a strategic reassessment in order to define three core interrelated factors. First, the nature of the EU’s actorness remains ill-defined and it is therefore necessary to explain, both within and beyond the Union, what its global role is. Second, in order to facilitate the joining up of the myriad of sub-strategies in EU external relations, the notion of ‘red lines’ should be considered which define specific aspects of behaviour that are mainstreamed throughout the EU’s external actions and, more importantly, upheld. Third, in spite of the rapid development of the harder elements of the EU’s actorness over the last decade or so, there remains a worrying gap between rhetoric and reality. This aspect is of particular concern for the United States and will affect perceptions of the EU’s ability to be a genuine strategic partner at a time of dramatic change in the international system. By engaging in what will inevitably be a difficult debate, the EU and its members will not only help give purpose and strategic direction to the Union’s actions on the international scene, it will also speak to the euro crisis since both are fundamentally about the future shape and direction of European integration.

Migration and asylum: The movement of people in the Mediterranean Region - Future scenarios and the EU response. Jean Monnet Occasional Paper No. 11/2014

Introduction. In recent years, the global discussion on migration and asylum has evolved from polarization of perspectives and mistrust, to improving partnerships and fostering cooperation between countries and regions. The paradigm has shifted from control and security exclusively to an increased awareness of the ramifications of migration in development and labour markets, the increasing demographic gap1 and the dangers of exclusion faced by migrant workers (regular or irregular). Eastern Europe will suffer the biggest population decline in the coming years, and Nigeria’s population will reach one billion by 2100. In Europe, the work replacement ratio will be two pensioners for one active worker. It has become clear that these facts cannot be ignored and that there is a need for greater convergence of policies (migration/mobility, fundamental rights, and economic growth), with a migrant-centred approach.2. The assumption that Europe will remain a geopolitical and economic hub that attracts immigrants at all skill levels might not hold water in the long run. The evolving demographic and economic changes have made it evident that the competitiveness of the EU (Europe 2020 Strategy) is also at stake, particularly if an adaptable workforce with the necessary skills is not secured in view of shortfalls in skill levels and because of serious labour mismatches. Therefore, it is the right moment to develop more strategic and long-term migration policies that take into account the evolving position of Europe and its neighbours in the world. By the same token, labour market strategies that meet needs and promote integration of regular migrants are still a pending task for the Member States (MS) in terms of the free movement of people, but also in relation with neighbouring and partner countries.

Stosunki Rosja-NATO przed i po 11 wrzesnia. Dazenia Litwy, Lotwy i Estonii do integracji z NATO i UE a stosunki tych krajow z Rosja. Prace OSW 4/2002. = Relations between Russia and NATO before and after the 11th of September. Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia's aspirations to integrate with NATO and the EU in the context of these countries' relations with Russia. OSW Study 4/2002

Membership of NATO and the EU is a priority of the foreign policies of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. The main stimulus that drives these membership aspirations is the will to ensure the security of these countries and to ultimately separate them from the post-Soviet space. Additionally, the authorities of the Baltic States believe that membership of both these organisations will make their counties more attractive for Western investors. The way to implement these priorities is not only through consistent adjustments to the standards prevailing in NATO and the EU, but it also involves refusing to join the post-Soviet structures and seeking out states that are willing to strongly support the Baltic States aspirations. The implementation of this policy has resulted in the status of the Baltic States preparations for membership in both international structures being assessed as good, and they are reckoned to be realistic candidates for NATO and EU enlargement.

Strategia unii europejskiej dla regionu dunaju. Implikacje dla Polski i Grupy Wyszehradzkiej. Prace OSW 37/2011. = European Union Strategy for the Danube region. Implications for the Polish and the Visegrad Group. OSW Study 37/2011

Strategia dunajska jest drugim po strategii bałtyckiej przykładem rosnącego znaczenia makroregionów w Unii Europejskiej. Na politykę regionalną patrzy się przy tym coraz częściej przez pryzmat realizacji nie tylko spójności wewnętrznej, ale także działań na rzecz lepszego powiązania państwa z otoczeniem zewnętrznym – zarówno unijnym, jak i pozaunijnym. Polska współtworzy strategię bałtycką, ale nie została włączona do ścisłego grona państw przygotowujących strategię dunajską. Wyzwaniem dla Grupy Wyszehradzkiej jest określenie stanowiska w sprawie roli strategii makroregionalnych w budowaniu spójności Europy Środkowej i harmonijnego rozwoju całej UE. Postulat lepszej koordynacji polityk i środków UE w celu wdrażania strategii makroregionalnych należy traktować także jako wezwanie do zacieśnienia współpracy między Polską a jej południowymi sąsiadami, bezpośrednio zaangażowanymi w realizację strategii dunajskiej.

A captive island. Kaliningrad between Moscow and the EU. OSW Study 41/2012

The Kaliningrad region can be called a 'captive island', because of its specific geopolitical location - it is part of the Russian legal, political and economic space, yet it is geographically separated from the rest of the Russian Federation, and it is particularly open to co-operation with its neighbours in the European Union. Moscow is trying to compensate the region for its separation, offering it financial support and economic privileges.At the same time, it is sensitive to any potential challenges to Russia's territorial integrity - and the centre's desire for control over the region often limits the latter's potential for cooperation and internal development. This report presents the situation in the region, and is intended to help develop a model for its effective regional co-operation with its EU neighbours.

Niemcy wobec wieloletnich ram finansowych unii Europejskiej na lata 2014-2020. Uwarunkowania i interesy. Raport OSW, pazdziernik 2011. = Germany and the multiannual financial framework of the European Union for the period 2014-2020. Considerations and interests. OSW Report, October 2011

No abstract.

Ukraine and the European Union: Time for a Re-Think. ACES Working Papers, 2011

There are two reasons for the virtual nature of the West’s dialogue with Ukraine. The first is institutional as the EU has until now only been willing to use ‘carrots’ and ‘sticks’ in ‘enlargement-heavy’ (i.e. full membership) whereas it has only used ‘carrots,’ but never ‘sticks’, in ‘enlargement-light’ (i.e. the DCFTA). European Council Foreign Relations Senior Fellows Nicu Popescu and Andrew Wilson argue that the EU should be more willing to use both carrots and sticks; that is integrating its soft and hard power. The second is a disconnection between the West and Kyiv over definitions of democracy. The Ukrainian authorities have until now wanted to have their cake and eat it, too; rolling back democracy in Kyiv while claiming to sign up to ‘European values’ in Brussels.

THE KYOTO PROTOCOL AND THE WTO: INSTITUTIONAL EVOLUTION AND ADAPTATION. CEPS Policy Brief No. 28/December

Overview. Questions about the interface between the multilateral climate regime embodied in the Kyoto Protocol and the multilateral trade regime embodied in the World Trade Organisation (WTO) have become especially timely since the fall of 2001. At that time, ministerial-level meetings in Marrakech and Doha agreed to advance the agendas, respectively, for the implementation of the Kyoto Protocol and for negotiations on further agreements at the WTO. There have been concerns that each of these multilateral arrangements could constrain the effectiveness of the other, and these concerns will become more salient with the entry into force of the Kyoto Protocol. There are questions about whether and how the rights and obligations of the members of the WTO and the parties to the Protocol may conflict. Of particular concern is whether provisions in the Protocol, as well as government policies and business activities undertaken in keeping with those provisions, may conflict with the WTO non-discrimination principles of national treatment and most-favoured nation treatment. The WTO agreements that are potentially relevant to climate change issues include many of the individual Uruguay Round agreements and subsequent agreements as well. The principal elements of the Kyoto Protocol that are particularly relevant are its provisions concerning emissions trading, the Clean Development Mechanism, Joint Implementation, enforcement, and parties’ policies and measures. In combination, therefore, there are numerous potential points of intersection between the elements of the Kyoto Protocol and the WTO agreements. Previous studies have clarified many issues, as they have focused on particular aspects of the regimes’ relationships. Yet, some analyses suggest that the two regimes are largely compatible and even mutually reinforcing, while others suggest that there are significant conflicts between them. Those and other studies are referenced in the ‘suggestions for further reading’ section at the end of the paper.1 The present paper seeks to expand on those studies by providing additional breadth and depth to understanding of the issues. The analysis gives special attention to key issues on the agenda – i.e. issues that are particularly problematic because of the likelihood of occurrence of specific conflicts and the significance of their economic and/or political consequences. The paper adopts a modified ‘triage’ approach, which classifies points of intersection as (a) highly problematic and clearly in need of further attention, (b) perhaps problematic but less urgent, and (c) apparently not problematic, at least at this point in time. The principal conclusions are that: · The missions and objectives of the two regimes are largely compatible, and their operations are potentially mutually reinforcing in several respects. · Some provisions of the multilateral agreements that may superficially seem at odds are not likely to become particularly problematic in practice. · ‘Domestic policies and measures’ that governments may undertake in the context of the Protocol could pose difficult issues in the context of WTO dispute cases. · Recent WTO agreements and dispute cases acknowledge the legitimacy of the ‘precautionary principle’ and are thus consistent with the environmental protection objectives of the Protocol. · The relative newness of the climate regime creates opportunities for institutional adaptation, as compared with the constraints of tradition in the trade-investment regime. · The prospect of largely independent evolutionary paths for the two regimes poses a series of issues about future international regime design and management, which may require new institutional arrangements. In sum, the present paper thus finds that although there are some areas of interaction that are problematic, the two regimes may nevertheless co-exist in relative harmony in other respects –more like ‘neighbours’ than either ‘friends’ or ‘foes’, as Krist (2001) has suggested.

The New European Commission Presidency and the Advent of European Democracy. Jean Monnet/Robert Schuman Paper Series Vol. 14 No. 17, August 2014

On June 15, 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker, the lead candidate of the European People’s Party, was elected President of the European Commission, with the support of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe, and some of the European Socialists and Greens. Amid unprecedented Euroscepticism, the media and many pundits predicted a record-low voter turnout and record-high results for Europhobic parties. The aforementioned parties then decided that the political outcome of these 2014 European elections would also be unprecedented. For the first time in EU history, the European political parties agreed to nominate candidates to chair the institution, which they justified by putting forward Article 17 of the Lisbon Treaty. The European Parliament has often characteristically used political discourse - the logos, to influence the EU’s institutional framework, even though it entails grappling with Member States. It took the form of reports and resolutions, like the official use of the phrase “European Parliament” in 1962, direct universal suffrage elections in 1975 and a European Union in 1984. Nominating contenders to chair the European Commission is no exception. It requires a specific political discourse whose origins can be traced back to the early years of the European Parliament, when it was still the “Common Assembly”. This political discourse is one of the elements thanks to which the European Parliament acquired visibility and new prerogatives, in pursuit of its legitimacy. However, the executive branch in all member states is not intent on yielding such prerogatives to the European Parliament. As a matter of fact, the European Parliament has often ended up strengthening the heads of state and governments, since MEPs are forced to resort to self-discipline. The symbolic significance of its logos and, consequently, its own politicisation as a source of legitimacy, is thus undermined. For instance, in 2014, Jean-Claude Juncker’s election actually strengthened German Chancellor Angela Merkel. First she questioned the fact that the candidate whose party holds the parliamentary majority after the election should be appointed President of the Commission. Then she seemed strongly intent on democratising the Union, when she confronted David Cameron, who openly opposed Juncker, believed to be too federalist and old-fashioned a candidate. By doing so, she eventually reduced the symbolic dimension of the European Parliament’s initiative, and Juncker’s election. She also unquestionably embodied EU leadership. This paper aims at analysing Juncker’s election to the Presidency of the European Commission, as well as other questions it raises. In the first part, I lay out some thoughts about the sociohistorical context of voting in European elections in order to make the readers understand why the European Parliament should be bolder. Secondly, I try to explain how the European Parliament has used the logos as a weapon to grapple with member states for more power, as was the case during the 2014 European elections. Last but not least, I seek to show how Angela Merkel got hold of that weapon and took advantage of it, thus proving that despite MEPs’ best efforts, Juncker’s task will be all the more complicated as he was not the consensual candidate of all the governments.

Influence of nitrogen deficiency on senescence and the amounts of RNA and proteins in wheat leaves

Senescence-associated coordination in amounts of enzymes localized in different cellular compartments were determined in attached leaves of young wheat (Triticum aestivum L. cv. Arina) plants. Senescence was initiated at the time of full leaf elongation based on declines in total RNA and soluble protein. Removal of N from the growth medium just at the time of full leaf elongation enhanced the rate of senescence. Sustained declines in the amount of ribulose-1,5-bisphosphate carboxylase/oxygenase (Rubisco, EC 4.1.1.39), and a marked decrease in the rbcS transcripts, just after full leaf elongation indicated that Rubisco synthesis/degradation was very sensitive to the onset of senescence. Rubisco activase amount also declined during senescence but the proportion of rca transcript relative to the total poly A RNA pool increased 3-fold during senescence. Thus, continued synthesis of activase may be required to maintain functional Rubisco throughout senescence. N stress led to declines in the amount of proteins located in the chloroplast, the peroxisome and the cytosol. Transcripts of the Clp protease subunits also declined in response to N stress, indicating that Clp is not a senescence-specific protease. In contrast to the other proteins, mitochondrial NADH-glutamate dehydrogenase (EC 1.4.1.2) was relatively stable during senescence and was not affected by N stress. During natural senescence with adequate plant nitrate supply the amount of nitrite reductase (EC 1.7.7.1) increased, and those of glutamine synthetase (EC 1.4.7.1) and glutamate synthase (EC 6.3.1.2) were stable. These results indicated that N assimilatory capacity can continue or even increase during senescence if the substrate supply is maintained. Differential stabilities of proteins, even within the same cellular compartment, indicate that proteolytic activity during senescence must be highly regulated.

Phase relationships between orbital forcing and the composition of air trapped in Antarctic ice cores

Orbital tuning is central for ice core chronologies beyond annual layer counting, available back to 60 ka (i.e. thousands of years before 1950) for Greenland ice cores. While several complementary orbital tuning tools have recently been developed using δ¹⁸Oatm, δO₂⁄N₂ and air content with different orbital targets, quantifying their uncertainties remains a challenge. Indeed, the exact processes linking variations of these parameters, measured in the air trapped in ice, to their orbital targets are not yet fully understood. Here, we provide new series of δO₂∕N₂ and δ¹⁸Oatm data encompassing Marine Isotopic Stage (MIS) 5 (between 100 and 160 ka) and the oldest part (340–800 ka) of the East Antarctic EPICA Dome C (EDC) ice core. For the first time, the measurements over MIS 5 allow an inter-comparison of δO₂∕N₂ and δ¹⁸Oatm records from three East Antarctic ice core sites (EDC, Vostok and Dome F). This comparison highlights some site-specific δO₂∕N₂ variations. Such an observation, the evidence of a 100 ka periodicity in the δO₂∕N₂ signal and the difficulty to identify extrema and mid-slopes in δO2∕N2 increase the uncertainty associated with the use of δO₂∕N₂ as an orbital tuning tool, now calculated to be 3–4 ka. When combining records of δ¹⁸Oatm and δO₂∕N₂ from Vostok and EDC, we find a loss of orbital signature for these two parameters during periods of minimum eccentricity (∼ 400 ka, ∼ 720–800 ka). Our data set reveals a time-varying offset between δO₂∕N₂ and δ¹⁸Oatm records over the last 800 ka that we interpret as variations in the lagged response of δ¹⁸Oatm to precession. The largest offsets are identified during Terminations II, MIS 8 and MIS 16, corresponding to periods of destabilization of the Northern polar ice sheets. We therefore suggest that the occurrence of Heinrich–like events influences the response of δ¹⁸Oatm to precession.